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Abstract
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in financial market models
that account for the impact of large transactions on asset prices. In this thesis we
consider an “illiquid market” with a risk-averse investor who has to liquidate a large
portfolio within a finite time horizon [0, T ]. At any point in time, the investor has
the option to trade at a traditional exchange (the “primary venue”) which yields
price impact and to place orders in a so-called dark pool.
The liquidity in dark pools is not openly displayed and dark pools do not con-
tribute to the price formation process. Instead, orders are executed at the price of
the primary venue if matching liquidity is available. Therefore, these orders have no
price impact. However, in contrast to the primary venue, their execution is uncer-
tain. The investor thus faces the trade-off between the direct costs resulting from
the price impact of her orders at the primary venue and the indirect costs resulting
from the execution uncertainty in the dark pool. This thesis considers stochastic
control problems arising in portfolio liquidation problems using dark pools.
At first we consider a discrete-time market model and a cost functional which
incorporates both the expected price impact costs and the market risk of a large
portfolio. For linear temporary price impact, this results in a linear-quadratic cost
functional and we obtain the optimal trading strategy in the form of an explicit
backward recursion. If a single asset position is to be liquidated, the investor trades
a certain proportion of the position at the primary venue, with the remainder being
placed in the dark pool. For multi asset liquidation this is generally not optimal, and
the optimal strategy depends strongly on the correlation of the assets. We generalize
this model for single asset liquidation and analyze adverse selection effects. This
reduces the attractiveness of the dark pool and thus optimal dark pool orders are
smaller; it can even be optimal to not use the dark pool at all.
In the second part of the thesis we consider the counterparts of the described
optimization problems in a continuous-time market model. In continuous time the
liquidation constraint implies a singularity of the value function at the terminal
time T . Via the HJB equation and a quadratic ansatz, we obtain a candidate for
the value function of the linear-quadratic optimization problem without adverse se-
lection. This candidate is the limit of a sequence of solutions of initial value problems
for a matrix differential equation. Although the differential equation is not a Riccati
equation, we are able to show that this limit actually exists by using an appropriate
matrix inequality and a known comparison result for Riccati equations. Addition-
ally, we thereby obtain upper and lower bounds of the solutions of the initial value
problems, which enables us to prove a verification theorem. The complexity of the
optimization problem with adverse selection stems form the non-linear-quadratic
form of the cost functional. Via the HJB equation and extensive heuristic consid-
erations we prove that the value function is a “quasi-polynomial” whose coefficients
depend on the asset position in a non-trivial way.
For single asset liquidation, all optimization problems are solved in closed form
both in discrete and in continuous time. The solutions of the discrete-time opti-
mization problems converge to the solutions of the continuous-time optimization
problems under appropriate conditions.
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Zusammenfassung
In mathematischen Finanzmarktmodellen wird seit einigen Jahren zunehmend der
Einfluss großer Transaktionen auf die Preisbildung von Wertpapieren berücksichtigt.
In dieser Arbeit soll nun ein solcher „illiquider Markt“ betrachtet werden, auf dem ein
risikoaverser Investor ein großes Portfolio bis zu einem festen Zeitpunkt T liquidieren
muss. Der Investor hat dabei zu jedem Zeitpunkt die Möglichkeit, gleichzeitig auf
einem traditionellen Markt (dem „Primärmarkt“) zu handeln, wobei er den Preis
beeinflusst, und Aufträge in einem sogenannten Dark Pool zu erteilen.
Die Liquidität in Dark Pools ist nicht öffentlich bekannt, und diese Märkte neh-
men nicht an der Preisfindung teil. Vielmehr werden Aufträge zum Preis des Pri-
märmarkts abgewickelt, sofern eine Transaktion möglich ist. Deshalb haben diese
Aufträge zwar keinen Preiseinfluss, deren Ausübung ist aber im Gegensatz zum Pri-
märmarkt nicht garantiert. Der Händler muss also zwischen den direkten Kosten,
die durch den Markteinfluss seines Handelns auf dem Primärmarkt und den indi-
rekten Kosten, die durch die Ausübungsunsicherheit seiner Aufträge im Dark Pool
entstehen, abwägen. Ziel der Arbeit ist die Lösung von stochastischen Steuerungs-
problemen, die im Rahmen eines Modells auftreten, das diesen Zielkonflikt möglichst
realistisch darstellt.
Zunächst betrachten wir in einem zeitdiskreten Handelsmodell ein Kostenfunktio-
nal, das sowohl die erwarteten Kosten durch den Preiseinfluss als auch das Marktri-
siko einer großen Position berücksichtigt. Für linearen temporären Preiseinfluss er-
halten wir ein linear-quadratisches Kostenfunktional und können die optimale Han-
delsstrategie in Form einer expliziten Rekursion bestimmen. Liquidiert der Investor
eine Position in einem einzelnen Wertpapier, so baut er sie langsam auf dem Pri-
märmarkt ab und bietet gleichzeitig den Rest im Dark Pool an. Besteht die Position
aus mehreren Wertpapieren, ist dies im Allgemeinen nicht mehr optimal, und die
optimale Strategie hängt stark von der Korrelation der Wertpapiere ab. Für die
Liquidation in einem einzelnen Wertpapier verallgemeinern wir dieses Modell und
untersuchen die Auswirkungen von Adverser Selektion. Diese verringert die Attrak-
tivität des Dark Pools und führt dazu, dass ein kleinerer Teil der Position im Dark
Pool angeboten wird oder dieser gar nicht genutzt wird.
Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit betrachten wir ein zeitstetiges Handelsmodell und in
diesem die Entsprechungen der beiden beschriebenen Optimierungsprobleme. In ste-
tiger Zeit impliziert die Liquidationsbedingung eine Singularität der Wertfunktion
am Endzeitpunkt T . Mittels der HJB Gleichung und eines quadratischen Ansatzes
erhalten wir einen Kandidaten für die Wertfunktion des linear-quadratischen Liqui-
dationsproblems ohne Adverse Selektion. Dieser wird beschrieben durch den Grenz-
wert einer Folge von Lösungen einer Matrix Differentialgleichung. Obwohl diese Dif-
ferentialgleichung keine Riccati Gleichung ist, können wir mit Hilfe einer geeigneten
Matrixungleichung und eines bekannten Vergleichsarguments für Riccati Gleichun-
gen beweisen, dass dieser Grenzwert existiert. Außerdem erhalten wir dadurch obere
und untere Schranken der Lösungen der Anfangswertprobleme, die es uns ermögli-
chen, ein Verifikationsargument durchzuführen. Die Schwierigkeit des Optimierungs-
problems mit Adverser Selektion liegt in der Struktur des Kostenfunktionals. Dieses
ist nicht linear-quadratisch. Mittels der HJB Gleichung und umfangreichen heuristi-
schen Betrachtungen gelingt es uns zu beweisen, dass die Wertfunktion ein quadra-
tisches „Quasi-Polynom“ ist, dessen Koeffizienten in nicht-trivialer Weise von der
Position abhängen.
Liquidiert der Investor eine Position in einem einzelnen Wertpapier, so können
wir sowohl im zeitdiskreten als auch im zeitstetigen Fall sämtliche Optimierungs-
probleme in geschlossener Form lösen. Unter geeigneten Bedingungen konvergieren
die Lösungen der diskreten Optimierungsprobleme gegen die Lösungen der stetigen
Optimierungsprobleme.
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Introduction
In the last years equity trading has been transformed by the advent of so-called dark
pools. These alternative trading venues differ significantly from classical exchanges.
Especially in the US equities market dark pools have gained a significant market share
increasing to about 8%. Although dark pools vary in a number of properties such as
ownership, crossing procedure and accessibility (see Mittal [2008] for further details and a
typology of dark pools), they generally share the following two stylized facts. First, dark
pools are dark. The liquidity available is not quoted, making trade execution uncertain
and unpredictable. Second, dark pools do not determine prices. Instead, they monitor
the prices determined by the classical exchanges and settle trades in the dark pool only
if possible at these prices. Thus, trades in the dark pool have no or less price impact.1
This thesis is concerned with the solution of stochastic optimal control problems in
discrete and continuous time arising in the context of optimal portfolio liquidation if a
large investor has access both to a classical exchange (or “primary venue” or “primary
exchange”) and to a dark pool.2 More precisely, we study a model for optimal liquidation
of a large portfolio consisting of n assets within a finite time horizon [0, T ] reflecting the
trade-off between execution uncertainty of dark pool orders and price impact costs of
trading at the primary venue. To our best knowledge, this is the first mathematical
framework within which optimal trade execution for a large multi asset portfolio using
a classical exchange and a dark pool simultaneously is analyzed.
In Chapter 1 we introduce a discrete-time setting where trading is possible at finitely
many points in time 0 = t1 < · · · < tN = T . In a first step we provide existence
and uniqueness of optimal liquidation strategies for a general form of price impact and
dark pool liquidity by a non-standard convexity argument. In a second step we consider
linear price impact and assume that dark pool orders are executed fully or not at all
in order to obtain further insights into the structure of the optimal strategy and the
value function of the optimization problem. If future price moves are independent of
current dark pool liquidity, the resulting cost functional is of linear-quadratic form and
we derive solutions of the quadratic value function and the linear optimal strategy in the
form of explicit backward recursions for multi asset liquidation (n ∈ N) and in closed
form for single asset liquidation (n = 1). For n = 1, a certain proportion of the position
is liquidated at the exchange while the remainder is placed in the dark pool. This is
1 For empirical evidence for lower transaction costs or price impact of dark pools compared to classical
exchanges see, e.g., Conrad et al. [2003] and Fong et al. [2004].
2 The overall liquidity traded in dark pools in the US is strongly fragmented among approximately 40
different venues, see e.g., Carrie [2008]. Therefore, liquidity aggregation is a major issue. Ganchev
et al. [2010] and Laruelle et al. [2009] establish learning algorithms to achieve optimal order split
between dark pools. Instead of analyzing the simultaneous use of several dark pools, we consider such
an “aggregated” dark pool in our model which we call “the dark pool”.
1
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no longer optimal for n ≥ 2. The optimal orders both in the primary exchange and in
the dark pool depend strongly on the correlation of the assets. In particular, it can be
optimal to place orders in the dark pool that are considerably smaller or larger than the
remainder of the position.
Subsequently, we generalize the linear price impact setting for the case n = 1 in order
to allow for “adverse selection” effects. Under adverse selection, the value function is not
of linear-quadratic form and the optimal strategy is not linear. We derive the structure
of the value function heuristically and solve the optimization problem in closed form.
Adverse selection reduces the attractiveness of the dark pool, and it is no longer optimal
to place the full remainder of the position in the dark pool. It can even be optimal to
not use the dark pool at all. The discrete-time setting of Chapter 1 is based on joint
work with Torsten Schöneborn, see Kratz and Schöneborn [2010].
In Chapters 2 and 3 we consider optimal liquidation with linear price impact with
respectively without adverse selection in continuous time. This gives rise to continuous-
time stochastic optimal control problems with jumps. Due to the liquidation constraint,
the value functions of the problems have singularities at the terminal time T , and hence
the verification arguments require non-standard considerations.
In either case, the dark pool liquidity is modeled by an n-dimensional Poisson process.
In the absence of adverse selection, the cost functional is linear-quadratic. We approx-
imate the liquidation constraint by a sequence of modified optimization problems with
increasing finite end-costs. Via a quadratic ansatz, the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation suggests that the value functions of the modified optimization
problems are quadratic forms for matrix-valued functions which are the solutions of
initial value problems for a specific matrix differential equation. Explicit solutions for
these initial value problems are not known, and the differential equation is not a Riccati
matrix differential equation. We establish a matrix inequality that allows us to apply
a known comparison result for Riccati matrix differential equation in order to obtain
closed form upper and lower bounds for the solutions of the initial value problems. The
bounds are important for several reasons. First, they enable us to prove a verification
theorem for the modified optimization problems with finite end-costs. Second, they im-
ply the existence of the limit of the solution of these optimization problems and thus
yield a well-defined candidate for the value function of the original optimization problem
with liquidation constraint. Third, the limit of the bounds transfers to bounds for this
candidate value function and we deduce a verification theorem for the solution of the
optimal liquidation problem.
In Chapter 3 we analyze adverse selection in a single asset model. The resulting opti-
mization problem is not of linear-quadratic form and the value function is not quadratic.
Via extensive heuristic considerations, we obtain candidates for the value function and
the optimal strategy in closed form. These are a quadratic “quasi-polynomial” respec-
tively a “quasi-affine linear” function with the coefficients depending on the state variable
in a non-trivial way. The candidate for the value function is well-defined and differen-
tiable and we are thus able to prove a verification theorem.
The thesis contributes to two lines of research in economic theory and mathematical
2
finance. A first line takes the liquidity effects as given and derives optimal trading strate-
gies within a stylized market model. Several such models have recently been proposed
for classical exchanges, e.g., Bertsimas and Lo [1998], Almgren and Chriss [2001], Alm-
gren [2003], Obizhaeva and Wang [2006], Schied and Schöneborn [2009], Alfonsi et al.
[2010] and Schied et al. [2010]. None of these models includes the effects of dark pools.
A second line of research focuses on the underlying mechanisms for illiquidity effects
and models the competition between financial markets when assets are traded at differ-
ent markets and one of the markets is a dark pool. Hendershott and Mendelson [2000]
analyze the interaction of dealer markets and a crossing network in a static one period
framework, where each investor buys or sells a single share. Degryse et al. [2009] in-
troduce a dynamic multi-period framework. Our research differs from these models for
several reasons. None of these models captures the effect of price impact of a single large
trader and the possibility of dynamically splitting orders between the primary market
and the dark pool. By contrast, we take the position of a single trader and consider price
moves, dark pool liquidity and price impact as given exogenously. Thus, we are able to
incorporate price impact in a general form and allow for adverse selection. Furthermore,
we consider a multi asset dynamic setting where the correlation between stocks matters
for risk-averse traders.
In continuous time the liquidation constraint yields a singularity of the value function
at the terminal time T , and thus the resulting stochastic control problems require non-
standard considerations. For optimal liquidation without dark pools for CARA investors,
such an optimization problem with singularity at the terminal time T has been studied
by Schied et al. [2010]. In this case the optimal control problem does not include jumps.
For optimal liquidation without adverse selection, the optimization problem is linear-
quadratic. For n = 1 and finite end-costs (hence no singularity of the value function at
time T ), the solution of the control problem is well-known, see, e.g., Øksendal and Hu
[2008]. Naujokat andWestray [2010] and Höschler [2011] have solved the single asset case
with infinite end-costs contemporaneously with our work, however in different contexts.
Naujokat and Westray [2010] use the stochastic maximum principle rather than HJB
equations for the solution. The difficulty in our setting stems form the combination of
the singularity of the value function and the fact that we consider multi-dimensional
portfolios; thus the solution of the optimization problem involves the detailed analysis of
a specific non-Riccati-type matrix differential equation, for which we establish existence
results and upper and lower bounds of the solution by means of a novel matrix inequality.
For optimal liquidation with adverse selection the difficulty originates form the non-
linear-quadratic form of the cost functional. The main contribution is therefore the fact
that we provide the solution in closed form.
Summary of the discrete-time part
In Chapter 1 we introduce a discrete-time market model for a large investor who aims
to liquidate a given portfolio X(t0) ∈ Rn of n possibly correlated assets in finitely many
time steps 0 = t0 < · · · < tN = T . We consider price moves, dark pool liquidity
3
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and price impact as given exogenously. The transaction price P (ti) ∈ Rn at the primary
exchange at time ti can be decomposed into the price impact of the primary venue trades
(xj)j=0,...,i of the large investor and the “fundamental” asset price P˜ (ti) that would have
occurred in the absence of large trades:
P (ti) = P˜ (ti) − fi(x(t0), . . . , x(ti)).
↑ ↑
“Fundamental” Price impact
asset price of investor
We assume that P˜ is a stochastic process with independent increments (ti) ∈ Rn and
that the overall price impact costs of trading∑
i
x(ti)>fi(x(t0), . . . , x(ti))
are strictly convex and grow superlinearly in the strategy (Assumption 1.1.1). Our price
impact model extends, e.g., the models of Almgren and Chriss [2001] and Obizhaeva and
Wang [2006].
The liquidity in the dark pool at time ti is given by random variables a(ti) and
b(ti) ∈ Rn (for the supply respectively the demand) independent of previous dark pool
liquidity and price moves (Assumption 1.1.3). Trades y(ti) in the dark pool are executed
until the liquidity is exhausted and the executed part of the order y(ti) is denoted by
z(ti):
zk(ti) :=
{
min(yk(ti), bk(ti)) if yk(ti) ≥ 0
−min(−yk(ti), ak(ti)) if yk(ti) < 0,
where the subscript k is used for asset k, and positive and negative orders denote sell
respectively buy orders. Notice that in this general setting the dependence of z(ti)
on the order y(ti) is non-linear. While the investor’s trades in the primary exchange
have a feedback effect on the market price, the price in the dark pool is the unaffected
fundamental asset price P˜ . If we replace the transaction price in the dark pool by P ,
market manipulation can become profitable and optimal trading strategies might not
exist (cf. Section 1.5).
At any point in time ti, the risk-averse investor can choose among all adapted strate-
gies (x, y) = (x(ti), . . . , x(tN ), y(ti), . . . , y(tN )) that liquidate the given portfolio X(ti)
(Definition 1.1.4):
N∑
j=i
x(tj) + z(tj) = X(ti).
Her trading objective is to minimize the following cost functional:
E
[
X(ti)>P˜ (ti)−
N∑
j=i
(
x(tj)>P (tj) + z(tj)>P˜ (tj)
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected implementation shortfall
+αE
[ N∑
j=i
X(tj)>Σ(tj+1)X(tj)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk costs
.
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Here, X(tj) is the portfolio position at time tj associated with the strategy (x, y), the
matrix Σ(tj+1) denotes the covariance matrix of the price increments of the n assets and
α ≥ 0 is the risk-aversion parameter of the investor. The criterion penalizes market risk
and hence slow liquidation. In the setting of Almgren and Chriss [2001] for optimal liq-
uidation without dark pools this is equivalent to minimizing a mean-variance functional
over all deterministic strategies, which is in turn equivalent to minimizing the utility of
a CARA investor over all strategies by Schied et al. [2010].
In Section 1.2 we consider the general form of price impact and dark pool liquidity
above and assume additionally that dark pool liquidity is independent across the differ-
ent assets (Assumption 1.2.1). Despite the general form of the model, we are able to
prove that there exists a unique optimal liquidation strategy (Theorem 1.2.2). Due to
the non-linear dependence of the executed fraction z(ti) on the dark pool order y(ti),
proving uniqueness via a convexity argument requires non-standard considerations (The-
orem 1.2.4).
In Section 1.3 we consider a more specific setting in order to obtain further insights
into the structure of the value function of the optimization problem and the optimal
liquidation strategy. We assume that the price impact of the investor is linear and tem-
porary given by a positive definite matrix Λ and that orders in the dark pool are executed
fully or not at all (Assumption 1.3.1 (i) and (iii)). This market impact model goes back
to the work of Almgren and Chriss [2001] that has become the basis of several theoretical
studies, e.g., Rogers and Singh [2010], Almgren and Lorenz [2007], Carlin et al. [2007]
and Schöneborn and Schied [2009]. Additionally, it demonstrated reasonable properties
in real world applications and serves as the basis of many optimal execution algorithms
run by practitioners (see, e.g., Kissell and Glantz [2003], Schack [2004], Abramowitz
[2006] and Leinweber [2007]). We also assume that future price moves in the market are
independent of the current liquidity in the dark pool and that the fundamental asset
price is a martingale (Assumption 1.3.1 (ii) and (iii)). The optimization problem then
simplifies to minimizing the linear-quadratic functional
E
[ N∑
j=i
x(tj)>Λx(tj)
]
+ αE
[
X(tj)>ΣX(tj)
]
. (1)
By backward induction, we derive recursions for the value function and the optimal
strategy and show that these are quadratic respectively linear in the portfolio position
(Theorem 1.3.4). Thus, we are able to analyze the properties of the optimal strategy
in detail. In a single asset setting, a certain proportion of the position is traded at
the primary exchange while at the same time the remainder of the position is being
offered in the dark pool. Compared to optimal liquidation without dark pools, the trad-
ing at the primary exchange is “slower”. We solve this case in closed form and deduce
monotonicity properties for the optimal strategy and the components of the costs of the
optimal strategy. If a multi asset portfolio is to be liquidated, the optimal liquidation
strategy depends strongly on the correlation of the n assets, and it is no longer optimal
to offer the whole remainder of the portfolio in the dark pool. If, e.g., the portfolio is
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balanced and thus only exposed to little market risk, then a complete liquidation of the
position in one of the assets is unfavorable and thus only a fraction of the entire portfo-
lio should be placed in the dark pool. This emphasizes that overly simple adjustments
of existing trading algorithms in order to include dark pools can yield undesirable effects.
While there is no feedback from the dark pool to the price determined at the exchange,
the two venues can be connected since liquidity in the dark pool and price movements
at the primary exchange can be dependent. For example, liquidity on the bid side of the
dark pool might be unusually high exactly when prices move up. We call the phenomenon
that a trader’s order is executed in the dark pool shortly before an impending favorable
price move in the market “adverse selection”.
Adverse selection in dark pools has been a topic both in theoretical and in empirical re-
search. In their equilibrium model, Hendershott and Mendelson [2000] find that adverse
selection occurs endogenously due to information asymmetry in the market. Traders
with less information about future price moves risk to be adversely selected in the dark
pool by well-informed traders. Næs and Ødegaard [2006] analyze transaction costs of
crossing networks empirically and find that potential savings are possibly mitigated by
adverse selection. Using the same data set, Næs and Skjeltorp [2003] find alternative
explanations for these effects and confirm that in spite of possible adverse selection,
transaction costs in crossing networks are lower than in the primary market.
Our general market model allows for the dependence of future price moves on dark
pool liquidity, and we can thus incorporate and analyze adverse selection in Section 1.4.
To this end, we generalize the linear price impact setting of Section 1.3 for the case of
single asset liquidation and model adverse selection by assuming that
E[(ti+1)|a(ti) =∞] =: −Γ < 0, E[(ti+1)|b(ti) =∞] =: Γ > 0
(Assumption 1.4.4). The resulting cost functional is then given by
E
[ N∑
j=i
(
Λx(tj)2 + pΓ|y(tj)|
)]
+ αE
[
ΣX(tj)2
]
, (2)
where p is the probability of dark pool execution. This can be interpreted as “linear”
costs for dark pool orders. Because of the terms pΓ|y(tj)|, this is not a linear-quadratic
functional, and we cannot expect the value function to be quadratic. We derive the
structure of the value function from extensive heuristic considerations and obtain ex-
plicit recursions for the optimal strategy and the value function. The value function
is piecewise a quadratic polynomial, and the optimal strategy is piecewise affine linear
in the asset position (Theorem 1.4.4). We also establish closed form solutions for the
value function and the optimal strategy (Corollary 1.4.10) and analyze their properties
(Section 1.4.5). Adverse selection lowers the attractiveness of the dark pool relative to
the primary exchange and changes the structure of the optimal strategy and the value
function significantly. It is no longer optimal to place the entire remainder of the posi-
tion in the dark pool. For small positions, it can even be optimal to not use the dark
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Summary of the continuous-time part
In Chapters 2 and 3 we transfer the discrete-time trading model with linear price impact
of Chapter 1 into a continuous-time trading model. Instead of placing orders x(ti)
(i = 0, . . . , N) in the traditional exchange, the investor can control her trading intensity
ξ(s) (s ∈ [0, T )). We model trade execution of orders η(s) in the dark pool by n
independent Poisson processes pi1, . . . , pin with intensities θ1, . . . , θn ≥ 0.
Given a point in time t ∈ [0, T ), a portfolio position x ∈ Rn at time t and a trading
strategy u = (ξ, η), the corresponding portfolio position Xu(s) at time s ∈ [t, T ) is hence
given by the solution of the following stochastic differential equation:
dXu(s) = −ξ(s)ds− η(s)dpi(s)
Xu(t) = x,
where pi = (pi1, . . . , pin)>.
All admissible liquidation strategies must satisfy the liquidation constraint
lim
s→T−
Xu(s) = 0 (3)
(Definition 2.1.1). Therefore, the value functions v of the optimization problems we
consider have singularities at the terminal time T :
lim
s→T−
v(s, x) =∞ for x 6= 0,
and hence solving the optimization problems with and without adverse selection requires
non-standard considerations.
Portfolio liquidation without adverse selection
In Chapter 2 we define the costs of the strategy u in analogy to Equation (1) by the
linear-quadratic functional
E
[ T∫
t
(
ξ(s)>Λξ(s) + αXu(s)>ΣXu(s)
)
ds
]
.
The investor aims to minimize these costs among all strategies that fulfill suitable mea-
surability and integrability conditions and the Liquidation Constraint (3).
Because of the singularity of the value function at the terminal time T , we approximate
the optimal liquidation problem by a sequence of modified optimization problems with
increasing end-costs
g(l,Xu(T )) := l ·Xu(T )>Xu(T ) for l→∞.
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For fixed l > 0, a quadratic ansatz yields a candidate w for the solution of the corre-
sponding HJB equation. It turns out that w takes the form
w(l, t, x) = x>C(l, t)x for t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rn, (4)
where the matrix-valued function C(l, ·) is the solution of the matrix initial value problem
C ′ = C>Λ−1C + C>C˜C − αΣ
C(T ) = lI
(5)
for
C˜ = diag
( θi
ci,i
)
(Corollary 2.1.6). In particular, the terminal condition w(t, x, T ) = g(l, x) is satisfied.
Because of the non-linear term C>C˜C, this is not an initial value problem for a Riccati
matrix differentiable equation if n ≥ 2. For n = 1,
C>C˜C = θC,
and (5) is an initial value problem for a scalar Riccati differential equation with constant
coefficients. The solution for such a problem is well-known in closed form and the limit
for l → ∞ exists and can easily be given in closed form. This yields a candidate for
the value function of the original optimization problem with liquidation constraint. The
fact that all objects are given in closed form reduces the complexity of the optimization
problem significantly and yields a much simpler verification argument.
For n ≥ 2, we first have to prove that the Initial Value Problem (5) admits a solution
on the whole interval [0, T ]. To this end, we establish the matrix inequalities
0 ≤ CC˜C ≤
n∑
i=1
θiC for C positive definite
(Theorem 2.2.4 and Corollary 2.2.5). These inequalities enables us to prove existence
of the solution of (5) via a well-known comparison theorem for Riccati matrix differ-
ential equations and at the same time to obtain explicit upper and lower bounds for
this solution (Theorem 2.2.8). The bounds are key. They allow us to prove that w
as in Equation (4) is indeed the value function of the optimization problem with finite
end-costs (Section 2.3). Furthermore, they yield an existence result for the limit of the
solutions of these optimization problems as l → ∞ and thus a candidate for the value
function of the optimal liquidation problem (Proposition 2.4.3). Finally, the limits of
the bounds are limits for this candidate value function (Theorem 2.4.4), which enables
us to prove a verification theorem for the optimal liquidation problem (Theorem 2.4.10).
We analyze the properties of the optimal strategy and the value function in Section 2.5.
For n = 1, all objects can be derived in closed form and we can prove monotonicity
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properties that resemble the properties of the discrete-time setting. It is an interesting
feature that the risk costs are decreasing in the intensity of the Poisson process θ, while
they are increasing in the probability of execution p for small p in the corresponding
discrete-time setting. This effect disappears if we let the number of trading times N + 1
tend to infinity.
At last, we prove that the solution of the single asset discrete-time optimization prob-
lem (with constant step-size) converges to the solution of the continuous-time optimiza-
tion problem as the number of trading times tends to infinity in Section 2.6. We give
heuristic arguments that suggest that an according convergence result also holds for
general n.
Single asset liquidation with adverse selection
In Chapter 3 we consider adverse selection in continuous time and analyze the single
asset liquidation problem corresponding to the discrete-time Cost Functional (2). In
analogy to (2) the costs of a continuous-time trading strategy u = (ξ, η) are given by
E
[ T∫
t
(
Λξ(s)2 + pΓ|η(s)|+ αΣXu(s)2)ds].
Again, these costs are to be minimized among all strategies that satisfy the Liquidation
Constraint (3) and the value function has a singularity at the terminal time T . This
time the optimization problem is not linear-quadratic, and hence the value function is
not quadratic. This complicates the analysis significantly.
The key is to find a suitable candidate for the value function, which we can no longer
expect to be of linear-quadratic form. Instead, the results of the corresponding discrete-
time optimization problem suggest that the value function is a quadratic polynomial for
small and for large asset positions. For intermediate positions we have to “interpolate”
these polynomials. In order to obtain this “interpolation procedure”, we make the ansatz
that a candidate w for the value function must have the form
w(t, x) = C¯1(t, x)x2 + C¯2(t, x)|x|+ C¯3(t, x),
with C¯1(t, ·), C¯2(t, ·) and C¯3(t, ·) constant in x for |x| smaller respectively larger than
appropriate time-dependent thresholds. The main step for the derivation of the “coeffi-
cients” C¯1, C¯2 and C¯3 is the educated guess that
x2
∂C¯1
∂x
(t, x) + |x|∂C¯2
∂x
(t, x) + ∂C¯3
∂x
(t, x) = 0 (6)
(Equation (3.7)). Under the assumption that (6) holds and after a slight change of no-
tation, the HJB equation yields scalar initial value problems for the coefficients (Equa-
tions (3.17) - (3.20)). These are initial value problems for a scalar Riccati differential
equation with constant coefficients respectively for linear differential equations and can
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be solved in closed form. Hence, we obtain a candidate w for the value function in closed
form (Equations (3.21) - (3.23)).
We analyze w in detail in Section 3.3. We show in Corollary 3.3.5 that w is well-
defined. Subsequently, we prove differentiability of w on [0, T ) × R and compute the
partial derivatives (Theorem 3.3.6). The main step in the proof of Theorem 3.3.6 is to
verify that the Assumption (6) is indeed true (Lemma 3.3.9). The proofs use rather
elementary methods but are cumbersome and tedious.
The analysis of the candidate value function w enables us to show that it fulfills the
corresponding HJB equation with singularity at the terminal time T (Theorem 3.3.11).
The unique maximizer for the HJB equation provides a candidate for the optimal liqui-
dation strategy. Both the trading intensity in the primary venue and the orders in the
dark pool are affine linear for small and for large asset positions. For intermediate asset
positions they are given by “interpolations” of these affine linear functions.
In spite of the singularity at the terminal time T , the fact that the candidate value
function is given in closed form allows us to finally prove the desired verification theorem
(Theorem 3.4.4). Because of the singularity, this involves taking the limit s→ T−, and
hence requires preliminary considerations (cf., e.g., Lemma 3.4.5).
Subsequently, we analyze the properties of the optimal liquidation strategy and the
value function in Section 3.5. Again, these resemble the properties of the respective
objects of the corresponding discrete-time setting.
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1. Optimal liquidation in discrete time
This chapter considers a discrete-time market model for liquidating a portfolio simul-
taneously at the primary exchange and in a dark pool. We introduce the model in
Section 1.1. It is flexible enough to allow for a very general form of the price impact
of the large investor and the liquidity in the dark pool. The objective of the investor is
to minimize a cost functional which accounts for both the price impact costs of trading
and for risk costs originating from the market risk of the portfolio. This gives rise to
a stochastic control problem, which we subsequently solve for different specifications of
the model.
In Section 1.2 we make only minor additional assumptions. We assume that the liq-
uidities of the n assets in the dark pool are independent and that the underlying prob-
ability space is finite. Despite the general structure, we are able to prove existence and
uniqueness of the optimal trading strategy, where uniqueness follows from an extensive
non-standard convexity argument.
In order to derive additional properties of the optimal strategy, we consider a more
specific model in Section 1.3; we assume the price impact to be linear and temporary
and that dark pool orders are executed fully or not at all. The resulting cost functional
is of linear-quadratic form, and we are able to derive an explicit backward recursion for
the quadratic value function and the linear optimal strategy for multi asset liquidation
and closed form solutions for single asset liquidation.
In Section 1.4 we generalize this setting for single asset liquidation by introducing
adverse selection. The cost functional is not linear-quadratic and thus the structure of
the value function and the optimal strategy are significantly more complicated. We are
still able to solve the optimal control problem and derive closed form solutions for the
value function and the optimal strategy via extensive heuristic considerations.
We close the chapter by considering a different execution price for orders in the dark
pool in Section 1.5. If the price in the dark pool includes the market impact generated
in the primary venue, market manipulation strategies can become possible and optimal
strategies might not exist. Both effects can be avoided by adapting the parameters
carefully, e.g., by assuming that dark pool liquidity is bounded and that adverse selection
is sufficiently strong.
1.1. Model description
The market we consider consists of n risky assets. Time is discrete and trades can be
executed at the (not necessarily equidistant) time points
0 = t0 < · · · < tN = T.
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For example, the distance can be taken in volume time to adjust for the U-shaped
intraday pattern of market volatility and liquidity.
At each time point the large investor as well as a number of noise traders execute
orders. We denote the orders of the investor at time ti at the primary venue by
x(ti) = (x1(ti), . . . , xn(ti))> ∈ Rn
and in the dark pool by
y(ti) = (y1(ti), . . . , yn(ti))> ∈ Rn.
Positive entries denote sell orders and negative entries denote buy orders.
Uncertainty and the evolution of information in the market is described by a stochastic
basis
(Ω,F ,F = (Fti)i=0,...,N , F˜ = (F˜ti)i=0,...,N ,P)
with two filtrations F, F˜, where F˜ti ⊆ Fti . The larger filtration F reflects the full
information in the market, whereas F˜ reflects the partial information available to the
investor. We give a more precise specification of the two filtrations later.
In the following Sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 we describe the different effects of the orders
x(ti) and y(ti). The execution of the order x(ti) at the primary venue is guaranteed but
has an adverse effect on the market price. The execution of the order y(ti) in the dark
pool is uncertain but has no price impact (irrespective of whether it is executed or not).
In Section 1.1.3 we define the trading objective of the investor and specify the set of
admissible strategies.
1.1.1. Transaction price and impact of primary venue orders
We assume that the transaction price P (ti) ∈ Rn at the exchange at time ti can be
decomposed into the price impact of the primary venue trades (x(tj))j=0,...,i of the large
trader and the “fundamental” asset price P˜ (ti) ∈ Rn that would have occurred in the
absence of large trades. We model the fundamental asset price P˜ (ti) as a stochastic
process with independent increments (ti) ∈ Rn adapted to F˜:
P˜ (ti+1) = P˜ (ti) + (ti+1).
We do not make assumptions on the distributions of the (ti). In particular, they can
have different distributions. The random price changes (ti) reflect the noise traders’
actions as well as all external events, e.g., news.
We allow a general form of the impact of the trades x(t0), . . . , x(ti) on the transaction
price P (ti):
P (ti) = P˜ (ti) − fi(x(t0), . . . , x(ti)),
↑ ↑
“Fundamental” Price impact
asset price of seller
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where fi : Rn×(i+1) → Rn. By allowing fi to depend on x(ti), we allow the order x(ti) to
influence its own execution price (in the form of a temporary price impact). We define
the price impact costs of trading as
N∑
i=0
x(ti)>fi(x(t0), . . . , x(ti)).
Assumption 1.1.1. The price impacts fulfill the following two conditions.
(i)
N∑
i=0
x(ti)>fi(x(t0), . . . , x(ti)) is strictly convex in (x(t0), . . . , x(tN )).
(ii)
N∑
i=0
x(ti)>fi(x(t0), . . . , x(ti)) grows superlinearly, i.e.,
lim
‖(x(t0),...,x(tN ))‖→∞
N∑
i=0
x(ti)>fi(x(t0), . . . , x(ti))
‖(x(t0), . . . , x(tN ))‖ =∞.
This framework generalizes many of the existing market impact models of liquidity.
Examples 1.1.2. (i) The model suggested by Almgren and Chriss [2001] is equivalent
to assuming that the (ti) are identically normally distributed and
fi(x(t0), . . . , x(ti)) = TempImp(x(ti)) +
i−1∑
j=0
PermImp(x(tj)).
Here, PermImp,TempImp : Rn → Rn are functions describing the permanent and
temporary market impact of a trade. If these functions are linear, we have
fi(x(t0), . . . , x(ti)) = Λix(ti) +
i−1∑
j=0
Γi,jx(tj)
for matrices Λi,Γi,j ∈ Rn×n (i = 0, . . . , N , j = 0, . . . , i−1). In terms of the matrix
Λ˜ :=

Λ0 12Γ>1,0 . . .
1
2Γ>N,0
1
2Γ1,0
. . . . . . ...
... . . . . . . 12Γ>N,N−1
1
2ΓN,0 . . .
1
2ΓN,N−1 ΛN

we get
N∑
i=0
x(ti)>fi(x(t0), . . . , x(ti)) = x˜>Λ˜x˜
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for x˜ = (x(t0), . . . , x(tN ))> ∈ Rn(N+1). Thus, Assumption 1.1.1 is fulfilled if the
Λi are symmetric and Λ˜ is positive definite.
(ii) The limit order book model introduced by Obizhaeva and Wang [2006] is included in
our model as a single asset example if we again assume that the (ti) are identically
normally distributed and that the price impact is given by
fi(x(t0), . . . , x(ti)) = γ
( i−1∑
j=0
x(tj) +
x(ti)
2
)
+ λ
( i−1∑
j=0
e−ρ(ti−tj)x(tj) +
x(ti)
2
)
for constants γ ≥ 0, λ > 0 and ρ > 0. It is elementary but somewhat tedious to
show that Assumption 1.1.1 (i) is satisfied. We omit this proof here.
1.1.2. Trade execution in the dark pool
Contrary to the primary venue, the dark pool does not guarantee trade execution since
it only provides limited liquidity. We introduce the Fti+1-measurable random variables
a(ti), b(ti) ∈ [0,∞]n
that model the liquidity which can be drawn upon in the time-interval [ti, ti+1) for buy
(ask side) and sell (bid side) orders, respectively. The dark pool liquidity is in general
unknown to the investor and therefore in general not F˜ti+1-measurable.
Assumption 1.1.3. The dark pool liquidity fulfills the following three conditions.
(i) For i = 0, . . . , N , a(ti) and b(ti) are independent of previous liquidity in the dark
pool a(t0), . . . , a(ti−1), b(t0), . . . , b(ti−1) and of previous price moves (t1), . . . , (ti).
(ii) For i = 0, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . , n,
P[ak(ti) = 0] > 0, P[bk(ti) = 0] > 0.
(iii) For all i = 0, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . , n, p > q ≥ 0 with
P[ak(ti) = p],P[ak(ti) = q] > 0 respectively P[bk(ti) = p],P[bk(ti) = q] > 0,
we have
0 ≥ E[k(ti+1)|ak(ti) = q] ≥ E[k(ti+1)|ak(ti) = p], (1.1)
0 ≤ E[k(ti+1)|bk(ti) = q] ≤ E[k(ti+1)|bk(ti) = p]. (1.2)
Assumption 1.1.3 allows for a dependence of the liquidity parameters a(ti) and b(ti)
and the price move (ti+1). This enables us to incorporate the simultaneous occurrence
of price jumps and liquidity in the dark pool which can lead to adverse selection (see
Section 1.4). Assumption 1.1.3 (iii) is needed in order to ensure uniqueness of the
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optimal strategy. Economically, it means that price moves in the market are monotone
with respect to dark pool liquidity, i.e., the stronger the demand in the dark pool, the
stronger the price at the exchange is expected to move upwards, and the stronger the
supply in the dark pool, the stronger the price is expected to move downwards. In other
words: a large amount of liquidity in the dark pool could be a sign for an impending
favorable price move. The case of strict inequality in Inequalities (1.1) or (1.2) for some
p > q ≥ 0 can lead to adverse selection and is studied in detail in Section 1.4.
The amount
z(ti) = (z1(ti), . . . , zn(ti))> ∈ Rn
which is executed in the dark pool between time ti and ti+1 is given by
zk(ti) =
{
min(yk(ti), bk(ti)) if yk(ti) ≥ 0
−min(−yk(ti), ak(ti)) if yk(ti) < 0,
where yk(ti) is the order in the dark pool for the kth asset at time ti. In contrast to
the dark pool liquidity (a(ti), b(ti)), which is general not known to the investor at the
end of the trading period [ti, ti+1), z(ti) is known to the investor at time ti+1, and we
assume that it is F˜ti+1-measurable. Having introduced all random objects, we can hence
interpret the two filtrations as follows. For i = 0, . . . , N ,
Fti = σ
(
(tj), a(tj−1), b(tj−1); j ≤ i
)
,
F˜ti = σ
(
(tj), z(tj−1); j ≤ i
)
.
Mathematically, this distinction does not play a role by Assumption 1.1.3 (i).
While the dark pool has no impact on prices at the primary exchange, it is less clear
to which extent the price impact fi of the exchange is reflected in the transaction price
of the dark pool. If, for example, the price impact fi is realized predominantly in the
form of a widening spread, then the impact on dark pools that monitor the mid quote
can be much smaller than fi. In Sections 1.2 - 1.4 we make the simplifying assumption
that trades in the dark pool are not influenced by the price impact fi at all, i.e., that
they are executed at the fundamental price P˜ (ti). If trading in the dark pool reflects
the price impact fi, then market manipulating strategies can become profitable. We
investigate this phenomenon in Section 1.5.
1.1.3. Liquidation problem
For fixed i = 0, . . . , N , we consider an investor who has executed trades
x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1) ∈ Rn
at times t0, . . . , ti−1 and needs to liquidate a portfolio
X(ti) = (X1(ti), . . . , Xn(ti))> ∈ Rn
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of risky assets within a finite time-horizon [ti, T ]. For Xk(ti) > 0, this implies liquidating
a long position in asset k (selling), whereasXk(ti) < 0 implies liquidating a short position
in asset k (buying). In both cases, we speak of “liquidation” or “sale”. We require that
at all times tj ≥ ti the investor’s orders x(tj) and y(tj) are adapted to F˜tj and therefore
only depend on past price-moves (t1), . . . , (tj) and executed orders z(t0), . . . , z(tj−1).
This includes deterministic (also called static) strategies, which do not depend on any
of the quantities (tl) or z(tl).
Definition 1.1.4. Let i = 0, . . . , N and X(ti) ∈ Rn be the portfolio position at time ti.
We call a sequence of F˜-adapted orders
(x, y) = (x(tj), y(tj))j=i,...,N
an admissible liquidation strategy if it fulfills the following conditions.
(i)
N∑
j=i
(
x(tj) + z(tj)
)
= X(ti) a.s.
(ii) For j = i, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . , n,
P
[− ak(tj) ≤ yk(tj) ≤ bk(tj)] > 0.
We denote the set of admissible liquidation strategies by A(ti, X(ti)).
Let us shortly comment on Definition 1.1.4. We recursively define for j ≥ i+ 1,
X(tj+1) := X(tj)− x(tj)− z(tj). (1.3)
By abuse of notation, the liquidation constraint in (i) is then equivalent to
X(tN+1) = 0 a.s.
By Assumption 1.1.3 (ii), all admissible liquidation strategies must satisfy
x(tN ) = X(tN ), y(tN ) = z(tN ) = 0 a.s.
Definition 1.1.4 (ii) is required in order to ensure uniqueness of the optimal strategy.
Note that we assume implicitly that the essential maxima of ak(tj) and bk(tj) are known
to the investor. Due to order submission fees, it is natural in practice to assume that
an investor only submits orders that have a positive probability of complete execution;
orders not satisfying Definition 1.1.4 (ii) cannot generate additional value (compared to
strategies that do satisfy Definition 1.1.4 (ii)).
The following definition is based on Perold [1988] and serves as the investor’s perfor-
mance measure.
16
1.1. Model description
Definition 1.1.5. For i = 0, . . . , N , past trades x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1) ∈ Rn, portfolio posi-
tion X(ti) ∈ Rn at time ti and an admissible liquidation strategy (x, y) ∈ A(ti, X(ti)),
the implementation shortfall is given by
R(ti) := R(ti, x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti); (x, y))
:= X(ti)>P˜ (ti)−
N∑
j=i
(
x(tj)>P (tj) + z(tj)>P˜ (tj)
)
=
N∑
j=i
(
x(tj)>
(
P˜ (ti)− P˜ (tj) + fj(x(t0), . . . , x(tj))
)
+ z(tj)>(P˜ (ti)− P˜ (tj))
)
.
The trade-off between expected proceeds and risk is an important driver of optimal
liquidation and has been the focus of several investigations including Almgren and Chriss
[2001], Almgren and Lorenz [2007], Schied and Schöneborn [2009] and Schied et al.
[2010]. Here, we assume that the investor wants to minimize the following function of
execution costs:
J(ti, x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti); (x, y))
:= E
[
R(ti, x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti); (x, y))
]
+ αE
[ N∑
j=i
X(tj)>Σ(tj+1)X(tj)
]
,
where α ≥ 0 is the coefficient of risk-aversion and Σ(tj) is the covariance matrix of the
increments k(tj). The risk costs
α
N∑
j=i
X(tj)>Σ(tj+1)X(tj)
reflect the market risk of the portfolio and thus penalize slow execution and poorly
diversified portfolios. In the setting of Almgren and Chriss [2001] for optimal liquidation
without dark pools, this is equivalent to minimizing the mean-variance functional
E
[R(ti)]+ αVar [R(ti)]
over all deterministic strategies. Schied et al. [2010] show that this in turn is equivalent
to maximizing the utility of investors with constant absolute risk-aversion. The value
function of the optimization problem is thus given by
v(ti, x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti))
:= inf
(x,y)∈A(ti,X(ti))
J(ti, x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti); (x, y)). (OPTgendis )
We call an admissible liquidation strategy (x, y) ∈ A(ti, X(ti)) optimal if it realizes the
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minimum in Equation (OPTgendis )and denote optimal strategies by
(x∗, y∗)
in the remainder of the chapter. The amount executed in the dark pool in [ti, ti+1)
associated with the optimal order y∗(ti) is denoted by
z∗(ti).
1.2. Optimal liquidation
In this section we state sufficient conditions for the Optimization Problem (OPTgendis ) to
admit a unique solution. To this end, we require the following additional assumptions.
Assumption 1.2.1. (i) The space Ω is finite and P[ω] > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
(ii) For i = 0, . . . , N − 1,
(a1(ti), b1(ti)), . . . , (an(ti), bn(ti))
are independent.
The results of this section extend to infinite state space and possibly dependent dark
pool liquidities of the n assets if the price increments , the liquidity variables (a, b) and
the price impact functions fi satisfy suitable conditions (cf. Sections 1.3 and 1.4). The
additional assumptions enable us to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 1.2.2. Let i = 0, . . . , N − 1, x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1) ∈ Rn be the previous trades
of the investor and X(ti) ∈ Rn be the portfolio position at time ti. Assume that the
processes , a and b and the functions fj fulfill the assumptions of Section 1.1 and
Assumption 1.2.1.
Then there exists a unique optimal strategy (x∗, y∗) ∈ A(ti, X(ti)) realizing the mini-
mum in Equation (OPTgendis ).
The remainder of the section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1.2.2. In Section 1.2.1
we prove existence of optimal liquidation strategies (Proposition 1.2.3). In Section 1.2.2
we show that the function
Hi(x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti))
:= v(ti, x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti)) +
i−1∑
j=0
x(tj)>fj(x(t0), . . . , x(tj)) (1.4)
is strictly convex in (x(t0), . . . , x(ti), X(ti)), from which we deduce uniqueness of the
optimal strategy (Theorem 1.2.4).
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1.2.1. Existence of optimal trading strategies
We first prove existence of optimal trading strategies. We only require (i) of the addi-
tional Assumption 1.2.1 for the proof. Assumption 1.2.1 (ii) is only needed for the proof
of uniqueness in Section 1.2.2.
Proposition 1.2.3. Let i = 0, . . . , N − 1, x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1) ∈ Rn be the previous trades
of the investors and X(ti) ∈ Rn be the portfolio position at time ti. Assume that the
processes , a and b and the functions fj fulfill the assumptions of Section 1.1 and
Assumption 1.2.1 (i).
Then there exists an optimal strategy (x∗, y∗) ∈ A(ti, X(ti)) realizing the minimum in
Equation (OPTgendis ).
Proof. Instead of describing a strategy (x, y) ∈ A(ti, X(ti)) as a stochastic process, we
can alternatively describe it as a vector. Let therefore
Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωM}.
By abuse of notation, we write
w =
(
x(ti, ω1), . . . , x(ti, ωM ), x(ti+1, ω1), . . . , x(ti+1, ωM ), . . . , x(tN , ω1), . . . , x(tN , ωM )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:wx
,
y(ti, ω1), . . . , y(tN , ωM )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:wy
)> ∈ Rn×2×M×(N+1−i).
The objective function
C(w) := J(ti, x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti);w)
is continuous in the strategy w ∈ Rn×2×M×(N+1−i), and the set of admissible strategies
corresponds to a closed subset of Rn×2×M×(N+1−i). We show that
lim
‖w‖→∞
C(w) =∞, (1.5)
where ‖ · ‖ is the maximum norm on Rn×2×M×(N+1−i). This allows us to restrict w to
a bounded set, and so the existence of an optimal strategy follows from continuity of C.
It is sufficient to prove Equation (1.5) for α = 0, for which we obtain
C(w) = E
[ N∑
j=i
x(tj)>fj(x(t0), . . . , x(tj))
]
+ E
[ N∑
j=i
x(tj)>(P˜ (ti)− P˜ (tj))
]
+ E
[ N∑
j=i
z(tj)>(P˜ (ti)− P˜ (tj))
]
=: C1(w) + C2(w) + C3(w).
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Note that C2 and C3 are not necessarily bounded from below and that C1(w) > 0 for
‖wx‖ large enough. Therefore, we have to show that C1 grows faster in w than |C2| and
|C3|.
It follows from Assumption 1.1.1 (ii) that
lim
‖wx‖→∞
C1(w)
‖wx‖ =∞. (1.6)
Since Ω is finite, the price process P˜ is bounded, and thus there exists a constant C˜ such
that for all wx 6= 0,
|C2(w)|
‖wx‖ ≤
1
‖wx‖
N∑
j=i
E
[|x(tj)>(P˜ (ti)− P˜ (tj))|]
≤ C˜‖wx‖
N∑
j=i
M∑
l=1
n∑
k=1
|xk(tj , ωl)|P[ωl]
≤ C˜ · n · (N + 1− i). (1.7)
If the liquidity in the dark pool is bounded for all assets, then ‖wy‖ and |C3(w)| are
bounded and thus
lim
‖w‖→∞
|C3(w)|
‖w‖ = 0.
If not, we obtain similarly as before for wy 6= 0 (recall that |z| ≤ |y|),
|C3(w)|
‖wy‖ ≤ C˜ · n · (N + 1− i). (1.8)
Finally, a large order in the dark pool at a given point in time requires large orders in
the primary venue with positive probability since by Definition 1.1.4 (ii), full execution
of the dark pool order is possible, while on the other hand future dark pool orders have
positive probability of non-execution (cf. Assumption 1.1.3 (ii)). Thus, there exists a
constant C such that
lim
‖wy‖→∞
‖wx‖
‖wy‖ > C. (1.9)
Equation (1.5) now follows directly from (1.6), (1.7), (1.8) and (1.9).
1.2.2. Uniqueness of the optimal trading strategy
In order to prove uniqueness of the optimal strategy, we require strict convexity of the
function Hi as in Equation (1.4). In Sections 1.3 and 1.4 we consider more specific
distributions of the random variables a(ti) and b(ti) and obtain a (pathwise) linear
dependence of z(ti) on y(ti). In that case, using dynamic programming, strict convexity
of Hi follows by a standard backward induction (cf., e.g., the proof of Theorem 1.4.2).
In general, the dependence of z(ti) on y(ti) is non-linear. Therefore, we require non-
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standard arguments to prove convexity, and this proof is divided into several steps.
Theorem 1.2.4. Let i = 0, . . . , N − 1, x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1) ∈ Rn be the previous trades
of the investor and X(ti) ∈ Rn be the portfolio position at time ti. Assume that the
processes , a and b and the functions fj fulfill the assumptions of Section 1.1 and
Assumption 1.2.1. Then:
(i) The function Hi as in Equation (1.4) is strictly convex in (x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti))>
∈ Rn×(i+1).
(ii) The optimal trading strategy (x∗, y∗) ∈ A(ti, X(ti)) realizing the minimum in Equa-
tion (OPTgendis ) is unique.
Proof. We proceed by backward induction on i. For i = N , the validity of the theorem
follows since the only admissible strategy is x(tN ) = X(tN ), y(tN ) = 0 due to Assump-
tion 1.1.3 (ii), and the convexity of HN defined by Equation (1.4) follows directly from
the convexity of the price impact cost of trading (Assumption 1.1.1 (i)) as
HN (x(t0), . . . , x(tN−1), X(tN ))=X(tN )>fN (x(t0), . . . , x(tN ))+αX(tN )>Σ(tN+1)X(tN )
+
N−1∑
j=0
x(tj)>fj(x(t0), . . . , x(tj)).
For the induction step we consider two points
(x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti)) and (x˜(t0), . . . , x˜(ti−1), X˜(ti)).
For these points, optimal orders
(x(ti), y(ti)) := (x∗(ti), y∗(ti)) respectively (x˜(ti), y˜(ti)) := (x˜∗(ti), y˜∗(ti))
exist by Proposition 1.2.3. We define continuous functions
x(tj , ·), y(tj , ·), X(ti, ·) : [0, 1] −→ Rn, 0 ≤ j ≤ i,
such that
x(tj , 0) = x(tj), y(tj , 0) = y(tj), X(ti, 0) = X(ti),
x(tj , 1) = x˜(tj), y(tj , 1) = y˜(tj), X(ti, 1) = X˜(ti), 0 ≤ j ≤ i.
Then by the dynamic programming principle,
v(ti, x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti−1, s), X(ti, s))
≤ x(ti, s)>fi(x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s)) + αX(ti, s)>Σ(ti+1)X(ti, s)
+ (X(ti, s)− x(ti, s))>E[P˜ (ti)− P˜ (ti+1)]− E[z(ti, s)>(P˜ (ti)− P˜ (ti+1))]
+ E[v(ti+1, x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s), X(ti, s)− x(ti, s)− z(ti, s))] (1.10)
=: hi(s),
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where Inequality (1.10) is an equality for s = 0 and s = 1. We now assume that the
theorem holds for i+ 1 and divide the proof of the induction step into three parts.
(i) Let
h˜i(s) := hi(s) +
i−1∑
j=0
x(tj , s)>fj(x(t0, s), . . . , x(tj , s)).
We show that if h˜i is strictly convex, then Hi is strictly convex and the optimal
strategy at time ti is unique.
(ii) We define the functions x(tj , ·), y(tj , ·), X(ti, ·) in such a way that x(tj , ·),E[z(tj , ·)]
and X(ti, ·) are affine linear; here, we use the shorthand notation z(ti, s) :=
z(ti, y(ti, s)). This is needed to carry out step (iii).
(iii) We show that if Hi+1 is strictly convex (induction hypothesis!),
(x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti), x(ti), y(ti)) 6= (x˜(t0), . . . , x˜(ti−1), X˜(ti), x˜(ti), y˜(ti))
and x(tj , ·), y(tj , ·), X(ti, ·) are defined as in (ii), then h˜i is strictly convex in s on
[0, 1]. Hence by (i), Hi is strictly convex.
The natural order of the three steps is (ii), (iii), (i). We start by proving (i) in order to
motivate the necessity of the steps (ii) and (iii). The second part is the key step in the
proof; the proof of the third part is rather extensive.
(i) Let
(x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti)) 6= (x˜(t0), . . . , x˜(ti−1), X˜(ti))
and s ∈ (0, 1). Then
Hi((1− s)x(t0) + sx˜(t0), . . . , (1− s)x(ti−1) + sx˜(ti−1), (1− s)X(ti) + sX˜(ti))
(1.10)
≤ h˜(s)
= h˜i((1− s) · 0 + s · 1)
< (1− s)h˜i(0) + sh˜i(1)
= (1− s)Hi(x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti))+sHi(x˜(t0), . . . , x˜(ti−1), X˜(ti)),
where the last equation follows from the fact that we have equality in Inequal-
ity (1.10) for s = 0 and s = 1. Thus, Hi is strictly convex.
For the uniqueness of the optimal strategy, let
(x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti)) = (x˜(t0), . . . , x˜(ti−1), X˜(ti)).
If
(x∗(ti), y∗(ti)) = (x(ti), y(ti)) 6= (x˜∗(ti), y˜∗(ti)) = (x˜(ti), y˜(ti)), (1.11)
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then h˜i(s) is strictly convex. On the other hand we have (cf. Inequality (1.10))
h˜i(0) = h˜i(1) ≤ h˜i(s) for all s ∈ (0, 1),
thus h˜i cannot be strictly convex, and (1.11) yields a contradiction.
(ii) We define the functions x(tj , ·) and X(ti, ·) by the convex combinations
x(tj , s) := (1− s)x(tj) + sx˜(tj) for all 0 ≤ j ≤ i, 0 ≤ s ≤ 1,
X(ti, s) := (1− s)X(ti) + sX˜(ti) for all 0 ≤ s ≤ 1.
Note that if we define y(ti, s) accordingly, the linearity of y(ti, ·) neither carries
over to z(ti, s) nor to E[z(ti, s)]. The key step in the proof is to define y(ti, s) in
such a way that
s 7→ E[z(ti, s)]
is affine linear. We set y(ti, s) such that
E[z(ti, s)] = (1− s)E[z(ti)] + sE[z˜(ti)].
To this end, we define the function
g(y) := E[z(y)].
It is injective by Definition 1.1.4 (ii) and continuous. We define
y(ti, s) := g−1
(
(1− s)E[z(ti)] + sE[z˜(ti)]
)
,
in particular y(ti, 0) = y∗(ti), y(ti, 1) = y˜∗(ti) and y(ti, ·) is continuous on [0, 1].
Note that y(ti, ·) is piecewise affine linear but not affine linear in general; also,
E[z(ti, ·)] is affine linear but pathwise z(ti, ·) is not affine linear.
(iii) If z(ti, ·) was pathwise affine linear on the whole interval [0, 1], then strict convexity
of Hi+1 would directly transfer to strict convexity of h˜i via Inequality (1.10). As
we only have linearity of E[z(ti, ·)], the argumentation becomes rather tedious and
extensive.
The only points where convexity of h˜i can break down are the points sj at which
the slope changes for yk(ti, ·) for some k = 1, . . . , n (cf. Figure 1.1).
We denote the finitely many points at which there is a coordinate k such that
P[−yk(ti, sj) = ak(ti)] > 0 or P[yk(ti, sj) = bk(ti)] > 0 (1.12)
by 0 < s1 < · · · < sM ′ < 1. We can assume without loss of generality that at
each sj there is exactly one coordinate kj such that (1.12) holds. In the case
that there are multiple such k′s, an arbitrary small perturbation of a(ti) and b(ti)
removes multiplicity, and a simple approximation argument using the fact that
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Figure 1.1.: If P[yk(ti, sj) = bk(ti)] > 0 for an order yk(ti, sj) > 0, then the slope of yk(ti, ·)
can change at sj , and zk(ti, ·) is not pathwise affine linear.
z(ti) is continuous in a(ti) and b(ti) extends the desired result to full generality.
On (sj , sj+1), the strict convexity of h˜i is clear since the map
s 7→ (x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s), z(ti, s), X(ti, s)) (1.13)
is pathwise affine linear (note that yk(ti, ·) is affine linear on (sj , sj+1)), and thus
h˜i is strictly convex by the strict convexity of Hi+1 via Equation (1.10).
Let therefore j = 1, . . . ,M ′ and k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
P
[{yk(ti, sj) = −ak(ti)} ∪ {yk(ti, sj) = bk(ti)}] > 0.
We first consider the case
yk(ti, sj) > 0, i.e., P
[
yk(ti, sj) = bk(ti)
]
> 0.
Then yk(ti, s) > 0 for all s ∈ (sj−1, sj+1) by Assumption 1.1.3 (ii). We assume
without loss of generality that yk(ti, sj−1) < yk(ti, sj+1) (the proof for the case
yk(ti, sj−1) = yk(ti, sj+1) is straightforward) and define
A := {yk(ti, sj) ≤ bk(ti)} ⊆ Ω.
Let
z¯k(ti, s) :=
{
E
[
zk(ti, s)|A
]
on A
zk(ti, s) otherwise.
(1.14)
z¯l(ti, s) := zl(ti, s) for l 6= k.
Note that for l 6= k, zl(ti, s) is pathwise affine linear on the whole interval
(sj−1, sj+1). On Ω \ A, zk(ti, s) is independent of s ∈ (sj−1, sj+1). On A, we
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Figure 1.2.: Orders yk(ti, s) and associated trades zk(ti, s) on the interval (sj−1, sj+1).
The thin solid line represents the orders yk(ti, s). Note that the slope of yk(ti, s) is larger
for s > sj than for s < sj . The dotted lines represent the trades zk(ti, s) on A1 and A2,
respectively. The affine linear function z¯(ti, s) defined in Equation (1.14) is represented by
the dashed line.
have
E
[
zk(ti, s)|A
]
= 1
P(A)
(
E[zk(ti, s)]− E[1Ω\Azk(ti, s)]
)
.
E[zk(ti, s)] is affine linear by construction and E[1Ω\Azk(ti, s)] is independent of s.
Therefore, z¯(ti, ·) is pathwise affine linear on the whole interval (sj−1, sj+1). We
obtain that
i−1∑
j=0
x(tj , s)>fj(x(t0, s), . . . , x(tj , s)) + h¯i(s), (1.15)
where
h¯i(s) := x(ti, s)>fi(x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s)) + αX(ti, s)>Σ(ti+1)X(ti, s)
+ (X(ti, s)− x(ti, s))>E[P˜ (ti)− P˜ (ti+1)]− E[z¯(ti, s)>(P˜ (ti)− P˜ (ti+1))]
+ E[v(ti+1, x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s), X(ti, s)− x(ti, s)− z¯(ti, s))]
is strictly convex in s on (sj−1, sj+1) as before by the strict convexity of Hi+1. It
is clear that h¯i(s) = hi(s) for s ≤ sj . If
h¯i(s) ≤ hi(s) for all s ∈ (sj−1, sj+1),
convexity of h˜i follows at the point sj .
To this end, we observe that for s > sj ,
hi(s)− h¯i(s) = E
[
1A(zk(ti, s)− z¯k(ti, s))k(ti+1)
]
+ E
[
1Av(ti+1, x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s), X(ti, s)− x(ti, s)− z(ti, s))
]
− E[1Av(ti+1, x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s), X(ti, s)− x(ti, s)− z¯(ti, s))]
=: C1 + C2 − C3.
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By Assumption 1.2.1 (ii), z1(ti, s), . . . , zk−1(ti, s), zk+1(ti, s), . . . , zn(ti, s) are inde-
pendent of A, and thus (using Assumption 1.2.1 (ii) again) z1(ti, s), . . . , zn(ti, s)
are independent with respect to the probability distribution P[·|A]. We denote
the distribution of z and zk with respect to P[·|A] by Pz|A respectively Pzk|A. By
induction hypothesis,
v(ti+1, x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s), ·)
is strictly convex, and thus by Jensen’s inequality, the definition of z¯k on A and
the independence of z1(ti, s), . . . , zn(ti, s) with respect to P[·|A], we have
C2 = E
[
1Av
(
ti+1, x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s), X(ti, s)− x(ti, s)− z(ti, s)
)]
= P[A]E
[
v
(
ti+1, x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s), X(ti, s)− x(ti, s)− z(ti, s)
)|A]
= P[A]
∫
v
(
ti+1, x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s), X(ti, s)− x(ti, s)− a
)
Pz|A(da)
= P[A]
∫
· · ·
∫
v
(
ti+1, x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s), X1(ti, s)− x1(ti, s)− a1,
. . . , Xn(ti, s)− xn(ti, s)− an
)
Pz1|A(da1) · · ·Pzn|A(dan)
= P[A]
∫
· · ·
∫
E
[
v
(
ti+1, x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s), (X1(ti, s)− x1(ti, s)− a1,
. . . , Xk(ti, s)− xk(ti, s)− zk(ti, s), . . . , Xn(ti, s)− xn(ti, s)− an)
)|A]
Pz1|A(da1) · · ·Pzk−1|A(dak−1)Pzk+1|A(dak+1) · · ·Pzn|A(dan)
≥ P[A]
∫
· · ·
∫
v
(
ti+1, x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s), (X1(ti, s)− x1(ti, s)− a1,
. . . , Xk(ti, s)− xk(ti, s)− E[zk(ti, s)|A], . . . , Xn(ti, s)− xn(ti, s)− an)
)
Pz1|A(da1) · · ·Pzk−1|A(dak−1)Pzk+1|A(dak+1) · · ·Pzn|A(dan)
= P[A]E[v
(
ti+1, x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s), X(ti, s)− x(ti, s)− z¯(ti, s)
)|A]
= E
[
1Av
(
ti+1, x(t0, s), . . . , x(ti, s), X(ti, s)− x(ti, s)− z¯(ti, s)
)]
= C3.
Note that the above argument fails if the additional Assumption 1.2.1 (ii) is not
satisfied.
The last step is to show that C1 ≥ 0. We let m1 be the slope of yk(ti, s) for s < sj
and m2 be the slope of yk(ti, s) for s > sj . Note that 0 < m1 < m2. For s ≤ sj , we
have yk(ti, s) = z¯k(ti, s) on A. Thus as z¯k(ti, ·) is affine linear, z¯k(ti, ·) has slope
m1 on the whole interval (sj−1, sj+1) (cf. Figure 1.2).
Let now s > sj . For
A1 := {yk(ti, sj) = b(ti)}, A2 := {yk(ti, sj) < b(ti)},
we have on A = A1∪˙A2,
z¯k(ti, s) > zk(ti, s) on A1, z¯k(ti, s) < zk(ti, s) on A2.
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More precisely,
zk(ti, s)− z¯k(ti, s) = −m1(s− sj) on A1, (1.16)
zk(ti, s)− z¯k(ti, s) = (m2 −m1)(s− sj) on A2. (1.17)
Note that
yk(ti, sj) +m1(s− sj)
= E[zk(ti, s)|A]
= 1
P[A]
(
E[1A1zk(ti, s)] + E[1A2zk(ti, s)]
)
= 1
P[A]
(
P[A1]yk(ti, sj) + P[A2]yk(ti, s)
)
= 1
P[A]
(
(P[A]− P[A2])yk(ti, sj) + P[A2](yk(ti, sj) +m2(s− sj))
)
. (1.18)
Equation (1.18) is equivalent to
P[A1] =
m2 −m1
m2
P[A],
P[A2] =
m1
m2
P[A].
Therefore, we have
C1 = E
[
1A(zk(ti, s)− z¯k(ti, s))k(ti+1)
]
= E
[
1A1(zk(ti, s)− z¯k(ti, s))k(ti+1)
]
+ E
[
1A2(zk(ti, s)− z¯k(ti, s))k(ti+1)
]
(1.17),(1.16)= −P[A1]m1(s− sj)E
[
k(ti+1)|A1
]
+ P[A2](m2 −m1)(s− sj)E
[
k(ti+1)|A2
]
= −m1(m2 −m1)
m2
P[A](s− sj)E
[
k(ti+1)|bk(ti) = yk(ti, sj)
]
+ m1(m2 −m1)
m2
P[A](s− sj)E
[
k(ti+1)|bk(ti) > yk(ti, sj)
]
≥ 0, (1.19)
where Inequality (1.19) follows from Assumption 1.1.3 (iii).
The cases
y(ti, sj) < 0 and y(ti, sj) = 0
follow similarly with straightforward modifications. Combining these observations,
we have strict convexity of h˜i at all points sj and on all intervals (sj , sj+1), i.e., on
the whole interval [0, 1], completing the proof of (iii).
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1.3. Linear price impact
In the previous section we established an existence and uniqueness result for a general
market model. In order to obtain additional insight into the structure of the optimal
liquidation strategy we now consider the case of linear temporary price impact, which
can be solved in explicit form. In Section 1.3.1 we specify the model in terms of its price
impact functions fi, the fundamental price process P˜ and the liquidity in the dark pool
a(t0), b(t0), ..., a(tN ), b(tN ). In Section 1.3.2 the value function v and the optimal orders
x∗(ti), y∗(ti) at times ti are proven to be of quadratic respectively linear form and shown
to satisfy a backward recursion. In Sections 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 we study the effects of dark
pools for liquidation of a single asset position and a two asset portfolio, respectively.
1.3.1. Model description
We do not require Assumption 1.2.1 in this section. The probability space Ω can be
infinite, and we allow for dependencies between the dark pool liquidities of the n assets.
We therefore do not make use of the findings of Section 1.2.
We specify the impact costs, the distributions of the fundamental asset price P˜ and
the dark pool liquidity (a, b) in the following way.
Assumption 1.3.1. (i) For i = 0, . . . , N ,
fi(x(ti)) := fi(x(t0), . . . , x(ti)) := Λx(ti)
for a positive definite matrix Λ ∈ Rn×n.
(ii) P˜ is an F-martingale and
Σ(ti) = Σ(tj) =: Σ for all i, j = 0, . . . , N.
(iii) For i = 0, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . , n,
ak(ti), bk(ti) ∈ {0,∞},(
(a(ti), b(ti))
)
i=0,...,N is identically distributed and (a(ti), b(ti)) is independent of
(ti+1).
(iv) For i = 0, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . , n,
P
[
ak(ti) =∞|a1(ti), . . . , ak−1(ti), ak+1(ti), . . . , an(ti),
b1(ti), . . . , bk−1(ti), bk+1(ti), . . . , bn(ti)
]
= P
[
bk(ti) =∞|a1(ti), . . . , ak−1(ti), ak+1(ti), . . . , an(ti),
b1(ti), . . . , bk−1(ti), bk+1(ti), . . . , bn(ti)
]
.
Assumption 1.3.1 (i) implies convexity and superlinear growth of the price impact
costs, so that Assumption 1.1.1 is satisfied. We call the matrix Λ the price impact
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matrix and say that the price impact is linear and temporary since the function fi only
depends on the trade x(ti) at time ti and not on past trades x(t0), ..., x(ti−1). As a
direct consequence of Assumption 1.3.1 (i), v(ti, x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti)) is independent
of x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1). The martingale property (Assumption 1.3.1 (ii)), the independence
of future price moves of dark pool liquidity (Assumption 1.3.1 (iii)) and the liquidation
constraint (Definition 1.1.4 (i)) imply
E
[ N∑
j=i
(x(tj) + z(tj))>
(
P˜ (ti)− P˜ (tj)
)]
= 0.
Combining the above observations, the Optimization Problem (OPTgendis ) becomes
v(ti, X(ti)) := v(ti, x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti))
= inf
(x,y)∈A(ti,X(ti))
{
E
[ N∑
j=i
x(tj)>Λx(tj)
]
+ αE
[ N∑
j=i
X(tj)>ΣX(tj)
]}
. (OPTdis)
The first part of Assumption 1.3.1 (iii) means that dark pool orders are executed fully or
not at all (e.g., in the sense of so-called “fill or kill” orders). The symmetry condition (iv)
for dark pool liquidity is required for tractability of the model as we demonstrate in the
following remark.
Remark 1.3.2. Let us illustrate Assumption 1.3.1 (iv) for n = 1. Assumption 1.3.1 (iii)
and (iv) imply for i = 0, . . . , N ,
p := P
[
a(ti) =∞
]
= P
[
b(ti) =∞
]
(1.20)
for some p ∈ [0, 1) independent of i. In order to compute the value function of the
Optimization Problem (OPTdis), we can proceed by backward induction using the corre-
sponding Bellman equation (cf. the proof of Theorem 1.3.4 below)
v(ti, X(ti)) = inf
(x,y)∈R×R
{
Λx2 + αΣX(ti)2 + E
[
v(ti+1, X(ti)− x− z)
]}
(1.20)= inf
(x,y)∈R×R
{
Λx2 + αΣX(ti)2 + pv(ti+1, X(ti)− x− y)
+ (1− p)v(ti+1, X(ti)− x)
}
(1.21)
=: inf
(x,y)∈R×R
v˜(x, y).
Strict convexity of v(ti, ·) now carries over to strict convexity of v˜. If v(ti+1, ·) is known
explicitly (and of sufficiently simple form), computing v(ti, X(ti)) becomes a standard
minimization problem.
If we drop Assumption 1.3.1 (iv), the situation becomes uncomfortable. We obtain
p1 := P
[
a(ti) =∞, b(ti) =∞
]
, p2 := P
[
a(ti) =∞, b(ti) = 0
]
,
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p3 := P
[
a(ti) = 0, b(ti) =∞
]
, p4 := P
[
a(ti) = 0, b(ti) = 0
]
= 1− p1 − p2 − p3
for some p1, p2, p3, p4 ∈ [0, 1) instead of Equation (1.20) and thus
v(ti, X(ti)) = inf
(x,y)∈R×R
{
Λx2 + αΣX(ti)2
+ 1{y≥0}
(
(p1 + p3)v(ti+1, X(ti)− x− y) + (p2 + p4)v(ti+1, X(ti)− x)
)
+ 1{y<0}
(
(p1 + p2)v(ti+1, X(ti)− x− y) + (p3 + p4)v(ti+1, X(ti)− x)
)}
=: inf
(x,y)∈R×R
v˜(x, y)
instead of Equation (1.21). The resulting optimization problem is thus significantly more
complicated. Additionally, it can be shown that strict convexity of v(ti+1, ·) does not
transfer to strict convexity of v˜ for n ≥ 2 in general. We omit the execution here.
Before we solve the Optimization Problem (OPTdis), we need to introduce the fol-
lowing notation. In each time-interval [ti, ti+1) there are 2n possible “combinations” or
“scenarios” with respect to joint execution and non-execution of the order y(ti) ∈ Rn in
the dark pool (note that due to Assumption 1.3.1 (iv), we can assume that execution
of an order yk(ti) is “independent” of the sign of yk(ti)). Each of these scenarios occurs
with a fixed probability, which we denote by pl for the lth scenario, determined by the
distributions of the random variables a(ti) and b(ti). We denote the amount executed
in the dark pool at time i in scenario l by z(l, ti), i.e.,
zk(l, ti) :=

yk(ti) if in the lth scenario the order in the kth asset
in the dark pool is executed
0 otherwise.
There exists a diagonal matrix Zl ∈ Rn×n (with 1’s and 0’s on the diagonal) such that
z(l, ti) = Zly(ti).
We define the diagonal matrix Pˆ = (pˆk,m)k,m=1,...,n by
Pˆ :=
∑
l
plZl, (1.22)
i.e., pˆk,k is the probability that an order for the kth asset is executed in the dark pool in
[ti, ti+1). We re-order the assets in such a way that for k0 ∈ {0, . . . , n},
pˆk,k = 0 if and only if k > k0,
i.e., k0 = 0 refers to the case where the dark pool is not used at all and k0 = n to the
case where there is liquidity with positive probability for all assets in the dark pool.
Finally, we introduce the following notation.
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Notation 1.3.3. For a positive definite matrix M ∈ Rn×n, we define
Mˇ = (mˇi,j)i,j=1,...,n :=
∑
l
plZlMZl.
For independent liquidity of the n assets in the dark pool, i.e., if Assumption 1.2.1 (ii)
holds, Mˇ becomes significantly simpler:
mˇi,j =
{
mi,j pˆi,i if i = j
mi,j pˆi,ipˆj,j if i 6= j.
Note that both Mˇ = (mˇk,m)k,m=1,...,n and Pˆ are positive definite for k0 = n but not for
k0 < n. In the latter case, mˇk,m = 0 for k > k0 or m > k0 and pˆk,k = 0 for k > k0.
However, the matrices Mˇ ′ := (mˇk,m)k,m=1,...,k0 ∈ Rk0×k0 and Pˆ ′ := (pˆk,m)k,m=1,...,k0 ∈
Rk0×k0 are positive definite. We therefore use generalized inverses of matrices. We denote
the Moore-Penrose Inverse of a matrix M by M †. For regular M , we have M−1 = M †
(see, e.g., the book by Ben-Israel and Greville [2003]).
1.3.2. Optimal liquidation
We are now able to solve the Optimization Problem (OPTdis). It turns out that the value
function v(ti, ·) is quadratic and that the optimal orders x∗(ti) placed at the primary
venue and y∗(ti) placed in the dark pool are linear functions of the portfolio X(ti) at
any time ti.
Theorem 1.3.4. Let i = 0, . . . , N and assume that X(ti) ∈ Rn is the portfolio position
at time ti. Then there exists a unique optimal strategy (x∗, y∗) ∈ A(ti, X(ti)) realizing
the minimum in Equation (OPTdis).
Moreover, there exist matrices A(ti), B(ti), C(ti) ∈ Rn×n independent of X(ti) such
that the optimal strategy fulfills
x∗(ti) = A(ti)X(ti),
y∗(ti) = B(ti)X(ti),
and the value function is given by
v(ti, X(ti)) = X(ti)>C(ti)X(ti)
with positive definite C(ti). A(ti), B(ti) and C(ti) are given recursively by A(tN ) = I,
B(tN ) = 0, C(tN ) = Λ + αΣ and
A(ti) =
(
Λ +D(ti+1)
)†
D(ti+1), (1.23)
B(ti) = Cˇ(ti+1)†PˆC(ti+1)
(
I −A(ti)
)
, (1.24)
C(ti) = αΣ +D(ti+1)−D(ti+1)
(
Λ +D(ti+1)
)†
D(ti+1), (1.25)
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where
D(ti+1) := C(ti+1)− C(ti+1)Pˆ Cˇ(ti+1)†PˆC(ti+1). (1.26)
Proof. We prove the theorem by backward induction. Note that C(tN ) = Λ + αΣ is
positive definite as Λ is positive definite, Σ (as a covariance matrix) is nonnegative
definite and α ≥ 0. Therefore all assertions follow for i = N .
Let now i < N . Due to the linearity of the price impact function, the martingale
property and the independence of dark pool liquidity of future price moves, we obtain
the Bellman equation
v(ti, X(ti)) = inf
(x,y)∈Rn×Rn
yk=0, k>k0
{
x>Λx+ α ·X(ti)>ΣX(ti)
+
∑
l
plv(ti+1, X(ti)− x− Zly)
}
; (1.27)
recall that the optimal strategy must fulfill yk(ti) = 0 for k > k0 almost surely by
Assumption 1.1.4 (ii). By abuse of notation, y denotes simultaneously y ∈ Rk0 and
y ∈ Rn with yk = 0 for k > k0, where either way is clear from the context. Using the
induction hypothesis, Equation (1.27) becomes
v(ti, X(ti))
= inf
(x,y)∈Rn×Rn
yk=0, k>k0
{
x>Λx+ αX(ti)>ΣX(ti)
+
∑
l
pl(X(ti)− x− Zly)>C(ti+1)(X(ti)− x− Zly)
}
.
The function v˜(ti, X(ti), ·) : Rn ×Rk0 −→ R given by
v˜(ti, X(ti), x, y) := x>Λx+ α ·X(ti)>ΣX(ti)
+
∑
l
pl(X(ti)− x− Zly)>C(ti+1)(X(ti)− x− Zly)
is a strictly convex linear-quadratic functional as C(ti+1) is positive definite by the
induction hypothesis and Λ is positive definite. Therefore, the unique minimum (x∗, y∗)
of v˜(ti, X(ti), ·) is given by the solution of
∇xv˜(ti, X(ti), x, y) = 0,
∇yv˜(ti, X(ti), x, y) = 0.
(1.28)
The System (1.28) is equivalent to(
Λ + C(ti+1)
)
x+ C(ti+1)Pˆ y = C(ti+1)X(ti),
PˆC(ti+1)x+ Cˇ(ti+1)y = PˆC(ti+1)X(ti),
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which in turn is equivalent to
PˆC(ti+1)x+ Cˇ(ti+1)y = PˆC(ti+1)X(ti),
(Λ +D(ti+1))x = D(ti+1)X(ti).
(1.29)
Solving System (1.29) for (x, y), yields Equations (1.23) and (1.24). Plugging this into
v˜(ti, X(ti), ·), we obtain
v(ti, X(ti))
= (A(ti)X(ti))>Λ(A(ti)X(ti)) + α ·X(ti)>ΣX(ti)
+
∑
l
(
pl(X(ti)−A(ti)X(ti)− ZlB(ti)X(ti))>
C(ti+1)(X(ti)−A(ti)X(ti)− ZlB(ti)X(ti))
)
= X(ti)>
(
A(ti)>ΛA(ti) + αΣ
+
∑
l
pl(I −A(ti)− ZlB(ti))>C(ti+1)(I −A(ti)− ZlB(ti))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:C(ti)
)
X(ti).
By the induction hypothesis, C(ti) is nonnegative definite. To see that C(ti) is indeed
positive definite, let x ∈ Rn, xk 6= 0. If A(ti)x 6= 0, then
x>A(ti)>ΛA(ti)x > 0.
In any case, there exists an l such that the kth diagonal element of Zl is 0 and pl > 0
(cf. Assumption 1.1.3 (ii)). If A(ti)x = 0, then y := (I −A(ti)− ZlB(ti))x 6= 0 and
plx
>(I −A(ti)− ZlB(ti))>C(ti+1)(I −A(ti)− ZlB(ti))x = ply>C(ti+1)y > 0
by the induction hypothesis. We now set
E(ti+1) := C(ti+1)Pˆ Cˇ(ti+1)†PˆC(ti+1) = C(ti+1)−D(ti+1).
Note that Cˇ(ti+1) and thus D(ti+1) and E(ti+1) are symmetric due to the symmetry of
C(ti+1). Furthermore,
C(ti) = A(ti)>ΛA(ti) + αΣ + C(ti+1)− C(ti+1)A(ti)−A(ti)>C(ti+1)
− C(ti+1)PˆB(ti)−B(ti)>PˆC(ti+1) +A(ti)>C(ti+1)A(ti)
+B(ti)>Cˇi+1B(ti) +A(ti)>C(ti+1)PˆB(ti) +B(ti)>PˆC(ti+1)A(ti)
= A(ti)>ΛA(ti) + αΣ + C(ti+1)− C(ti+1)A(ti)−A(ti)>C(ti+1)− E(ti+1)
+A(ti)>C(ti+1)A(ti) + E(ti+1)A(ti) +A(ti)>E(ti+1)−A(ti)>E(ti+1)A(ti)
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= A(ti)>ΛA(ti) + αΣ +D(ti+1)−D(ti+1)A(ti)−A(ti)>D(ti+1)
+A(ti)>D(ti+1)A(ti)
= αΣ +D(ti+1)−D(ti+1)
(
Λ +D(ti+1)
)†
D(ti+1)
as required.
1.3.3. Liquidating a single asset position
The most transparent case to analyze is the liquidation of a position X(t0) in a single
asset (n = 1), for which we derive a closed form solution. Some of the most interesting
effects of using dark pools can be observed in this case, and we therefore study it in
more depth in this section.
Let
p := P[a(ti) =∞] = P[b(ti) =∞]
be the probability of order execution in the dark pool. For a given p ∈ [0, 1), we denote
the matrices (now real numbers) A(ti), B(ti) and C(ti) introduced in Theorem 1.3.4 by
A(ti, p), B(ti, p) and C(ti, p) in order to highlight their dependence on p.
For the remainder of the section, we let
X(t0) > 0.
The results are symmetric in the sign of X(t0) and can be easily transfered to negative
initial asset positions X(t0).
Closed form solutions for the value function and the optimal strategy
The following proposition gives closed form solutions for the optimal strategy and the
value function. This result is a generalization of the corresponding result in Almgren
and Chriss [2001] for optimal liquidation without dark pools (p = 0).
Proposition 1.3.5. Let
κ(p) := arcosh
(√1− p
2
(αΣ
Λ + 1 +
1
1− p
))
. (1.30)
Then the optimal orders at time ti are given by
x∗(ti) = A(ti, p)X(ti) and y∗(ti) = B(ti, p)X(ti)
with
A(ti, p) = 1− sinh(κ(p)(N − i))√1− p sinh(κ(p)(N + 1− i)) , (1.31)
B(ti, p) = 1−A(ti, p) = sinh(κ(p)(N − i))√1− p sinh(κ(p)(N + 1− i)) < 1. (1.32)
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In particular,
0 < x∗(ti), y∗(ti) < X(ti) and x∗(ti) + y∗(ti) = X(ti)
for i 6= N . The value function is given by
v(ti, X(ti)) = C(ti, p)X(ti)2
with
C(ti, p) =
Λ
1− p
(√1− p sinh(κ(p)(N + 2− i))
sinh(κ(p)(N + 1− i)) − 1
)
. (1.33)
Proof. Note first that for i < N , we have Cˇ(ti+1, p) = pC(ti+1, p) and D(ti+1, p) =
(1− p)C(ti+1, p). Thus by Equations (1.23), (1.24) and (1.25),
A(ti, p) =
(1− p)C(ti+1, p)
(1− p)C(ti+1, p) + Λ , B(ti, p) =
Λ
(1− p)C(ti+1, p) + Λ (1.34)
and
C(ti, p) =
αΣΛ + (1− p)C(ti+1, p)(Λ + αΣ)
Λ + (1− p)C(ti+1, p) . (1.35)
We therefore define
uk := C(tN−k, p) > 0, k = 0, . . . , N
and obtain the following recursion:
u0 = Λ + αΣ,
uk+1 =
αΣΛ + (1− p)uk(Λ + αΣ)
Λ + (1− p)uk .
This recursion can be solved as follows. We set
wk :=
√
1− p
Λ
(
uk +
Λ
1− p
)
.
Since κ(p) is well-defined and strictly positive as
√
1− p
2
(αΣ
Λ + 1 +
1
1− p
)
≥ 12
(√
1− p+ 1√1− p
)
> 1,
we obtain the following modified recursion:
w0 =
√
1− p
Λ
(
Λ + αΣ + Λ1− p
)
= 2 cosh(κ(p)),
wk+1 =
√
1− p
Λ
( Λ
1− p + uk+1
)
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=
√
1− p
Λ
( Λ
1− p +
αΣΛ + (1− p)(Λ + αΣ)( Λ√1−pwk − Λ1−p)
Λ + (1− p)( Λ√1−pwk − Λ1−p)
)
= 2 cosh(κ(p))− 1
wk
.
This well-known type of recursion (see, e.g., Perron [1954], §12) can be solved explicitly:
if
a := κ(p), b := (k + 2)κ(p)
and
wk =
sinh
(
(k + 2)κ(p)
)
sinh
(
(k + 1)κ(p)
) ,
then
w0 =
sinh
(
2κ(p)
)
sinh
(
κ(p)
) = 2 cosh (κ(p))
and
wk+1 +
1
wk
=sinh(b+ a)sinh(b) +
sinh(b− a)
sinh(b)
= exp(b+ a)− exp(−b− a) + exp(b− a)− exp(a− b)exp(b)− exp(−b)
= 2 cosh(a)
as desired. Equation (1.33) follows directly.
Equations (1.31) and (1.32) follow easily by plugging Equation (1.33) into (1.34).
Finally, B(ti, p) < 1 follows directly from Equation (1.34) and the fact that C(ti+1, p) >
0.
We can also express X(ti), x∗(ti) and y∗(ti) as functions of X(t0).
Corollary 1.3.6. Let i = 0, . . . , N and assume that no dark pool order has been executed
until time ti. We recursively define
Xne(t0, p) := X(t0), Xne(tj , p) := Xne(tj−1, p)− x∗(tj−1).
Then
X(ti) = Xne(ti, p) =
1√
1− pi
sinh(κ(p)(N + 1− i))
sinh(κ(p)(N + 1)) X(t0), (1.36)
and the optimal orders at time ti are given by
xne(ti, p) := x∗(ti)
= A(ti, p)X(ti)
= 1√
1− pi+1
√
1− p sinh(κ(p)(N + 1− i))− sinh(κ(p)(N − i))
sinh(κ(p)(N + 1)) X(t0), (1.37)
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yne(ti, p) := y∗(ti)
= B(ti, p)X(ti)
= Xne(ti, p)− x∗(ti, p)
= 1√
1− pi+1
sinh(κ(p)(N − i))
sinh(κ(p)(N + 1))X(t0). (1.38)
If a dark pool order has been executed before time ti, then X(ti) = x∗(ti) = y∗(ti) = 0.
Proof. We prove Equation (1.36) by forward induction. Equations (1.37) and (1.38)
then follow as
xne(ti, p) = Xne(ti, p)−Xne(ti+1, p) and
yne(ti, p) = Xne(ti, p)− xne(ti, p)
by Proposition 1.3.5.
The case i = 0 is clear. For i > 0, we use the induction hypothesis and Equation (1.31)
and obtain
Xne(ti+1, p) = Xne(ti, p)−A(ti, p)Xne(ti, p)
= sinh(κ(p)(N + 1− i))√
1− pi sinh(κ(p)(N + 1))
X(t0)
−
(
1− sinh(κ(p)(N − i))√1− p sinh(κ(p)(N + 1− i))
) sinh(κ(p)(N + 1− i))√
1− pi sinh(κ(p)(N + 1))
X(t0)
= sinh(κ(p)(N − i))√
1− pi+1 sinh(κ(p)(N + 1))
X(t0)
as required.
Properties of the optimal strategy
Proposition 1.3.5 answers the question of how to use a dark pool optimally for n = 1. It
is always optimal to place the largest possible order in the dark pool as we do not pay
price impact there. Consequently, the liquidation task is finished as soon as the dark
pool order is executed by Assumption 1.3.1 (iii).
Using the dark pool also changes optimal trading in the primary exchange. Intuitively,
the trader should slow down the trading speed in the primary venue as she wants as much
as possible to be executed in the dark pool. If the position is not yet executed towards
the end, she has to speed up in order to finish the liquidation until time T .
The first part of the following proposition confirms this intuition. The second part
states that the expected asset positions for trading with dark pool are smaller than
without dark pool, although trading at the primary exchange is slower.
Proposition 1.3.7. Let i = 1, ..., N − 1.
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(i) Xne(ti, p) is strictly increasing in p. In particular
Xne(ti, p) > Xne(ti, 0) for all p > 0.
(ii) Let Ep[X(ti)] be the expected asset position at time ti if the probability of execution
in the dark pool is p and the optimal strategy is applied:
Ep
[
X(ti)
]
= (1− p)iXne(ti, p) =
√
1− pi sinh(κ(p)(N + 1− i))
sinh(κ(p)(N + 1)) X(t0). (1.39)
Then Ep[X(ti)] is strictly decreasing in p, in particular
Ep
[
X(ti)
]
< E0
[
X(ti)
]
for all p > 0.
We require the following lemma for the proof of Proposition 1.3.7. Assertion and proof
of the lemma are elementary. However, the first part of the lemma plays an important
role not only in the proof of Proposition 1.3.7 but also later in the proofs of Proposi-
tion 1.3.9, where we prove monotonicity results for the cost components of the optimal
strategy and of Proposition 2.5.1, where we prove the corresponding properties for the
optimal strategy and the value function in the continuous-time setting of Chapter 2.
Lemma 1.3.8. (i) Let 0 < a < b, x > 0. Then
0 > d
dx
sinh(ax)
sinh(bx) > (a− b)
sinh(ax)
sinh(bx) . (1.40)
(ii) Let p ∈ (0, 1). Then
κ′(p) = (1− p)
−3/2
4Λ sinh(κ(p))
(
pΛ− (1− p)αΣ), (1.41)
in particular
κ′(p) < 0 on
(
0, αΣ
αΣ + Λ
)
and κ′(p) > 0 on
( αΣ
αΣ + Λ , 1
)
. (1.42)
Furthermore,
|κ′(p)| ≤ 12(1− p) . (1.43)
Proof. (i) Note first that
d
dx
sinh(ax)
sinh(bx) =
a cosh(ax) sinh(bx)− b cosh(bx) sinh(ax)
sinh2(bx)
(1.44)
= sinh(ax)sinh(bx)
(
a
cosh(ax)
sinh(ax) − b
cosh(bx)
sinh(bx)
)
(1.45)
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and
d
dx
(
a
cosh(ax)
sinh(ax) − b
cosh(bx)
sinh(bx)
)
= b
2
sinh2(bx)
− a
2
sinh2(ax)
< 0
as
0 < sinh(cx)
c
=
∞∑
i=0
x2i+1c2i
(2i+ 1)!
increases strictly in c > 0. We obtain
0 = lim
t→0+
(
a
cosh(at)
sinh(at) − b
cosh(bt)
sinh(bt)
)
>
(
a
cosh(ax)
sinh(ax) − b
cosh(bx)
sinh(bx)
)
(1.46)
> lim
t→∞
(
a
cosh(at)
sinh(at) − b
cosh(bt)
sinh(bt)
)
= a− b. (1.47)
Inequality (1.46) directly implies the first inequality in (1.40) (cf. Equation (1.45)).
The second inequality in (1.40) follows from Equation (1.45) and Inequality (1.47).
(ii) We have
2 sinh(κ(p))κ′(p) = 2 d
dp
cosh(κ(p)) = (1− p)
−3/2
2 −
(1− p)−1/2
2
(αΣ
Λ + 1
)
and thus
κ′(p) = (1− p)
−3/2
4Λ sinh(κ(p))
(
pΛ− (1− p)αΣ).
Furthermore,
sinh2(κ(p)) = cosh2(κ(p))− 1 = 1− p4
(αΣ
Λ + 1 +
1
1− p
)2 − 1
= 1− p4
( ( 1
1− p + 1
)2 − 41− p︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
(
p
1−p
)2
+α
2Σ2
Λ2 + 2
( 1
1− p + 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ p1−p
αΣ
Λ
)
≥ 1− p4
(αΣ
Λ +
1
1− p − 1
)2
.
Therefore,
sinh(κ(p)) ≥ 12Λ√1− p
(
pΛ + (1− p)αΣ) ≥ 12Λ√1− p |pΛ− (1− p)αΣ∣∣, (1.48)
hence (cf. Equation (1.41))
|κ′(p)| = (1− p)
−3/2
4Λ
|pΛ− (1− p)αΣ|
sinh(κ(p)) ≤
1
2(1− p) .
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We are now ready to prove Proposition 1.3.7.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.7. Let 0 < a < b. By Lemma 1.3.8, we obtain∣∣∣ ∂
∂p
sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p))
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣κ′(p) ∂
∂κ
sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p))
∣∣∣ < b− a2(1− p) sinh(aκ(p))sinh(bκ(p)) . (1.49)
Therefore,
∂
∂p
(
(1− p) b−a2 sinh(aκ(p))sinh(bκ(p))
)
= −b− a2 (1− p)
b−a
2 −1 sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p)) + (1− p)
b−a
2
∂
∂p
sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p))
(1.49)
< −b− a2 (1− p)
b−a
2 −1 sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p)) +
b− a
2 (1− p)
b−a
2 −1 sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p))
= 0 (1.50)
and similarly
∂
∂p
(
(1− p)− b−a2 sinh(aκ(p))sinh(bκ(p))
)
= b− a2 (1− p)
− b−a2 −1 sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p)) + (1− p)
− b−a2 ∂
∂p
sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p))
(1.49)
>
b− a
2 (1− p)
− b−a2 −1 sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p)) −
b− a
2 (1− p)
− b−a2 −1 sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p))
= 0. (1.51)
We can directly deduce the two assertions.
Let i > 0 and set a = N + 1 − i and b = N + 1, thus yielding b − a = i. By
Equation (1.36) and Inequality (1.51), we obtain
∂
∂p
Xne(ti, p) = X(t0)
∂
∂p
(
(1− p)− i2 sinh(aκ(p))sinh(bκ(p))
)
> 0.
By Equation (1.39) and Inequality (1.50), we obtain
∂
∂p
Ep
[
X(ti)
]
= X(t0)
∂
∂p
(
(1− p) i2 sinh(aκ(p))sinh(bκ(p))
)
< 0.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 illustrate how the dark pool changes the optimal strategy in the
primary venue. In all pictures the optimal strategy without using the dark pool is
displayed by the thin line. When the dark pool is used, then the portfolio evolution
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Figure 1.3.: Comparison of the portfolio evolution for the optimal strategies of a risk-
neutral trader (α = 0) of a stock with large (left) and small (right) probability of execution
p in the dark pool. The task of the trader is to liquidate a position X(t0) = 1 in N+1 = 501
trading times. Furthermore, Λ = 500 and p = 3500 (left graph), p =
1
1000 (right graph). The
solid thick lines show the scenario where a trade in the dark pool is executed in the τ th
trading period (left τ = 150, right τ = 350). Dotted lines refer to the optimal strategy until
execution, solid thin lines to the optimal strategy without dark pool and dashed lines to the
expected asset position when the dark pool is used.
Figure 1.4.: The same liquidation problems as in Figure 1.3 but for a risk-averse trader
(α = 4, Σ = 1500 ).
is stochastic and depends on the liquidity found in the dark pool. We illustrate the
stochastic portfolio evolution with three lines. The solid line shows the evolution of the
asset position when liquidity is found in the dark pool at time τ . If there is no liquidity
found in the dark pool during the entire trading horizon, the trader follows the dotted
line until time T . The figures illustrate how the trading speed is slowed down by the
introduction of the dark pool. The dashed lines denote the expected asset position over
time if the dark pool is used.
Properties of the value function
The costs of an admissible liquidation strategy (x, y) are composed of the impact costs
of trading at the primary venue
Λ · E
[ N∑
i=0
x(ti)2
]
(1.52)
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and the risk costs
αΣ · E
[ N∑
i=0
X(ti)2
]
.
Intuitively, using a dark pool reduces the overall costs. However, this does not necessarily
apply to both components of the costs. It is possible that the dark pool reduces one
component, while the other one is increased. The following proposition shows that both
the total costs and the impact costs of the optimal trading strategy are strictly decreasing
in the probability of execution p. On the other hand, the risk costs are not decreasing
in p ∈ (0, 1) in general. In particular, it is generally not true that the risk costs of using
a dark pool are smaller than the risk costs of not using a dark pool.
Proposition 1.3.9. Let (x∗(ti), y∗(ti))i=0,...,N be the optimal strategy and define X(ti)
recursively by
X(ti) = X(ti+1)− x∗(ti)− z∗(ti)
as before.
(i) For i = 1, ..., N − 1, C(ti, p) is strictly decreasing in p for p ∈ (0, 1).
(ii) If αΣ > 0, then the risk costs
αΣ · E
[ N∑
i=0
X(ti)2
]
are strictly increasing for p ∈ (0, αΣΛ+αΣ) and strictly decreasing for p ∈ ( αΣΛ+αΣ , 1).
(iii) The impact costs
Λ · E
[ N∑
i=0
x∗(ti)2
]
are strictly decreasing for p ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. (i) We prove the first assertion by backward induction using the recursion
formula for C given in Equation (1.35):
C(ti, p) = αΣ +
(1− p)C(ti+1, p)Λ
Λ + (1− p)C(ti+1, p) . (1.53)
This implies C(ti, p) > 0 for i = 0, . . . , N by backward induction; recall that
C(tN , p) = Λ + αΣ > 0 is independent of p < 1. Let now i < N . By the induction
hypothesis, we have
∂C
∂p
(ti+1, p) ≤ 0.
By Equation (1.53), we obtain
∂C
∂p
(ti, p) =
∂
∂p
(
αΣ + (1− p)C(ti+1, p)ΛΛ + (1− p)C(ti+1, p)
)
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= Λ2
(1− p)∂C∂p (ti+1, p)− C(ti+1, p)(
Λ + (1− p)C(ti+1, p)
)2
< 0
as desired.
(ii) Applying the optimal strategy, we obtain
E
[
X(ti)2
]
= (1− p)iXne(ti, p)2 =
(sinh(κ(p)(N + 1− i))
sinh(κ(p)(N + 1))
)2
X(t0)2
by Equation (1.36). By Lemma 1.3.8, this term is strictly increasing for p ∈
(0, αΣΛ+αΣ) and strictly decreasing for p ∈ ( αΣΛ+αΣ , 1).
(iii) Assertions (i) and (ii) imply that the impact costs are strictly decreasing for p ∈
(0, αΣΛ+αΣ). We can thus limit our attention to p ∈ ( αΣΛ+αΣ , 1), in particular κ′(p) > 0
by (1.42). We obtain
E[x∗(ti)2] = (1− p)ixne(ti, p)2
= 11− p
(√1− p sinh(κ(p)(N + 1− i))− sinh(κ(p)(N − i))
sinh(κ(p)(N + 1))
)2
X(t0)2
by Equation (1.37). For i = 0, . . . , N , we set a = N + 1− i, b = N + 1 and define
the function
gi(p) :=
sinh((a+ 1)κ(p))− 1√1−p sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p)) .
As in the proof of Proposition 1.3.7, we obtain (cf. Inequality (1.48))
sinh(κ(p)) ≥ p2√1− p.
Using the addition formulae for hyperbolic functions and the definition of κ(p), we
deduce
sinh((a+ 1)κ(p))− 1√1− p sinh(aκ(p))
= sinh(aκ(p)) cosh(κ(p)) + cosh(aκ(p)) sinh(κ(p))− 1√1− p sinh(aκ(p))
= sinh(aκ(p))
(
cosh(κ(p))− 1√1− p
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥
√
1−p
2 (1+
1
1−p )− 1√1−p=
−p
2
√
1−p
+ cosh(aκ(p)) sinh(κ(p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ p2√1−p
≥ p2√1− p(cosh(aκ(p))− sinh(aκ(p))) > 0.
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To finish the proof, it is thus sufficient to show that
d
dp
gi(p) ≥ 0 for all i and d
dp
gi0(p) > 0 for at least one i0.
We compute
d
dp
gi(p) = − 1
2(1− p) 32
sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p))
+ κ
′(p)√
1− p
(√
1− p ∂
∂κ
sinh((a+ 1)κ(p))
sinh(bκ(p)) −
∂
∂κ
sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:hi(p)
. (1.54)
Let us first assume that
−sinh(aκ(p))sinh(bκ(p)) ≤
∂
∂κ
sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p)) .
For i 6= 0, we have
∂
∂κ
sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p)) < 0 and
κ′(p)√
1− p <
1
2(1− p) 32
by Lemma 1.3.8 (recall κ′(p) > 0) and therefore
κ′(p)√
1− phi(p) < −
1
2(1− p) 32
∂
∂κ
sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p)) ≤
1
2(1− p) 32
sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p)) ,
hence
d
dp
gi(p) < 0.
For i = 0, we have a = b,
∂
∂κ
sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p)) = 0
and thus
d
dp
gi(p) ≤ 0.
We can therefore assume that
−sinh(aκ(p))sinh(bκ(p)) >
∂
∂κ
sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p))
from now on. Using the addition formulae for hyperbolic functions, we obtain
hi(p) =
√
1− p ∂
∂κ
sinh(aκ(p)) cosh(κ(p)) + cosh(aκ(p)) sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p))
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− ∂
∂κ
sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p))
=
√
1− p ∂
∂κ
((
cosh(κ(p)) + sinh(κ(p))− 1√1− p
)sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p))
+
(
cosh(aκ(p))− sinh(aκ(p))) sinh(κ(p))sinh(bκ(p))
)
=
√
1− p ( cosh(κ(p)) + sinh(κ(p))− 1√1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂
∂κ
sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<− sinh(aκ(p))sinh(bκ(p))
+
√
1− p( cosh(κ(p)) + sinh(κ(p)))sinh(aκ(p))sinh(bκ(p))
+
√
1− p ( cosh(aκ(p))− sinh(aκ(p)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂
∂κ
sinh(κ(p))
sinh(bκ(p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 by Lemma 1.3.8
+ a
√
1− p ( sinh(aκ(p))− cosh(aκ(p)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
sinh(κ(p))
sinh(bκ(p))
<
sinh(aκ(p))
sinh(bκ(p)) .
We note again that
0 < κ
′(p)√
1− p <
1
2(1− p) 32
and deduce by Equation (1.54) that
d
dp
gi(p) < 0,
finishing the proof.
We illustrate the dependence of the two components of the costs of the optimal strategy
on p in Figure 1.5. The left graph shows that the risk costs are increasing for small p
while the impact costs are decreasing in p on the whole interval (0, 1) (right graph).
Therefore, the reduction of the impact costs outweighs the increase of the risk costs for
small p.
1.3.4. Liquidating a portfolio of two assets
If a risk-averse investor has to liquidate a portfolio of multiple assets (n ≥ 2), then
correlation between the assets comes into play. It might no longer be optimal to always
place the remaining portfolio into the dark pool. For example, a trader liquidating a
well diversified portfolio consisting of two assets will most likely not want to risk losing
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Figure 1.5.: Risk costs (left graph) and impact costs (right graph) of the optimal strategy
dependent on the probability of execution in the dark pool p. For p ∈ (0, αΣΛ+αΣ ), the risk
costs are increasing whereas the impact costs are strictly decreasing on the whole interval
(0, 1). N = 15, Λ = 15, Σ = 115 , α = 4.
her balanced position by being executed in only one of the two assets. It is therefore
important to analyze the dependence of the optimal strategy on the model parameters,
especially on the correlation of the assets. Intuitively, we expect the optimal order
placement to depend on the correlation of the n assets in the following sense.
If the portfolio is well diversified at the beginning, the orders in the dark pool should
be much smaller than the current portfolio as the trader does not want to risk entering an
undiversified position. The trading speed in the primary venue should be almost constant
since the portfolio position bears little risk and a constant trading speed minimizes the
price impact cost (cf. the thin lines in Figure 1.3). If the portfolio is poorly diversified,
the orders should initially be comparatively large both in the primary venue and in the
dark pool. They might even be larger than the current portfolio for risk mitigating
reasons as the execution of the dark pool order for one of the assets can lead to a less
risky overall position.
As we are not able to compute the solution of the Optimization Problem (OPTdis)
in closed form for n ≥ 2, we illustrate the above intuitions by the following numerical
example.
Example 1.3.10. We consider different portfolios of two highly correlated stocks with
Σ = 1500 ·
(
1 0.9
0.9 1
)
.
We model the second stock as being more liquid. This is reflected by both a smaller price
impact and a higher execution probability in the dark pool1 compared to the first asset:
Λ =500 ·
(
3 0
0 0.2
)
,
1Intuitively, we expect a close connection between liquidity costs in the primary venue and probability
of execution in the dark pool. However, we are not aware of any empirical work supporting this.
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Figure 1.6.: Evolution of a portfolio consisting of two highly correlated stocks over time.
The left figure illustrates the poorly diversified portfolio, the right figure the well diversified
portfolio. In both pictures thin lines are used for the less liquid first stock and thick lines
for the more liquid second stock. Dotted lines correspond to trading without the dark pool,
dashed lines correspond to the expected position in the assets if the dark pool is used and
solid lines correspond to a realization of the liquidation process using the dark pool, where
dark pool orders for the second stock are executed at times τ1, τ2, τ3 and for the first stock
only at time τ4.
P[No dark pool execution] = 9931000 ,
P[Dark pool execution of first asset only] = 11000 ,
P[Dark pool execution of second asset only] = 61000 ,
P[Dark pool execution of both assets] =0.
We consider the following two portfolios in more depth:
(i) Long positions in both stocks, i.e., a poorly diversified portfolio:
X(t0) =
(
1
1
)
.
(ii) A long position in the first and a short position in the second stock, i.e., a well
diversified portfolio:
X(t0) =
(
1
−1
)
.
Figure 1.6 shows the evolution of the two portfolios if a risk-averse investor (α = 4)
applies the optimal strategy. The left picture corresponds to the first case, the right one
to the second. In both pictures thin lines are used for the first stock and thick lines
for the second. Dotted lines correspond to trading without the dark pool, dashed lines
correspond to the expected position in the assets if the dark pool is used and the solid
lines correspond to a realization of the liquidation process using the dark pool, where the
47
1. Optimal liquidation in discrete time
Figure 1.7.: Evolution of risk X(ti)>ΣX(ti) over time for the liquidation paths in Fig-
ure 1.6. The dashed line denotes the expected evolution of risk. Note the different scales in
the left and the right graph.
dark pool orders for the second stock are executed at times τ1, τ2, τ3 and for the first stock
only at time τ4, i.e., dark pool orders for the more liquid stock are executed several times
before any execution in the less liquid stock takes place.
For the poorly diversified portfolio, the trader tries to improve her risky position by
trading out of the second stock. For this stock, trading in the primary venue is less
expensive and being executed in the dark pool is more probable. If the trader uses the
dark pool, this process on average evolves significantly faster than without the dark pool.
For the well diversified portfolio, the portfolio position is decreasing almost linearly in
time in all cases. We expect to trade only slightly faster if we use the dark pool. Note
that this corresponds to the intuition given at the beginning of the section: It is most
profitable to trade out of the position almost evenly.
Additionally, orders in the dark pool are very large for the poorly diversified portfolio
and comparatively small for the well diversified portfolio. The reason can be observed in
Figure 1.7. The solid lines in the two pictures represent the evolution of portfolio risk
X(ti)>ΣX(ti) over time corresponding to the realized liquidation paths in Figure 1.6.
The dotted lines represent the evolution of risk if the optimal strategy without the dark
pool is used and the dashed lines represent the expected evolution of risk.
As long as the portfolio is poorly diversified, the risk is relatively large and is signif-
icantly decreased by a large execution in the dark pool (left picture). However, if it is
well diversified as in the right picture, each execution in the dark pool increases the risk.
Therefore, the dark pool saves price impact costs but potentially increases risk costs in
this case. Note also that in the case of an initially well diversified portfolio, the expected
risk can be larger than the risk without using the dark pool.
Our model allows for dependencies between the liquidities of the assets in the dark
pool. In Example 1.3.10 we assumed that the probability of simultaneous execution
in the dark pools is zero. This is not necessarily the case in reality. Intuitively, we
expect the optimal orders in the dark pool to depend strongly on the correlation of the
liquidities. For a well diversified portfolio, large probability of simultaneous execution
decreases the risk of losing the balanced position by a dark pool execution. Therefore,
we expect the absolute value of the optimal orders in the dark pool to increase in the
48
1.3. Linear price impact
Figure 1.8.: Dependence of the optimal orders in the dark pool on the probability of
simultaneous execution. The left picture shows the optimal orders at time t0 for a poorly
diversified portfolio (X(t0) = (1, 1)>) and the right picture for a well diversified portfolio
(X(t0) = (1,−1)>). In both pictures the solid line represents the first (illiquid) asset and
the dashed line the second (liquid) asset.
probability of simultaneous execution. For a poorly diversified portfolio, large probability
of simultaneous execution decreases the likelihood of reaching a more balanced position
by a dark pool execution for only one of the two assets, and we therefore expect the
optimal orders to decrease in the probability of simultaneous execution. Again, we
illustrate these intuitions by a numerical example.
Example 1.3.11. Let us consider the same stocks as in Example 1.3.10 but this time
p := P[Dark pool execution of both assets] ∈[0, 11000],
P[Dark pool execution of first asset only] = 11000 − p,
P[Dark pool execution of second asset only] = 61000 − p,
P[No dark pool execution] = 9931000 + p.
The left picture of Figure 1.8 shows the optimal orders at time t0 in the dark pool
dependent on p for a poorly diversified portfolio (X(t0) = (1, 1)>) and the right picture
shows the absolute value of the optimal orders for a well diversified portfolio (X(t0) =
(1,−1)>). In both pictures the solid line represents the first (illiquid) asset and the
dashed line the second (liquid) asset. Thus, the intuitions preceding the example are
supported.
Figure 1.8 also illustrates that the optimal strategy depends strongly on the relative
liquidity of the two stocks. Risk mitigation plays a minor role for the illiquid stock as
impact costs outweigh risk. Therefore, both in the poorly and in the well diversified case,
the orders in the dark pool for the illiquid stock are relatively close to the remainder of
the position in the stock, whereas this is not the case for the liquid stock.
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1.4. Adverse selection
In Section 1.3 we assumed that the price increments (ti+1) are independent of the
liquidity a(ti), b(ti) in the dark pool. This assumption is not always satisfied in reality.
For example, other large traders might simultaneously seek liquidity in the dark pool
and move prices at the primary trading venue. If price changes (ti+1) and liquidity
a(ti), b(ti) in the dark pool at time ti are correlated, liquidity seeking traders might find
that their trades in the dark pool are usually executed just before a favorable price move,
i.e., exactly when they do not want them to be executed since they miss out on the price
improvement. In advance of adverse price movements, they might observe that they
rarely find liquidity in the dark pool. We call such a phenomenon “adverse selection”.
We keep the assumptions of Section 1.3 except for the fact that we allow for de-
pendencies of dark pool liquidity and future price moves in a single asset model. In
Section 1.4.1 we specify the market model. As in Section 1.3, we drop Assumption 1.2.1
and can therefore not use the results of Section 1.2. In Section 1.4.2 we prove exis-
tence and uniqueness of optimal trading strategies by the same line of reasoning as in
the proofs of Proposition 1.2.3 respectively Theorem 1.2.4. As in Section 1.3, z(ti) de-
pends linearly on y(ti) by Assumption 1.4.1 (iii). This simplifies the uniqueness proof
significantly. Section 1.4.3 is concerned with heuristics about the structure of the value
function and the optimal strategy. Using these heuristics, we derive recursions for both
in Section 1.4.4. We discuss the properties of the value function and the optimal strat-
egy in Section 1.4.5. These results enable us to derive closed form solutions of the value
function and the optimal strategy in Section 1.4.6.
1.4.1. Model description
We only treat the case of single asset liquidation (n = 1) here. As in Section 1.3, we do
not require Assumption 1.2.1 and consider a possibly infinite probability space Ω. We
replace Assumption 1.3.1 by the following assumption.
Assumption 1.4.1. (i) For i = 0, . . . , N ,
fi(x(ti)) := fi(x(t0), . . . , x(ti)) := Λx(ti)
for a positive definite matrix Λ ∈ Rn×n.
(ii) P˜ is an F-martingale and
Σ(ti) = Σ(tj) =: Σ for all i, j = 0, . . . , N.
(iii) For i = 0, . . . , N ,
a(ti), b(ti) ∈ {0,∞},
((a(ti), b(ti)))i=0,...,N is identically distributed and there exists a nonnegative real
number Γ such that for i = 0, . . . , N ,
E[(ti+1)|a(ti) =∞] = −Γ, E[(ti+1)|b(ti) =∞] = Γ.
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(iv) There exists a real number p ∈ [0, 1) such that for all i = 0, . . . , N ,
p = P
[
a(ti) =∞] = P
[
bk(ti) =∞].
The only difference compared to Assumption 1.3.1 is (iii) (recall that for the case
n = 1, Assumption 1.3.1 (iv) is equivalent to Assumption 1.4.1 (iv)). The model in this
section is thus a generalization of the model in Section 1.3 for the case n = 1. On the
other hand, the model in Section 1.3 generalizes the case Γ = 0 of this model for general
n ∈ N.
The martingale property (Assumption 1.4.1 (ii)), the dependence of future price moves
on dark pool liquidity (Assumption 1.4.1 (iii)), Assumption 1.4.1 (iv) and the liquidation
constraint (Definition 1.1.4 (i)) imply
E
[ N∑
j=i
(x(tj) + z(tj))
(
P˜ (ti)− P˜ (tj)
)]
= E
[ N∑
j=i
pΓ|y(tj)|
]
.
The Optimization Problem (OPTgendis ) thus becomes
v(ti, X(ti)) = inf
(x,y)∈A(ti,X(ti))
{
E
[ N∑
j=i
(
Λx(tj)2+pΓ|y(tj)|
)]
+αE
[ N∑
j=i
ΣX(tj)2
]}
. (OPTdis)
Adverse selection is irrelevant for trading without dark pools (or equivalently p = 0),
so we can assume p > 0 from now on.
1.4.2. Existence and uniqueness of optimal strategies
If an optimal strategy at time ti for an asset position X ∈ R exists, we denote it by
(x∗(ti, X), y∗(ti, X)) ∈ R×R.
Theorem 1.4.2. Let i = 0, . . . , N .
(i) v(ti, ·) is symmetric and monotone in the following sense:
v(ti,−X(ti)) = v(ti, X(ti)) and
|X(ti)| ≤ |Y (ti)| ⇒ v(ti, X(ti)) ≤ v(ti, Y (ti)).
(ii) v(ti, ·) is strictly convex, and for X(ti) ∈ R there exits a unique optimal trading
strategy (x∗, y∗) ∈ A(ti, X(ti)) realizing the minimum in Equation (OPTdis).
Proof. The Optimization Problem (OPTdis) yields the Bellman equation
v(ti, X(ti)) = inf
(x,y)∈R×R
{
Λx2 + αΣX(ti)2 + p|y|Γ + pv(ti+1, X(ti)− x− y)
+ (1− p)v(ti+1, X(ti)− x)
}
. (1.55)
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We define the function v˜(X(ti), ·) : R2 −→ R by
v˜(X(ti), x, y) := Λx2 + αΣX(ti)2 + p|y|Γ + pv(ti+1, X(ti)− x− y)
+ (1− p)v(ti+1, X(ti)− x). (1.56)
(i) Symmetry can be shown by a straightforward backward induction on i ≤ N . We
also prove monotonicity by backward induction. The case i = N is clear, and we
set i < N . We can assume without loss of generality that 0 ≤ X(ti) ≤ Y (ti) by
symmetry. For any admissible pair of orders (x(ti), y(ti)) ∈ R2 we define
x˜(ti) :=
{
x(ti) if X(ti)− x(ti) ≥ 0
X(ti) else,
y˜(ti) :=

y(ti) if X(ti)− x(ti), X(ti)− x(ti)− y(ti) ≥ 0
X(ti)− x(ti) if X(ti)− x(ti) ≥ 0, X(ti)− x(ti)− y(ti) < 0
0 else.
In all three possible cases a simple argument using the induction hypothesis estab-
lishes
v˜(X(ti), x˜(ti), y˜(ti)) ≤ v˜(Y (ti), x(ti), y(ti)),
finishing the proof.
(ii) The strict convexity of v(ti, ·) and the existence and uniqueness of an optimal
trading strategy can also be established by backward induction. Again, the case
i = N is clear. Let therefore i < N and X(ti) ∈ R. Note that by the induction
hypothesis and (i), v˜(X(ti), ·) is strictly convex (in particular continuous) and
lim
‖(x,y)‖→∞
v˜(X(ti), x, y) =∞.
Therefore, a unique optimal strategy exists. Strict convexity of v(X(ti), ·) follows
by the strict convexity of v˜(ti, ·) using the Bellman Equation (1.55).
We can deduce properties of the optimal trading strategy from Theorem 1.4.2 that
are helpful for obtaining recursions for the value function and the optimal strategy in
Section 1.4.4 (cf. the proof of Theorem 1.4.4). The first assertion of the next corollary
means that neither changing the direction of trading nor changing the sign of the position
can be optimal.
Corollary 1.4.3. Let i = 0, . . . , N .
(i) For X(ti) > 0, we have
x∗(ti, X(ti)), y∗(ti, X(ti)) ≥ 0 and x∗(ti, X(ti)) + y∗(ti, X(ti)) ≤ X(ti). (1.57)
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(ii) (x∗(ti, ·), y∗(ti, ·)) is continuous.
Proof. (i) Let (x(ti), y(ti)) ∈ R2 be any admissible pair of orders not satisfying (1.57).
We define
x˜(ti) :=

x(ti) if x(ti) ≥ 0, x(ti, X(ti)) ≤ X(ti)
X(ti) if x(ti) ≥ 0, x(ti, X(ti)) > X(ti)
0 else,
y˜(ti) :=

y(ti) if 0 ≤ y(ti) ≤ X(ti)− x˜(ti)
X(ti)− x˜(ti) if y(ti) > X(ti)− x˜(ti)
0 else.
For v˜ as in Equation (1.56) the Bellman Equation (1.55) and Theorem 1.4.2 (i)
yield
v˜(X(ti), x˜(ti), y˜(ti)) < v˜(Y (ti), x(ti), y(ti))
for all possible cases, finishing the proof.
(ii) Let X ∈ R and consider a sequence of real numbers (Xk)k such that
lim
k→∞
Xk = X ∈ R.
By (i), the sequences (x∗(ti, Xk))k and (y∗(ti, Xk))k are bounded and therefore
there exist convergent subsequences (x∗(ti, Xkl))l, (y∗(ti, Xkl))l such that
lim
l→∞
x∗(ti, Xkl) = x0 ∈ R, lim
l→∞
y∗(ti, Xkl) = y0 ∈ R.
Assume that (x0, y0) 6= (x∗(ti, X), y∗(ti, X)). By the uniqueness of the optimal
trading strategy and the continuity of v(ti, ·) and v˜(·) as in Equation (1.56), we
obtain
v˜(X,x0, y0) > v˜(X,x∗(ti, X), y∗(ti, X)) = v(ti, X) = lim
l→∞
v(ti, Xkl)
= lim
l→∞
v˜(Xkl , x∗(ti, Xkl), y∗(ti, Xkl)) = v˜(X,x0, y0),
a contradiction.
1.4.3. Heuristics for the value function and the optimal strategy
So far we proved existence and uniqueness of the optimal trading strategy. The aim
of this section is to derive the structure of the value function and the optimal strategy
heuristically. In Section 1.4.4 we formalize these heuristics and present a rigorous proof
(Theorem 1.4.4). The proof of Theorem 1.4.4 is constructive and based on the heuristic
considerations of this section.
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Figure 1.9.: Small asset positions X(ti) ≤ β(ti) are expected to stay below β(tj) for all
j ≥ i if the candidate optimal strategy in Equation (1.9) is applied.
Let i < N and consider a nonnegative asset position X(ti) ≥ 0. By Corollary 1.4.3 (i),
the Bellman Equation (1.55) becomes
v(ti, X(ti)) = min
x,y≥0
{
Λx2 + αΣX(ti)2 + pΓy + pv(ti+1, X(ti)− x− y)
+ (1− p)v(ti+1, X(ti)− x)
}
. (1.58)
For Γ = 0, we obtain the single asset case of Section 1.3.3. In this case the value function
is quadratic, and the optimal strategy is linear in the asset position. Because of the linear
term
pΓy
we cannot expect this to be the case for general Γ > 0. We rather expect the value
function to be a quadratic polynomial:
v(ti, X(ti)) = C¯1(ti)X(ti)2 + C¯2(ti)X(ti) + C¯3(ti). (1.59)
It turns out that this ansatz does not capture the whole complexity of the Optimization
Problem (OPTdis). However, it is a useful starting point for the following considerations.
The term pΓy in the Bellman Equation (1.58) is equivalent to assuming that orders
in the dark pool yield linear costs. For large orders the quadratic costs of trading in
the primary venue outweigh the linear costs of trading in the dark pool. However, if a
trader aims to liquidate a sufficiently small asset position, then dark pool orders can be
more expensive then trading at the primary venue. For this reason, we expect that there
exists a time-dependent boundary β(ti) (i = 0, . . . , N) such that for
X(ti) ≤ β(ti),
the optimal dark pool order is
y∗(ti, X(ti)) = 0
and the value function and the optimal strategy in the primary venue are the same as
without dark pool as given in Section 1.3.3:
v(ti, X(ti)) = C(ti, 0)X(ti)2,
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Figure 1.10.: Asset positions X(ti) > β(ti). The position in the left picture is sufficiently
small for the optimal asset position to cross the boundary at time tj . The larger position
in the right picture is sufficiently large such that the optimal asset position only crosses
the boundary if the optimal dark pool order is executed (which happens at time τ in the
displayed scenario).
x∗(ti, X(ti)) = A(ti, 0)X(ti). (1.60)
If the asset position is below the boundary at time ti, we expect it to stay below it for
the remainder of the trading horizon [ti, T ] if the candidate optimal trading strategy
given by Equation (1.60) is applied (see Figure 1.9 for an illustration).
Following the above considerations, we expect at least two different trading regions
[0, β(ti)] and (β(ti),∞).
In the first one the optimal dark pool order should be zero and in the second one it
should be greater than zero. Given an asset position
X(ti) > β(ti),
there should again be roughly two possibilities. Either the order is sufficiently small
such that applying the optimal strategy in the primary venue, the optimal asset position
crosses the boundary β(tj) at some later point in time tj , j = i+ 1, . . . , N − 1 without
any execution in the dark pool. Or it is sufficiently large such that the optimal asset
position without any dark pool execution never crosses the boundary. We illustrate the
first case in the left picture and the second case in the right picture of Figure 1.10. In
both cases we expect that optimal orders in the dark pool are sufficiently large such that
the optimal position crosses the boundary immediately after the execution of a dark
pool order.
There are N + 1− i possible points in time where the optimal asset position can cross
the boundary β. This suggests that we should distinguish between N +1− i rather than
two trading regions, dependent on the time tj (j = i+1, . . . , N) the initial asset position
X(ti) crosses the boundary β(tj) without an execution in the dark pool. More precisely,
we expect that there exists a function
X¯(ti, ·) : {ti, . . . , tN+1} → [0,∞],
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which divides the positive real line into trading regimes
0 =: X¯(ti, ti) < β(ti) =: X¯(ti, ti+1) < · · · < X¯(ti, tN+1) :=∞
such that
(i) for
X(ti) ∈ [X¯(ti, ti), X¯(ti, ti+1)] = [0, β(ti)],
the dark pool is not used,
(ii) for j = i+ 1, . . . , N − 1,
X(ti) ∈ (X¯(ti, tj), X¯(ti, tj+1)],
the dark pool is only used in the first j−i trading periods, and the optimal trading
strategy crosses the boundary β(tj) =: X¯(tj , tj+1) at time tj if no dark pool order
has been executed before,
(iii) for
X(ti) ∈ (X¯(ti, tN ), X¯(ti, tN+1)) = (X¯(ti, tN ),∞),
the dark pool is used at all trading times ti, . . . , tN−1 until execution.
Let us now return to the beginning of the section (cf. Equation (1.59)). We expect
that in each of the N +1− i trading regions the value function is a quadratic polynomial
with the coefficients depending on the trading regime:
v(ti, X(ti)) = C1(ti, tj)X(ti)2 + C2(ti, tj)X(ti) + C3(ti, tj)
for X(ti) ∈ (X¯(ti, tj), X¯(ti, tj+1)). This proves to be the correct ansatz, and we are able
to obtain backward recursions for the coefficients C1, C2, C3 and the functions X¯ in
Theorem 1.4.4.
1.4.4. Structure of the optimal strategy and the value function
We confirm the intuitions about trading regions and the form of the value function given
in Section 1.4.3 in Theorem 1.4.4. By backward induction, we obtain recursions both
for the value function and for the optimal strategy. We consider the case
αΣ > 0
of a risk-averse investor first. The simpler case αΣ = 0 is treated at the end of this
section.
Theorem 1.4.4. The value function v(ti, ·) of the Optimization Problem (OPTdis) is a
piecewise quadratic polynomial and the optimal strategy (x∗(ti, ·), y∗(ti, ·)) at time ti is
piecewise affine linear.
More precisely, let X(ti) be the asset position at time ti.
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(i) There exist
0 =: X¯(ti, ti) < · · · < X¯(ti, tN+1) :=∞
such that for
X(ti) ∈ [X¯(ti, tj), X¯(ti, tj+1)),
the unique optimal strategy and the value function are given by
x∗(ti, X(ti)) = A1(ti, tj)X(ti) +A2(ti, tj), (1.61)
y∗(ti, X(ti)) = B1(ti, tj)X(ti) +B2(ti, tj), (1.62)
v(ti, X(ti)) = C1(ti, tj)X(ti)2 + C2(ti, tj)X(ti) + C3(ti, tj). (1.63)
The coefficients A1, . . . , C3 and X¯ are given recursively in Appendix A.1.
(ii) For X(ti) < 0, the optimal strategy and the value function are given by
x∗(ti, X(ti)) = −x∗(ti,−X(ti)),
y∗(ti, X(ti)) = −y∗(ti,−X(ti)),
v(ti, X(ti)) = v(ti,−X(ti)).
Proof. We prove (i). Assertion (ii) follows directly by Theorem 1.4.2 (i). Let therefore
i = 0, . . . N and X(ti) ≥ 0. By Corollary 1.4.3 (i), we know that the optimal asset
position at time tj fulfills X(tj) ≥ 0 for all j ≥ i.
We proceed by backward induction. For i = N there is only one admissible strategy
and all the properties are satisfied.
For the induction step we assume that all properties are valid for time ti+1 (i < N).
By Corollary 1.4.3 (i), the Bellman Equation (1.55) becomes
v(ti, X(ti)) = min
x,y≥0
{
Λx2 + αΣX(ti)2 + pyΓ
+ pv(ti+1, X(ti)− x− y) + (1− p)v(ti+1, X(ti)− x)
}
.
(i) As a first step we prove the assertion for j = i, i.e., the case where the initial asset
position is below the boundary and we expect that the use of the dark pool is not
optimal:
0 ≤ X(ti) < X¯(ti, ti+1).
The recursion formula for C(ti, 0), Equation (1.35), implies
C(ti+1, 0) < C(ti+2, 0)
and therefore we know by Equation (A.10) that
X¯(ti+1, ti+2) =
Γ(C(ti+2, 0) + Λ)
2C(ti+2, 0)Λ
<
Γ(C(ti+1, 0) + Λ)
2C(ti+1, 0)Λ
= X¯(ti, ti+1).
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Assume for now that
0 ≤ X(ti) < X¯(ti+1, ti+2) < X¯(ti, ti+1).
This implies
0 ≤ X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti))− y∗(ti, X(ti)) ≤ X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti)) < X¯(ti+1, ti+2)
by Corollary 1.4.3 (i). We define the set
A¯(X(ti)) :=
{
(x, y) ∈ R2|x, y ≥ 0, X(ti)− x− y ≥ 0
}
and obtain by the backward induction hypothesis that
v(ti, X(ti)) = min
(x,y)∈A¯(X(ti))
{
Λx2 + αΣX(ti)2 + pyΓ
+ p
(
C1(ti+1, ti+1)(X(ti)− x− y)2
+ C2(ti+1, ti+1)(X(ti)− x− y) + C3(ti+1, ti+1)
)
+ (1− p)(C1(ti+1, ti+1)(X(ti)− x)2
+ C2(ti+1, ti+1)(X(ti)− x) + C3(ti+1, ti+1)
)}
(A.1)= min
(x,y)∈A¯(X(ti))
{
Λx2 + αΣX(ti)2 + pyΓ + pC(ti+1, 0)(X(ti)− x− y)2
+ (1− p)C(ti+1, 0)(X(ti)− x)2
}
. (1.64)
Let v¯(X(ti), ·) : R2 −→ R be given by
v¯(X(ti), x, y) := Λx2 + αΣX(ti)2 + pyΓ + pC(ti+1, 0)(X(ti)− x− y)2
+ (1− p)C(ti+1, 0)(X(ti)− x)2.
In order to minimize v¯(X(ti), ·), we consider the first order condition for minimality
∂
∂x
v¯(X(ti), x, y) = 0,
∂
∂y
v¯(X(ti), x, y) = 0.
This system of linear equations has the unique solution (x¯i, y¯i) given by
x¯i =
C(ti+1, 0)(1− p)
C(ti+1, 0)(1− p) + ΛX(ti) +
Γp
2(C(ti+1, 0)(1− p) + Λ) , (1.65)
y¯i =
Λ
C(ti+1, 0)(1− p) + ΛX(ti)−
Γ(C(ti+1, 0) + Λ)
2C(ti+1, 0)(C(ti+1, 0)(1− p) + Λ) . (1.66)
An elementary calculation shows that the Hessian of v¯(X(ti), ·) is positive definite.
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Thus, (x¯i, y¯i) is the global minimum of v¯(X(ti), ·). However,
y¯i <
Λ
C(ti+1, 0)(1− p) + ΛX¯(ti+1, ti+2)−
Γ(C(ti+1, 0) + Λ)
2C(ti+1, 0)(C(ti+1, 0)(1− p) + Λ)
(A.10)= 0.
Therefore, v¯(X(ti), ·) is minimal for y = 0 on A¯(X(ti)). Hence y∗(ti, X(ti)) = 0,
and x∗(ti, X(ti)) can be obtained by minimizing
Λx2 + αΣX(ti)2 + C(ti+1, 0)(X(ti)− x)2. (1.67)
Thus,
x∗(ti, X(ti)) =
C(ti+1, 0)
C(ti+1, 0) + Λ
X(ti) = A(ti, 0)X(ti).
As X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti)) and y∗(ti, X(ti)) are continuous in X(ti) (Corollary 1.4.3
(ii)),
(A(ti, 0)X(ti), 0)
is the optimal strategy at time ti as long as
y¯i < 0 and X(ti)−A(ti, 0)X(ti) < X¯(ti+1, ti+2),
which is equivalent to
0 ≤ X(ti) < X¯(ti, ti+1).
Plugging this into (1.67), we obtain
v(ti, X(ti)) =
αΣΛ + C(ti+1, 0)(Λ + αΣ)
C(ti+1, 0) + Λ
X(ti)2 = C(ti, 0)X(ti)2,
completing the proof for j = i.
We will now show the assertion for j = i+ 1, . . . , N by forward induction on j.
(ii) For the induction basis j = i+ 1 let
X(ti) ∈ [X¯(ti, ti+1), X¯(ti, ti+2)).
For X(ti) = X¯(ti, ti+1), the case j = i proven above and the continuity of the
optimal strategy imply
X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti)) = X(ti)−A(ti, 0)X(ti)
(1.34),(A.10)= Γ2C(ti+1, 0)
<
Γ(C(ti+2, 0) + Λ)
2C(ti+2, 0)Λ
(1.68)
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(A.10)= X¯(ti+1, ti+2),
where Inequality (1.68) follows from (1.35) as αΣ > 0:
Γ
2C(ti+1, 0)
= Γ(Λ + C(ti+2, 0))2(αΣΛ + C(ti+2, 0)(Λ + αΣ))
<
Γ(C(ti+2, 0) + Λ)
2C(ti+2, 0)Λ
.
Again by continuity of the optimal strategy, we obtain that the Bellman equation
is given by (1.64) in some neighborhood (X¯(ti, ti+1), X¯(ti, ti+1) + ). We consider
the first order conditions of optimality again and obtain that the global minimum
(x¯i, y¯i) of v¯(X(ti), ·) is as given in Equations (1.65) and (1.66) by the positive
definiteness of the Hessian as before. This time we have x¯i > 0, y¯i ≥ 0, and by
Equations (A.6) - (A.9), x¯i and y¯i are of the required form:
x¯i = A1(ti, ti+1)X(ti) +A2(ti, ti+1),
y¯i = B1(ti, ti+1)X(ti) +B2(ti, ti+1).
Using the continuity of (x∗(ti, ·), y∗(ti, ·)) again, we deduce that (x¯i, y¯i) is the op-
timal strategy as long as
y¯i ≥ 0 and X(ti)− x¯i < X¯(ti+1, ti+2). (1.69)
A straightforward calculation shows that (1.69) is equivalent to
X(ti) ≥ Γ(C(ti+1, 0) + Λ)2C(ti+1, 0)Λ = X¯(ti, ti+1) and X(ti) < X¯(ti, ti+2).
Plugging (x¯i, y¯i) into v¯(X(ti), ·), we obtain
v(ti, X(ti)) = C1(ti, ti+1)X(ti)2 + C2(ti, ti+1)X(ti) + C3(ti, ti+1),
with C1, C2 and C3 according to Appendix A.1, which finishes the proof of the
induction basis for the forward induction.
(iii) For the induction step, we assume that the assertion is true for some
j = i+ 1, . . . N − 1 and let
X(ti) ∈ [X¯(ti, tj+1), X¯(ti, tj+2)).
By the induction hypothesis, the continuity of x∗(ti, ·) and y∗(ti, ·) and the recur-
sions in Appendix A.1, we have
X¯(ti, tj+1)− x∗(ti, X¯(ti, tj+1))
= X¯(ti, tj+1)−A1(ti, tj)X¯(ti, tj+1)−A2(ti, tj)
(A.6),(A.8)= B1(ti, tj)X¯(ti, tj+1)−A2(ti, tj)
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(A.11)= X¯(ti+1, tj+1),
X¯(ti, tj+1)− x∗(ti, X¯(ti, tj+1))− y∗(ti, X¯(ti, tj+1))
= X¯(ti, tj+1)−A1(ti, tj)X¯(ti, tj+1)−A2(ti, tj)
−B1(ti, tj)X¯(ti, tj+1)−B2(ti, tj)
(A.6),(A.8)= −A2(ti, tj)−B2(ti, tj)
(A.7),(A.9)= Γ2C(ti+1, 0)
and
y∗(ti, X¯(ti, tj+1)) > 0.
Thus, again by continuity of x∗(ti, ·) and y∗(ti, ·), there exists an  > 0 such that
for X(ti) ∈ (X¯(ti, tj+1), X¯(ti, tj+1) + ),
y∗(ti, X(ti)) > 0,
X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti)) < X¯(ti+1, tj+2), (1.70)
X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti)) > X¯(ti+1, tj), (1.71)
X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti))− y∗(ti, X(ti)) < X¯(ti+1, ti+2).
In order to apply the backward induction hypothesis, we want to ensure that the
optimal asset position at time ti+1, provided the dark pool order has not been
executed, fulfills
X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti)) ∈ [X¯(ti+1, tj+1), X¯(ti+1, tj+2));
notice that Inequalities (1.70) and (1.71) only imply
X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti)) ∈ (X¯(ti+1, tj), X¯(ti+1, tj+2)).
To this end, assume that X(ti) − x∗(ti, X(ti)) < X¯(ti+1, tj+1). For this case the
backward induction hypothesis would imply
v(ti, X(ti))
= min
Aˇ(X(ti))
{
Λx2 + αΣX(ti)2 + pyΓ + pC(ti+1, 0)(X(ti)− x− y)2
+ (1−p)(C1(ti+1, tj)(X(ti)−x)2+ C2(ti+1, tj)(X(ti)−x) + C3(ti+1, tj))},
where
Aˇ(X(ti)) :=
{
(x, y) ∈ R2|x, y ≥ 0, X¯(ti+1, tj) ≤ X(ti)− x ≤ X¯(ti+1, tj+1),
0 ≤ X(ti)− x− y ≤ X¯(ti+1, ti+2)
}
.
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A simple calculation shows that this minimization problem has the unique solution
xˇi = A1(ti, tj)X(ti) +A2(ti, tj),
yˇi = B1(ti, tj)X(ti) +B2(ti, tj)
for A1, . . . , B2 according to Appendix A.1. This implies
X(ti)− xˇi (A.6),(A.8)= B1(ti, tj)X(ti)−A2(ti, tj)
> B1(ti, tj)X¯(ti+1, tj)−A2(ti, tj)
(A.11)= X¯(ti+1, tj+1),
a contradiction. Therefore,
X(ti)− x(ti, X(ti)) ≥ X¯(ti+1, tj+1) for X(ti) ∈ (X¯(ti, tj+1), X¯(ti, tj+1) + ).
By the backward induction hypothesis, the Bellman Equation (1.55) becomes
v(ti, X(ti))
= min
Aˆ(X(ti))
{
Λx2 + αΣX(ti)2 + pyΓ + pC(ti+1, 0)(X(ti)− x− y)2 + (1− p)
(
C1(ti+1, tj+1)(X(ti)−x)2+ C2(ti+1, tj+1)(X(ti)−x) + C3(ti+1, tj+1)
)}
.
=: min
Aˆ(X(ti))
vˆ(X(ti), x, y),
where
Aˆ(X(ti)) :=
{
(x, y) ∈ R2|x, y ≥ 0, X¯(ti+1, tj+1) ≤ X(ti)− x ≤ X¯(ti+1, tj+2),
0 ≤ X(ti)− x− y ≤ X¯(ti+1, ti+2)
}
.
Again, the Hessian of vˆ(X(ti), ·) is positive definite and the gradient equals zero
for (xˆi, yˆi) such that
xˆi =
C1(ti+1, tj+1)(1− p)
C1(ti+1, tj+1)(1− p) + ΛX(ti) +
C2(ti+1, tj+1)(1− p) + Γp
2(C1(ti+1, tj+1)(1− p) + Λ)
(A.6),(A.7)= A1(ti, tj+1)X(ti) +A2(ti, tj+1),
yˆi =
Λ
C1(ti+1, tj+1)(1− p) + ΛX(ti)−
C(ti+1, 0)C2(ti+1, tj+1)(1− p) + Γ(C1(ti+1, tj+1)(1− p) + C(ti+1, 0)p+ Λ)
2C(ti+1, 0)(C1(ti+1, tj+1)(1− p) + Λ)
(A.8),(A.9)= B1(ti, tj+1)X(ti) +B2(ti, tj+1),
i.e., xˆi and yˆi are of the required form. Again, by continuity of (x∗(ti, ·), y∗(ti, ·)),
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(xˆi, yˆi) defines the optimal strategy as long as
X¯(ti+1, tj+1) ≤ X(ti)− xˆi ≤ X¯(ti+1, tj+2) and yˆi > 0;
notice that
X(ti)− xˆi − yˆi (A.6),(A.8)= −A2(ti, tj+1)−B2(ti, tj+1)
(A.7),(A.9)= Γ2C(ti+1, 0)
< X¯(ti+1, ti+2).
Hence, (xˆi, yˆi) is the optimal strategy as long as
X(ti) ≤ X¯(ti+1, tj+1) +A2(ti, tj+1)
B1(ti, tj+1)
(A.7),(A.8),(A.11)= X¯(ti, tj+2)
as desired. Plugging (xˆi, yˆi) into vˆ(X(ti), ·), we obtain
v(ti, X(ti)) = C1(ti, tj+1)X(ti)2 + C2(ti, tj+1)X(ti) + C3(ti, tj+1),
which finishes the proof.
In the following we deduce properties of the optimal strategy and the functions X¯
defined in Theorem 1.4.4. We discuss these properties in more detail in Section 1.4.5.
Additionally, the properties are useful for finding closed form solutions to the coefficients
A1, . . . , C3 and the function X¯ in Section 1.4.6.
Corollary 1.4.5. Let i = 0, . . . , N − 1.
(i) If |X(ti)| ≤ X¯(ti, ti+1), then
y∗(ti, X(ti)) = 0,
x∗(ti, X(ti)) = A(ti, 0)X(ti),
v(ti, X(ti)) = C(ti, 0)X(ti)2
and
X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti)) ≤ X¯(ti+1, ti+2).
(ii) If |X(ti)| ≥ X¯(ti, tN ), then
A1(ti, tN ) = A(ti, p),
B1(ti, tN ) = B(ti, p),
C1(ti, tN ) = C(ti, p);
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recall that A(ti, p), B(ti, p) and C(ti, p) are the coefficients of the optimal strategy
respectively the value function for optimal liquidation without adverse selection
(cf. Equations (1.31) - (1.33)).
(iii) If j = i+ 1, . . . , N and X(ti) ∈ (X¯(ti, tj), X¯(ti, tj+1)), then
x∗(ti, X(ti)), y∗(ti, X(ti)) and X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti))
are increasing in X(ti) and
X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti))− y∗(ti, X(ti)) = Γ2C(ti+1, 0) < X¯(ti+1, ti+2),
X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti)) ∈ (X¯(ti+1, tj), X¯(ti+1, tj+1)).
(iv) For j = i+ 2, . . . , N ,
X¯(ti, tj) = min
{
X ≥ X¯(ti, tj−1) |X − x∗(ti, X) = X¯(ti+1, tj)
}
.
Proof. Assertion (i) follows directly from Theorem 1.4.4.
Note that the recursions for C1(·, tN ), A1(·, tN ) and B1(·, tN ) given by Equations
(A.3), (A.6) and (A.8) are the same as the recursions for C(·, p), A(·, p) and B(·, p)
given by (1.34) and (1.35). The fact that
C(tN , p) = C(tN , tN )
thus establishes (ii).
Due to the strict convexity of v(tk, ·), k = i, . . . , N (cf. Theorem 1.4.2), we have
C1(tk, tj) > 0, k = i, . . . , N,
and thus by Equations (A.6) and (A.8) that
A1(ti, tj) > 0 and B1(ti, tj) > 0.
Therefore, x∗(ti, X(ti)) and y∗(ti, X(ti)) are strictly increasing in X(ti). Strict mono-
tonicity of X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti)) follows from the fact that
X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti)) = B1(ti, tj)X(ti)−A2(ti, tj).
Using Equation (A.6) - (A.9), we obtain
X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti))− y∗(ti, X(ti)) = −A2(ti, tj)−B2(ti, tj)
= Γ2C(ti+1, 0)
<
Γ(C(ti+2, 0) + Λ)
2C(ti+2, 0)Λ
(1.72)
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= X¯(ti+1, ti+2),
where Inequality (1.72) follows from the fact that
C(ti+1, 0) = αΣ +
ΛC(ti+2, 0)
Λ + C(ti+2, 0)
by Equation (1.35).
Finally, let X ∈ (X¯(ti, tj−1), X¯(ti, tj)) and note that X−x∗(ti, X) is strictly increasing
in X. Then
X − x∗(ti, X) = B1(ti, tj−1)X −A2(ti, tj−1).
The assertion follows as
lim
X→X¯(ti,tj)−
X − x∗(ti, X) = X¯(ti+1, tj)
by Equations (A.7), (A.8) and (A.11).
Risk-neutral investors
In Theorem 1.4.4 we assumed αΣ > 0. Here, we treat the case of a risk-neutral investor
αΣ = 0.
For trading without dark pools, it is optimal to liquidate the position evenly, and the
optimal strategy and the value function are given by (cf. the Recursions (1.34) and (1.35))
C(ti, 0)X(ti)2 =
Λ
N + 1− iX(ti)
2,
A(ti, 0)X(ti) =
1
N + 1− iX(ti).
For obtaining the structure of the value function and the optimal strategy for risk-neutral
trading with adverse selection, we let αΣ tend to zero and obtain that the boundary,
below which the dark pool is not used, is given by
X¯(ti, ti+1) =
Γ(C(ti+1, 0) + Λ)
2C(ti+1, 0)Λ
= Γ(N + 1− i)2Λ .
By continuity of the optimal strategy, we obtain
X¯(ti, ti+1)− x∗(ti, X¯(ti, ti+1)) = X¯(ti+1, ti+2).
In contrast to the case of a risk-averse investor, the position does not cross the boundary.
This suggests that for all asset positions
X(ti) > X¯(ti, ti+1),
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the boundary is never crossed. Also, after a dark pool execution the position should be
on the boundary:
X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti))− y∗(ti, X(ti)) = Γ2C(ti+1, 0) =
Γ(N − i)
2Λ = X¯(ti+1, ti+2).
The following result summarizes these findings and can be proven by the same line of
reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 1.4.4 with appropriate modifications. Alternatively
we can prove the result by taking the limit αΣ → 0 in the closed form solutions for
X¯(ti, tj), j = i+ 1, . . . , N , obtained in Section 1.4.6 below.
Proposition 1.4.6. Let αΣ = 0. For i = 0, . . . , N and asset position X(ti) at time ti,
the value function and the optimal strategy are given by
v(ti, X(ti)) =
{
C(ti, 0)X(ti)2 if |X(ti)| ≤ X¯(ti, ti+1)
C1(ti, tN )X(ti)2 + C2(ti, tN )|X(ti)|+ C3(ti, tN ) else,
x∗(ti, X(ti)) =
{
A(ti, 0)X(ti) if |X(ti)| ≤ X¯(ti, ti+1)
A1(ti, tN )X(ti) + sgn(X(ti))A2(ti, tN ) else,
y∗(ti, X(ti)) =
{
0 if |X(ti)| ≤ X¯(ti, ti+1)
B1(ti, tN )X(ti) + sgn(X(ti))B2(ti, tN ) else
for A1, . . . , C1 as in Appendix A.1. In particular,
X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti)) > X¯(ti+1, ti+2),
X(ti)− x∗(ti, X(ti))− y∗(ti, X(ti)) = X¯(ti+1, ti+2)
for |X(ti)| > X¯(ti, ti+1).
1.4.5. Properties of the optimal strategy
Theorem 1.4.4 and Corollary 1.4.5 provide the structure of the value function and the
optimal strategy. In this section we discuss these properties and deduce additional
properties.
For simplicity we assume X(ti) ≥ 0 and αΣ > 0 throughout the section. By symmetry
(cf. Theorem 1.4.4 (ii)) all properties transfer to negative asset positions X(ti) < 0. It
is always clear from the context whether corresponding properties also apply for risk-
neutral investors.
General properties of the optimal strategy
Theorem 1.4.4 and Corollary 1.4.5 (i) stress the importance of the boundary X¯(ti, ti+1)
for the optimal strategy. The dark pool is only used at time ti if the asset position X(ti)
is above X¯(ti, ti+1). If
X(ti) < X¯(ti, ti+1),
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it is optimal to place no order in the dark pool and the optimal strategy in the primary
venue is the same as the one without dark pool. This intuition is reflected by practition-
ers’ rules of thumb which often do not use dark pools for orders smaller than a certain
threshold. Even for asset positions
X(ti) > X¯(ti, ti+1),
it is no longer optimal to place the full remainder of the position in the dark pool
(cf. Section 1.3.3) by Corollary 1.4.5 (iii). The trader wishes to keep a fraction of her
position in order to not miss out a possible favorable price move completely. However,
a dark pool execution at time tj will cause the position to cross the boundary for the
next trading interval X¯(tj+1, tj+2), and consequently it is optimal to not use the dark
pool afterwards (cf. Corollary 1.4.5 (iii) again). If
X(ti) ∈ (X¯(ti, tj), X¯(ti, tj+1))
for some j = i+1, . . . , N , the dark pool is only used at times ti, . . . , tj−1 until execution.
From time tj respectively after execution, the dark pool is not used anymore as X(tj) <
X¯(tj , tj+1) (cf. Corollary 1.4.5 (iii)). Only if
X(ti) > X¯(ti, tN )
and if orders in the dark pool are never executed, the optimal asset position stays above
the boundary X¯(tj , tj+1) throughout the whole time horizon [0, T ], and in this case it
is optimal to use the dark pool at all trading times ti, . . . , tN−1 until execution. Note
also that by Corollary 1.4.5 (ii), adverse selection only has a second order impact on the
optimal strategy and the value function for very large
X(ti) >> X¯(ti, tN ).
We illustrate these properties by Figure 1.11. The left picture shows the optimal
strategies for two initial asset positions. A larger one (X(t0) = 1.8) which lies above
X¯(t0, tN ) = X¯(t0, t100) = 1.27 and a smaller one (X(t0) = 0.6) which lies between
X¯(t0, t12) and X¯(t0, t13). Consequently, the larger asset position crosses the boundary
X¯(ti, ti+1) (dashed line) only if the order in the dark pool is executed (which happens
at time τ2 in the displayed scenario). The smaller one crosses the boundary after the
twelfth trading period (at time τ1) if no order in the dark pool is executed before. Com-
pared to the optimal strategies if no adverse selection is expected (right picture, solid
lines), the trading speed in the primary venue is initially faster but still slower than the
trading speed of the optimal strategy without dark pool (thin lines). Additionally, the
order in the dark pool is smaller than the remainder of the position, and after execution
in the dark pool the investor trades out of the rest solely in the primary venue. The
reason for both properties is the fact that trading in the dark pool is not entirely free
anymore and thus (in relation to it) trading is cheaper in the primary venue.
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Figure 1.11.: The left picture shows the optimal strategies for a smaller and a larger asset
position if adverse selection is expected. The right picture shows the respective strategies
if adverse selection is not expected. In all cases we consider the scenario where the order
in the dark pool is executed at time τ2. The solid lines denote the optimal strategies for
this scenario, the dotted those for the scenario where orders in the dark pool are never
executed. The dashed line in the left picture reflects the boundary X¯(ti, ti+1) below which
the optimal order in the dark pool is zero. The thin lines in the right pictures denote the
optimal strategies without dark pools. N = 100, Λ = 100, Σ = 1100 , p =
6
100 , α = 4, Γ = 2.
Coefficients of the value function and the optimal strategy
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 1.4.4, we obtain the following corollary. It is
concerned with the coefficients of the value function and the optimal strategy.
Corollary 1.4.7. Let i = 0, . . . N , j = i, ..., N .
(i)
C1(ti, tj), C2(ti, tj) ≥ 0 and C3(ti, tj) ≤ 0.
C1(ti, ·) and C3(ti, ·) are decreasing, and C2(ti, ·) is increasing.
(ii)
A1(ti, tj), A2(ti, tj), B1(ti, tj) ≥ 0 and B2(ti, tj) ≤ 0.
A1(ti, ·) and B2(ti, ·) are decreasing, and A2(ti, ·) and B1(ti, ·) are increasing. In
particular, x∗(ti, ·) is concave and y∗(ti, ·) is convex.
Proof. Both assertions are straightforward backward inductions using the respective
recursions from Appendix A.1.
Figure 1.12 illustrates the dependence of the optimal order size in the primary venue
(solid line) and in the dark pool (dashed line) on the asset position. As shown in
Corollary 1.4.7, the order size in the primary venue is concave in X(t0) and the order
size in the dark pool is convex in X(t0).
Dependence on Γ
In Section 1.3.3 we showed that a high probability of execution in the dark pool slows
down trading in the primary venue initially. Intuitively, adverse selection should have the
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Figure 1.12.: Optimal order sizes in the dark pool and the primary venue at time t0
depending on the asset position X(t0). The solid line denotes the optimal order size in
the primary venue x∗(t0, X(t0)), the dashed line the optimal order size in the dark pool
y∗(t0, X(t0)). N = 2, Λ = 10, Σ = 12 , p = 0.6, α = 4, Γ = 10.
opposite effect: higher adverse selection should speed up trading in the primary venue
as trading in the dark pool is relatively more expensive and thus waiting for execution
is less attractive (cf. also Figure 1.11 and the corresponding discussion). The following
proposition confirms that this intuition is correct.
In order to stress the dependence of the value function and the optimal strategy on
the parameter Γ, we first introduce the following notation: for a setting with adverse
selection Γ ≥ 0, we denote the optimal strategy at time ti by
(x∗(ti, X(ti),Γ), y∗(ti, X(ti),Γ)).
In a similar fashion we characterize optimal trajectories, value functions etc. Similarly
as in the proof of Lemma 1.4.9, we define Xne(tj ,Γ) (j = i, . . . , N) recursively by
Xne(ti,Γ) = X(ti) and Xne(tj ,Γ) = Xne(tj−1,Γ)− x∗(tj , Xne(tj−1,Γ),Γ) for j > i.
Proposition 1.4.8. Let i = 0, . . . , N − 1 and X(ti) > 0 as before. We define
Γ0 :=
2C(ti+1, 0)Λ
C(ti+1, 0) + Λ
X(ti).
(i) For j = i+ 1, . . . , N , X¯(ti, tj , ·) is strictly increasing for Γ ≥ 0.
(ii) v(ti, X(ti), ·) is strictly increasing for Γ < Γ0 and constant for Γ ≥ Γ0.
(iii) x∗(ti, X(ti), ·) is strictly increasing for Γ < Γ0 and constant for Γ ≥ Γ0.
(iv) y∗(ti, X(ti), ·) is strictly decreasing for Γ < Γ0 and constant for Γ ≥ Γ0.
(v) For j = i + 1, . . . , N , Xne(tj , ·) is strictly decreasing for Γ < Γ0 and constant for
Γ ≥ Γ0.
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Proof. (i) Note first that C1 is independent of Γ by Equations (A.1) and (A.3). By
backward induction on i using Equation (A.4), we deduce that for i = 0, . . . , N −1
and j = i + 1, . . . , N , C2(ti, tj , ·) is strictly increasing in Γ. The assertion follows
by another backward induction on i using Equation (A.11).
(ii) For Γ < Γ0, adverse selection is small enough to ensure that
X(ti) >
Γ(C(ti+1, 0) + Λ)
2C(ti+1, 0)Λ
and thus
y∗(ti, X(ti),Γ) > 0.
Applying the strategy (x∗(ti, X(ti),Γ), y∗(ti, X(ti),Γ)) to a setting with adverse
selection Γ˜ < Γ generates hence strictly less costs. This implies by backward
induction that
v(ti, X(ti), Γ˜) < v(ti, X(ti),Γ).
(iii) Note first that A1 is independent of Γ by Equation (A.1) and (A.6) (recall that
C1 is independent of Γ). As C2(ti, tj , ·) is strictly increasing in Γ (cf. the proof
of (i)), A2(ti, tj) is strictly increasing in Γ for i = 0, . . . , N − 1, j = i+ 1, . . . , N by
Equation (A.7). Let now Γ˜ < Γ < Γ0 and assume that
X(ti) ∈ [X¯(ti, tj ,Γ), X¯(ti, tj+1,Γ)) for j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , N}.
By (i), we have X(ti) ∈ [X¯(ti, th, Γ˜), X¯(ti, th+1), Γ˜) for h ≥ j. Therefore (and by
the monotonicity of A2),
x∗(ti, X(ti), Γ˜) = A1(ti, th, Γ˜)X(ti) +A2(ti, th, Γ˜)
≤ A1(ti, tj , Γ˜)X(ti) +A2(ti, tj , Γ˜) (1.73)
< A1(ti, tj ,Γ)X(ti) +A2(ti, tj ,Γ)
= x∗(ti, X(ti),Γ),
where Inequality (1.73) follows from the concavity of x∗(ti, ·, Γ˜) (cf. Corollary 1.4.7
(ii)).
(iv) By Corollary 1.4.5 (iii),
x∗(ti, X(ti), ·) + y∗(ti, X(ti), ·)
is strictly decreasing in Γ, and hence y∗(ti, X(ti),Γ) is strictly decreasing in Γ
by (iii).
(v) Let Γ˜ < Γ < Γ0. By forward induction on j, we deduce from (iii) that for j > i,
Xne(tj ,Γ) = Xne(ti−1,Γ)− x∗(ti−1, Xne(ti−1,Γ),Γ)
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Figure 1.13.: Dependence of the optimal order size in the primary venue (solid lines) and
in the dark pool (dashed lines) on adverse selection (left picture) and on the probability of
execution in the dark pool (right picture), respectively. X(t0) = 1.5, N = 2, Λ = 10, Σ = 12 ,
α = 4; p = 0.6 in the left picture, Γ = 10 in the right picture.
≤ Xne(ti−1, Γ˜)− x∗(ti, Xne(ti−1, Γ˜),Γ) (1.74)
< Xne(ti−1, Γ˜)− x∗(ti, Xne(ti−1, Γ˜), Γ˜)
= Xne(ti, Γ˜),
where (1.74) follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact that X(ti) −
x∗(ti, X(ti)) is strictly increasing in X(ti) (cf. Corollary 1.4.5 (iii)).
Figure 1.13 illustrates the dependence of the trading speed in the primary venue on
adverse selection (left picture) and on the probability of execution (right picture). As we
have shown in Proposition 1.4.8, large adverse selection speeds up trading in the primary
venue and decreases the optimal order size in the dark pool. On the other hand, high
execution probability in the dark pools slows down trading in the primary venue and
increases the optimal order size in the dark pool.
1.4.6. Closed form solutions
With the results about the optimal strategy given in Theorem 1.4.4 and Corollary 1.4.5,
we are able to derive inhomogeneous linear difference equations for the functions X¯(·, tj),
which we solve explicitly in Corollary 1.4.10. We can deduce closed form solutions for
the coefficients A1, . . . , C3.
To this end, we first require the following lemma which reduces the set of possibly
optimal strategies.
Lemma 1.4.9. Let j = 1, . . . , N and X(t0) = X¯(t0, tj). For an admissible liquidation
strategy (x˜, y˜) ∈ A(t0, X(t0)), we define the trading trajectory for the scenario, where no
dark pool orders are executed by
X˜(ti), i = 0, . . . , N.
Let (x˜, y˜) be optimal. If no dark pool order is executed before tj−2, then
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(i)
X˜(tj−1) = X¯(tj−1, tj) =
Γ(C(tj , 0) + Λ)
2C(tj , 0)Λ
,
(ii)
X˜(tj) =
Γ
2C(tj , 0)
,
(iii)
X˜(ti)− x˜(ti)− y˜(ti) = Γ2C(tj+1, 0)
for i = 0, . . . , j − 2, and
(iv)
x˜(ti) = A(ti, 0)X˜(ti), y˜(ti) = 0
for i ≥ j.
If a dark pool order is executed at time tk, k = 0, . . . , j − 2, then
(v) the optimal strategy without dark pool is applied at trading times tk+1, . . . , tN .
Proof. Let Xne(ti) be defined recursively by
Xne(t0) = X(t0) and Xne(ti) = Xne(ti−1)− x∗(ti, Xne(ti−1)) for i > 0. (1.75)
By Theorem 1.4.4, the optimal strategy (x˜, y˜) must satisfy
X˜(ti) = Xne(ti)
for all i = 0, . . . , N . We have
Xne(ti) = X¯(ti, tj)
for i = 0, . . . , j − 1 by Corollary 1.4.5 (iv), in particular
Xne(tj−1) = X¯(tj−1, tj) =
Γ(C(tj , 0) + Λ)
2C(tj , 0)Λ
,
and (i) follows. Assertion (ii) follows as
Xne(tj) = Xne(tj−1)− x∗(tj−1, Xne(tj−1)) = (1−A(tj−1, 0))Xne(tj−1)
= Γ2C(tj , 0)
.
Assertion (iii) follows from Corollary 1.4.5 (iii), Assertions (iv) and (v) follow directly
from Corollary 1.4.5 (i) and (iii).
We denote the set of admissible strategies satisfying (i) - (v) by A¯(t0, X(t0)).
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We are now able to derive explicit formulae for X¯(ti, tj) (i = 0, . . . , N−1, j = i, . . . , N)
by minimizing the costs over those strategies only that fulfill (i) - (v).
Corollary 1.4.10. Let i = 0, . . . , N − 1, j = i, . . . , N . Then
X¯(ti, tj) =
1
2αΣ(1− p) sinh(κ(p))
·
(
2αΣ
(
d(tj) sinh((j − i)κ(p))
√
1− pj−i+1
− e(tj) sinh((j − i− 1)κ(p))
√
1− pj−i+2
)
+ Γp
(√
1− pj−i−1 sinh((j − i)κ(p))
−√1− pj−i sinh((j − i− 1)κ(p))− sinh(κ(p)))), (1.76)
where
d(tj) :=
Γ(C(tj , 0) + Λ)
2C(tj , 0)Λ
, e(tj) :=
Γ
2C(tj , 0)
for j < N and
d(tN ) := e(tN ) := 0.
Closed form solutions for the coefficients A1, . . . , C3 are given in Appendix A.2 (Equa-
tions (A.12) - (A.24)).
Proof. Let j = 2, . . . , N and X(t0) = X¯(t0, tj). Define Xne(ti) as in (1.75) and consider
the cost functional J(t0, X(t0), ·) : A(t0, X(t0)) −→ R given by
J(t0, X(t0), (x, y)) := E
[ N∑
j=0
Λx(tj)2 + pΓ|y(tj)|
]
+ αE
[ N∑
j=0
ΣX(tj)2
]
.
By Lemma 1.4.9, we can replace A by A¯:
v(t0, X(t0)) = inf
(x,y)∈A(t0,X(t0))
J(t0, X(t0), (x, y)) = inf
(x,y)∈A¯(t0,X(t0))
J(t0, X(t0), (x, y)).
Let now (x˜, y˜) ∈ A¯(t0, X(t0)) and define X˜(ti) as in Lemma 1.4.9. By the definition of
A¯, we have
X˜(t0) = X(t0), X˜(tj−1) =
Γ(C(tj , 0) + Λ)
2C(tj , 0)Λ
, X˜(tj) =
Γ
2C(tj+1, 0)
.
The costs of the strategy (x˜, y˜) are given by
J(t0, X(t0), (x˜, y˜))
=
j−2∑
i=0
(1− p)i
(
Λ(X˜(ti)− X˜(ti+1))2 + αΣX˜(ti)2 + pΓ
(
X˜(ti+1)− Γ2C(ti+1,0)
))
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+
j−2∑
i=0
(1− p)ipC(ti+1, 0)
(
Γ
2C(ti+1,0)
)2
+ (1− p)j−1
(
Λ(X˜(tj−1)− X˜(tj))2 + αΣX˜(tj−1)2 + C(tj , 0)
(
Γ
2C(tj ,0)
)2)
(1.77)
=: U(X˜(t1), . . . , X˜(tj−2)).
Let us briefly comment on the terms in Equation (1.77).
(i) The terms
Λ(X˜(ti)−X˜(ti+1))2, αΣ(X˜(ti))2, pΓ
(
X˜(ti+1)− Γ2C(ti+1, 0)
)
, i = 0, . . . , j−2,
reflect the impact, risk respectively adverse selection costs at time ti in the scenarios
where no dark pool order is executed before time ti (cf. Lemma 1.4.9 (iii) for the
adverse selection costs). This happens with probability (1− p)i.
(ii) The term
C(ti+1, 0)
(
Γ
2C(ti+1,0)
)2
, i = 0, . . . , j − 2,
reflects the costs for the remainder of the trading horizon (times ti+1, . . . , tN ) in
the scenarios, where the dark pool order is executed at time ti; the corresponding
scenarios have probability p(1− p)i.
(iii) The terms
Λ(X˜(tj−1)− X˜(tj))2 + αΣX˜(tj−1)2, C(tj , 0)
(
Γ
2C(tj ,0)
)2
reflect the costs at time tj−1 respectively for the remainder of the trading horizon
(times tj , . . . , tN ) in the scenarios, where no dark pool order is executed until time
tj−1. This happens with probability (1− p)j−1.
The optimal strategy (x∗, y∗) minimizes J(t0, X0, ·) uniquely. Therefore,
(Xne(t1), . . . , Xne(tj−2))
minimizes U uniquely and solves the system of linear equations
∂U
∂xi
(X˜(t1), . . . , X˜(tj−2)) = 0, i = 1, . . . , j − 2.
This is equivalent to the inhomogeneous linear difference equation
X˜(ti)
(
1 + 11− p +
αΣ
Λ
)
+ Γp2(1− p)Λ = X˜(ti+1) +
1
1− pX˜(ti−1). (1.78)
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By standard methods we compute a special solution of Equation (1.78):
X(1)(ti) =
−Γp
2(1− p)αΣ
and two linearly independent solutions of the corresponding homogeneous linear differ-
ence equation:
X(2)(ti) =
exp(κ(p)(j − 1− i))√
1− pi
, X(3)(ti) =
exp(−κ(p)(j − 1− i))√
1− pi
.
Consequently, the solutions of Equation (1.78) are given by
X(1)(ti) + aX(2)(ti) + bX(3)(ti)
for a, b ∈ R.
Xne(ti) = X¯(ti, tj) is the unique solution of Equation (1.78) satisfying the boundary
conditions
X˜(tj−1) =
Γ(C(tj , 0) + Λ)
2C(tj , 0)Λ
, X˜(tj) =
Γ
2C(tj , 0)
.
Elementary but tedious algebraic manipulations confirm Equation (1.76).
We deduce closed form solutions for the coefficients A1, . . . , C3 as follows. By Corol-
lary 1.4.5 (iv), we have
X¯(ti, tj)−A1(ti, tj)X¯(ti, tj)−A2(ti, tj) = X¯(ti+1, tj),
X¯(ti, tj+1)−A1(ti, tj)X¯(ti, tj+1)−A2(ti, tj) = X¯(ti+1, tj+1)
for i = 0, . . . , N − 2, j = i+ 1, . . . , N − 1. Here, we defined by abuse of notation
X¯(ti+1, ti+1) :=
Γ
2C(ti+2, 0)
6= 0.
Solving this system of linear equations in A1(ti, tj) and A2(ti, tj) yields Equations (A.12)
and (A.13). Equations (A.14) - (A.17) follow from that directly with the correspond-
ing recursions from Appendix A.1. Equations (A.18), (A.20) and (A.22) follow from
Corollary 1.4.5 (ii). Therefore, Equation (A.19) follows as
X¯(ti, tN )−A1(ti, tN )X¯(ti, tN )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B1(ti,tN )X¯(ti,tN )
−A2(ti, tN ) = X¯(ti+1, tN ).
Equation (A.21) follows from Corollary 1.4.5 (iv) (recall that A(ti, p) + B(ti, p) = 1),
and Equation (A.23) follows from Equation (A.7). Finally, Equation (A.24) follows by
a backward induction on i ≤ N − 1 from Equations (A.1) and (A.5).
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1.5. Trading prices in the dark pool
So far we have assumed that trades in the dark pool are executed at the unaffected
price P˜ . Within this section we assume instead that dark pool orders are executed at
the exchange quoted price P , which includes the temporary market impact of the orders
x(ti). As indicated in Section 1.1.2, this might be a more appropriate assumption for
some dark pools. This results in profitable market manipulating strategies unless the
model parameters are chosen with great care as we shall show in this section. For
simplicity, we assume the single asset model described in Section 1.3.3 and furthermore
assume that the investor is risk-neutral (α = 0) in this section.
Market manipulation is a concern in all market models where a large trader’s orders
have a feedback effect on the execution price of her own orders. Huberman and Stanzl
[2004] and Gatheral [2010] derive necessary conditions for market models that exclude
profitable market manipulation at a primary exchange. Both papers disregard trading
opportunities in dark pools. For the primary exchange, the market model introduced
in Section 1.3 fulfills the requirements established in these papers, i.e., it is not possible
to generate profits from market manipulation by trading only at the primary exchange.
However, it might be possible to generate profits from market manipulation if orders are
placed cleverly in parallel in the dark pool. It is unclear whether such profitable market
manipulation strategies exist in reality; given that such strategies were used and had
to be forbidden (see Gatheral [2010] for an exposition), such opportunities seem to be
available at least sometimes. Nevertheless, we agree with Huberman and Stanzl [2004],
Gatheral [2010], Alfonsi and Schied [2010] and Alfonsi et al. [2009] that an appropriate
mathematical market model should exclude profitable market manipulation.
For the purposes of this section, we define market manipulation strategies in the
following way.
Definition 1.5.1. Let i = 0, . . . , N and X(ti) ∈ R. We call a strategy (x(ti), y(ti)) a
market manipulation strategy if
sgn(X(ti)) 6= sgn(x(ti)) or sgn(X(ti)) 6= sgn(y(ti)).
As we saw in Section 1.3.4, such orders can be attractive as risk mitigation tools in
a multi asset setting. In the single asset setting of this section this justification does
not apply, and we saw in Section 1.3.3 that if trades are executed in the dark pool at
fundamental prices, then market manipulation as defined here is never optimal.
In the following we consider in particular a market manipulation strategy similar to
the classical ‘pump and dump’ strategy2. In our market model, selling the stock at the
primary exchange after artificially elevating its price (‘pumping’) cannot generate profits
due to the associated price reaction. A liquidation in the dark pool however does not
face such a price penalty. Consider the following strategy:
2“‘Pump and dump’ schemes, also known as ‘hype and dump manipulation’, involve the touting of a
company’s stock [...] . After pumping the stock, fraudsters make huge profits by selling their cheap
stock into the market.” (From http://www.sec.gov/answers/pumpdump.htm)
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Assume that the initial asset position is zero and that the number of trading time
points N + 1 is divisible by four. From t0 until t(N+1)/4 the investor buys a stock
quantity X at each point in time at the primary exchange. Simultaneously, she seeks
to dump shares by placing a sell order for (N+1)X2 in the dark pool until the order gets
executed (if at all). At time t(N+1)/4 the investor either holds a long or short position
of (N+1)X4 in the asset, which she liquidates at a constant rate over the remaining time
points t(N+1)/4, . . . , tN . The expected trading proceeds are then
E
[ N∑
i=0
(x(ti) + z(ti))P (ti)
]
= E
[ N∑
i=0
(x(ti) + z(ti))P˜ (ti)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−E
[ N∑
i=0
(x(ti) + z(ti))Λx(ti)
]
= Λ
(
− (N + 1)(14 +
3
4
1
9)X
2 + (1− (1− p)(N+1)/4)(N + 1)X
2
2
)
= Λ(N + 1)
(1
6 −
(1− p)(N+1)/4
2
)
X2.
The last expression is positive if the number of trading time points N+1 is large enough.
Furthermore, the expected proceeds grow in the position sizing factor X: the larger the
bets, the larger the expected proceeds. The following proposition summarizes the issues
we found.
Proposition 1.5.2. Assume that trades in the dark pool are executed at the market price
P . If
N + 1 ≥ b4 log(1/3)/ log(1− p)c+ 1,
then profitable market manipulation strategies exist and optimal strategies do not exist.
In Section 1.3.3 we assumed both infinite liquidity in the dark pool if trading is possible
(a(ti), b(ti) ∈ {0,∞}) and no adverse selection ((ti+1) independent of a(ti), b(ti)). We
replace Assumption 1.3.1 (iii) by the following assumption.
Assumption 1.5.3. Let i = 0, . . . , N − 1.
(i) Liquidity in the dark pool is bounded:
a(ti), b(ti) ∈ {0, L}
for some L ∈ (0,∞).
(ii) There might be adverse selection:
E[(ti+1)|a(ti) = L] = −Γ, E[(ti+1)|b(ti) = L] = Γ
with Γ > 0.
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By limiting dark pool liquidity, market manipulating strategies with very large trades
cannot be profitable. On the other hand, adverse selection makes market manipula-
tion by small trades unprofitable. The following proposition shows that if Assump-
tion 1.3.1 (iii) is replaced by Assumption 1.5.3 and adverse selection is sufficiently large,
then the undesirable properties outlined in Proposition 1.5.2 disappear.
Proposition 1.5.4. Let i = 0, . . . , N . Assume that trades in the dark pool are executed
at the market price P (tj), j = i, . . . , N . We consider the following optimization problem:
v¯(ti, X(ti)) := inf
(x,y)∈A(ti,X(ti))
E
[ N∑
j=i
(
x(tj) + z(tj)
)>(
P˜ (ti)− P (tj)
)]
. (1.79)
If
Γ > ΛL, (1.80)
then there exist optimal strategies realizing the minimum in Equation (1.79) and these
are not market manipulating.
Proof. We prove existence of an optimal trading strategy together with symmetry,
v¯(ti,−X(ti)) = v¯(ti, X(ti)),
monotonicity,
|X(ti)| ≤ |Y (ti)| ⇒ v¯(ti, X(ti)) ≤ v¯(ti, Y (ti))
and continuity of the value function v¯(ti, ·) by backward induction (cf. Theorem 1.4.2
and its proof). The case i = N is clear. For i < N , Equation (1.79) yields the Bellman
equation
v¯(ti, X(ti)) = inf
(x,y)∈R×R, |y|≤L
{
Λx2 + p|y|Γ + pΛxy + pv¯(ti+1, X(ti)− x− y)
+ (1− p)v¯(ti+1, X(ti)− x)
}
.
=: inf
(x,y)∈R×R, |y|≤L
v˜(X(ti), x, y). (1.81)
Symmetry follows immediately. For monotonicity, we can therefore assume without loss
of generality that 0 ≤ X(ti) ≤ Y (ti). Let (x(ti), y(ti)) ∈ R2 be an admissible pair of
orders. Let us first assume that
sgn(x(ti)) = sgn(y(ti)) or x(ti) · y(ti) = 0.
As in the proof of Theorem 1.4.2, we define:
x˜(ti) :=
{
x(ti) if X(ti)− x(ti) ≥ 0
X(ti) else,
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y˜(ti) :=

y(ti) if X(ti)− x(ti), X(ti)− x(ti)− y(ti) ≥ 0
X(ti)− x(ti) if X(ti)− x(ti) ≥ 0, X(ti)− x(ti)− y(ti) < 0
0 else.
In all three possible cases a simple argument using the induction hypothesis establishes
v˜(X(ti), x˜(ti), y˜(ti)) ≤ v˜(Y (ti), x(ti), y(ti)).
Let therefore
sgn(x(ti)) 6= sgn(y(ti)).
Assume that
v¯(ti+1, Y (ti)− x(ti)) < v¯(ti+1, Y (ti)− x(ti)− y(ti)) + Λx(ti)y(ti) + Γ|y(ti)|.
Then orders
x¯(ti) = x(ti) and y¯(ti) = 0
result in lower costs:
Λx(ti)2 + v¯(ti+1, Y (ti)− x(ti)),
and therefore we obtain as before
v˜(X(ti), ˜¯x(ti), ˜¯y(ti)) ≤ v˜(Y (ti), x¯(ti), y¯(ti)) < v˜(Y (ti), x(ti), y(ti)).
Otherwise,
v¯(ti+1, X(ti)− x(ti)) ≥ v¯(ti+1, X(ti)− x(ti)− y(ti)) + Λx(ti)y(ti) + Γ|y(ti)|
and orders
x¯(ti) = x(ti) + y(ti) and y¯(ti) = 0
result in lower costs:
Λx(ti)2 + Λy(ti)2 + 2Λx(ti)y(ti) + v¯(ti+1, X(ti)− x(ti)− y(ti))
< Λx(ti)2 + Λy(ti)x(ti) + Γ|y(ti)|+ v¯(ti+1, X(ti)− x(ti)− y(ti)), (1.82)
where Inequality (1.82) follows from Condition (1.80), sgn(x∗(ti)) 6= sgn(y∗(ti)) and the
fact that |y(ti)| ≤ L (cf. Definition 1.1.4 (ii)). Again,
v˜(X(ti), ˜¯x(ti), ˜¯y(ti)) ≤ v˜(Y (ti), x¯(ti), y¯(ti)) < v˜(Y (ti), x(ti), y(ti)),
and monotonicity follows.
By the induction hypothesis, an optimal strategy for X(ti+1) = 0 exists, and therefore
the value function v¯(ti+1, ·) is bounded from below:
v¯(ti+1, ·) ≥ v¯(ti+1, 0) > −∞,
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hence
lim
‖(x,y)‖→∞
v˜(X(ti), x, y) = lim|x|→∞ v˜(X(ti), x, y) =∞. (1.83)
The induction hypothesis implies continuity of v¯(ti+1, ·) which in turn implies continuity
of v˜(·). Hence, Equation (1.83) implies the existence of an optimal trading strategy at
time ti. Continuity of v¯(ti, ·) follows directly.
It remains thus to show that optimal liquidation strategies are not market manipulat-
ing. We proceed by backward induction again. The case i = N is clear. For i < N and
asset position X(ti), we consider an optimal strategy
(x∗(ti), y∗(ti)).
By the considerations above, we know that
sgn(x∗(ti)) = sgn(y∗(ti)) or x∗(ti) · y∗(ti) = 0.
It follows directly from the Bellman Equation (1.81) that
sgn(x∗(ti)) 6= sgn(X(ti)) or sgn(y∗(ti)) 6= sgn(X(ti))
yield a contradiction as in these cases, orders
x˜(ti) = y˜(ti) = 0
result in lower costs.
Note that neither limited dark pool liquidity nor adverse selection alone are sufficient
to establish the previous proposition; only the combination of the two ensures the desired
property.
The assumptions of Proposition 1.5.4 are strong; we leave it for future research to de-
termine tighter necessary and sufficient conditions for the exclusion of profitable market
manipulation in markets with dark pools. We only want to remark that our assump-
tions in Proposition 1.5.2 are not too restrictive for dark pool usage in general: for large
initial asset positions X(t0), the optimal strategy places orders in the dark pool in a
non-market manipulating fashion.
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We transfer the discrete-time trading model of Chapter 1 into a continuous-time trading
model in Section 2.1. More precisely, we consider the portfolio liquidation model of
Section 1.3 and replace the discrete trades in the primary venue by a continuous trading
intensity that can be controlled by the trader. Additionally, we assume that execution
of orders in the dark pool is driven by an n-dimensional Poisson process.
The costs of a trading strategy are specified by the continuous-time analog of the
Optimization Problem (OPTdis). Thus we obtain a linear-quadratic stochastic control
problem. Due to the liquidation constraint, the value function v of the optimization
problem has a singularity at the terminal time. Thus, a verification argument using the
HJB equation corresponding to the problem requires non-standard considerations.
We first approximate the liquidation constraint by penalizing non-liquidation by finite
end-costs. Heuristic considerations indicate that the value function of the modified
optimization problem is quadratic. The corresponding HJB equation suggests that it is
given via an initial value problem for a matrix differential equation.
We analyze this initial value problem in Section 2.2. The differential equation is not a
Riccati matrix differential equation, and therefore the existing theory for this type of dif-
ferential equations is not applicable directly. However, via an adequate matrix inequality
we can apply a well-known comparison result for Riccati equations and prove existence
of the solution of the initial value problem on the whole interval [0, T ]. Additionally, we
are able to obtain upper and lower bounds for this solution in closed form.
These results enable us to solve the modified optimization problem with finite end-
costs in Section 2.3. By letting the end-costs tend to infinity, we can transfer the solution
to the original optimal liquidation problem in Section 2.4. The key results towards this
goal are the bounds obtained in Section 2.2.
In Section 2.5 we determine properties of the optimal liquidation strategy. In Sec-
tion 2.6 we analyze convergence of the solution of the discrete-time optimization problem
of Section 1.3 to the solution of the continuous-time optimization problem obtained in
Section 2.4.
2.1. Model description
For a fixed time interval [0, T ], we consider the stochastic basis (Ω,F ,P,F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ]),
where the filtration satisfies the usual conditions.
As in Chapter 1, we investigate a market model where a risk-averse trader with a
personal risk-aversion parameter α ≥ 0 has to liquidate a portfolio x ∈ Rn of n assets
within a finite trading horizon [0, T ]. Again, the investor has the possibility to trade
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simultaneously at a traditional exchange and in a dark pool, facing the trade-off of
paying market impact costs in the traditional exchange against uncertain execution in
the dark pool.
Here, we replace the discrete orders in the primary venue of Chapter 1 by a trading
intensity that can be controlled by the trader at any given point in time t ∈ [0, T ). We
also allow for continuous updating of the orders in the dark pool.
In a similar fashion as in Section 1.3, we assume that trading in the traditional ex-
change generates linear temporary price impact given by a positive definite matrix
Λ ∈ Rn×n, constant in time.
Trading in the dark pool neither generates price impact nor does the trader pay a higher
price in the dark pool because of the price impact generated by her trading in the
traditional exchange (in contrast to the model in Section 1.5).
The fundamental price at which the assets are traded in the market (provided the
large investor does not influence the demand and supply by her actions) is given by an
n-dimensional stochastic process
P˜ = (P˜ (t))t∈[0,T ].
As in Section 1.3, we assume that P˜ is a martingale. By the results of Section 1.3.2,
both the optimal strategy and the value function in the case of discrete-time trading
are independent of the evolution of the fundamental asset prices. For simplicity and
in order to keep the exposition consistent, we will not specify P˜ any further, and the
costs of a given trading strategy will not be directly specified via the implementation
shortfall (cf. Definition 1.1.5). Rather they will be specified in an analog fashion as in
the Optimization Problem (OPTdis), and the fundamental asset price P˜ will only be
relevant through its covariance matrix
Σ ∈ Rn×n, constant in time.
In analogy to the Poisson type execution of orders in the dark pool in the discrete-
time model in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, we model trade execution in the dark pool by an
n-dimensional Poisson process
pi = (pi1, . . . , pin)
with intensities
θ1, . . . , θn ≥ 0,
respectively. We assume that pi1, . . . , pin are independent.
In Section 2.1.1 we specify admissibility of trading strategies and derive a useful mo-
ment estimate for the controlled portfolio process that we require for the verification
argument in Section 2.3. In Section 2.1.2 we define the cost functional and the optimiza-
tion problem. Heuristic arguments suggest that the value function of the optimization
problem is singular at terminal time T because of the liquidation constraint. Hence, we
introduce a modified optimization problem where we drop the liquidation constraint and
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approximate it by finite end-costs for a portfolio not liquidated by time T as an interme-
diate step. In Section 2.1.3 we derive a candidate for the value function of the modified
optimization problem via a quadratic ansatz and the corresponding HJB Equation. In
Section 2.3 we verify that this candidate is indeed the value function of the modified
optimization problem. In Section 2.4 we show that if the end-costs tend to infinity,
the limit of the candidate value function converges to the value function of the original
liquidation problem.
2.1.1. Admissible trading strategies
Let t ∈ [0, T ) be a given point in time and x ∈ Rn be the portfolio position of the trader
at time t.
The trader has the possibility to trade asset k in the traditional exchange with trading
intensity ξk(s) at time s ∈ [t, T ) and to place orders ηk(s) in the dark pool at time s.
We call a 2n - dimensional stochastic process
(u(s))s∈[t,T ) = (ξ(s), η(s))s∈[t,T )
a trading strategy if ξ is progressively measurable and η is predictable. Given a trading
strategy u, the portfolio position at time s ∈ [t, T ) is given by the following controlled
stochastic differential equation:
dXu(s) = −ξ(s)ds− η(s)dpi(s)
Xu(t) = x
(2.1)
such that the left hand side in (2.1) is well-defined.
For solving the optimization problem we have in mind, we require all trading strategies
to fulfill the following conditions.
Definition 2.1.1. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ Rn be fixed. Let
u = (u(s))s∈[t,T ) = ((ξ(s), η(s)))s∈[0,T )
be a trading strategy, i.e., ξ is progressively measurable and η is predictable.
(a) We call u an admissible trading strategy if it fulfills the following conditions.
(i) The Stochastic Differential Equation (2.1) possesses a unique solution on [t, T ).
(ii)
Et,x
[ T∫
t
‖ξ(s)‖42ds
]
:= E
[ T∫
t
‖ξ(s)‖42ds
∣∣∣Xu(t) = x] <∞,
Et,x
[ T∫
t
‖η(s)‖82ds
]
:= E
[ T∫
t
‖η(s)‖82ds
∣∣∣Xu(t) = x] <∞. (2.2)
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(iii) If θi = 0, then ηi(s) = 0 for all s ∈ [t, T ).
We denote the set of admissible trading strategies by A˜(t, x).
(b) We call u ∈ A˜(t, x) an admissible liquidation strategy or just liquidation strategy if
additionally
(iv)
lim
s→T−
Xu(s) = 0 a.s.
and denote the set of admissible liquidation strategies by A(t, x).
For convenience, we use from now on the notation in (ii) for expectations conditional
of the initial state x of the controlled process at time t.
Remark 2.1.2. Note that the set of admissible liquidation strategies is not empty. In-
deed, let t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ Rn and define u = (ξ, η) by
ξ(s) = x
T − t ,
η(s) = 0
for s ∈ [t, T ). Thus, the dark pool is not used, and the trading intensity in the primary
venue is constant. The solution of the Stochastic Differential Equation (2.1) is then
Xu(s) = x−
s∫
t
ξ(r)dr = (T − s)x
T − t
on [t, T ), in particular we have
lim
s→T−
Xu(s) = 0.
Remark 2.1.3. We expect that the stochastic control problems we solve in this chapter
and in Chapter 3 are such that the optimal control is of Markovian form (see, e.g., the
book by Øksendal [2007], Theorem 11.2.3):
u(s) = (ξ(s), η(s)) = (ξ(s,X(s)), η(s,X(s−))
for deterministic functions ξ, η : [t, T )×Rn → Rn.
The deterministic initial value problem
X ′ = −ξ(·, X)
X(t) = x
(2.3)
possesses a unique solution on [t, T ) if
‖ξ(s, y)‖ ≤ f(s)‖y‖+ g(s) on [t, T )×Rn
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for f, g ∈ C([t, T )) and ξ(s, ·) is locally Lipschitz (e.g., C1), i.e.,
‖ξ(s, y1)− ξ(s, y2)‖ ≤ h(s)‖y1 − y2‖ for y1, y2 ∈ Rn, s ∈ [t, T ),
where h is locally bounded (e.g., by Peano’s existence theorem and Gronwall’s inequality).
Let ξ : [t, T )×Rn → Rn fulfill these conditions and let η : [t, T )×Rn → Rn. We can
pathwise construct the solution of the Stochastic Differential Equation (2.1) inductively
by interlacing the jumps (see, e.g., Applebaum [2004], Example 1.3.13): as the n Poisson
processes are independent, they jump at distinct times almost surely. Let (τi)i≥1 be the
jump times of pi such that
t =: τ0 < τ1 < . . . almost surely,
and let X be the solution of the Initial Value Problem (2.3) on [τi, τi+1 ∧ T ) with initial
value x = X(τi) for i ∈ N such that τi ≤ T . For τi+1 ≤ T and ∆pik(τi+1) > 0, we set
X(τi+1) := X(τi+1−)− ηk(τi+1, X(τi+1−))ek,
where ek is the kth unit vector.
Definition 2.1.1 implies the following moment estimate for the controlled process. We
need this result later for the proof of the verification theorem in Section 2.3.2.
Proposition 2.1.4. Let t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ Rn and u ∈ A˜(t, x). Then
Et,x
[
sup
t≤s≤T
‖Xu(s)‖42
]
<∞,
in particular
Et,x
[ T∫
t
‖Xu(s)‖42ds
]
<∞.
Proof. Let s ∈ [t, T ]. Then
‖Xu(s)‖42 ≤
(
‖x‖2 +
∥∥∥ s∫
t
ξ(r)dr
∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥ s∫
t
η(r)dpi(r)
∥∥∥
2
)4
≤ 33
(
‖x‖42 +
∥∥∥ s∫
t
ξ(r)dr
∥∥∥4
2
+
∥∥∥ s∫
t
η(r)dpi(r)
∥∥∥4
2
)
≤ 27
(
‖x‖42 + (s− t)3
s∫
t
‖ξ(r)‖42dr +
∥∥∥ s∫
t
η(r)dpi(r)
∥∥∥4
2
)
, (2.4)
where Inequality (2.4) follows from a multidimensional version of Jensen’s inequality
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(see, e.g., Kallenberg [2002], Lemma 3.5). Note first that by Definition 2.1.1 (ii),
Et,x
[
(s− t)3
s∫
t
‖ξ(r)‖42dr
]
≤ (T − t)3Et,x
[ T∫
t
‖ξ(r)‖42dr
]
< K (2.5)
for a constant K independent of s. Let us now consider the compensated Poisson pro-
cesses
Mi(s) := pii(s)− θis, i = 1, . . . , n.
Then by Hölder’s inequality,
∣∣∣ s∫
t
ηi(r)dpii(r)
∣∣∣4 = ∣∣∣ ∑
r, ∆pii(r)6=0
ηi(r)
∣∣∣4
≤ (pii(s)− pii(t))3 s∫
t
|ηi(r)|4dpii(r)
=
(
pii(s)− pii(t)
)3( s∫
t
|ηi(r)|4dMi(r) + θi
s∫
t
|ηi(r)|4dr
)
.
We obtain
Et,x
[(
pii(s)− pii(t)
)3 s∫
t
|ηi(r)|4dMi(r)
]
≤ Et,x
[(
pii(s)− pii(t)
)6] 12Et,x[( s∫
t
|ηi(r)|4dMi(r)
)2] 12
(2.6)
≤ Et,x
[
pii(T − t)6
] 1
2
Et,x
[
θi
T∫
t
|ηi(r)|8dr
] 1
2
(2.7)
< Ki (2.8)
for a constant Ki independent of s. Inequality (2.6) follows from Hölder’s inequality,
Inequality (2.7) follows from Itô’s isometry (note that 〈Mi〉(s) = θis) and Inequality (2.8)
follows from Definition 2.1.1 (ii) and the fact that Poisson distributed random variables
have finite moments. Therefore, by Definition 2.1.1 (ii) and Hölder’s inequality (recall
that ei denotes the ith unit vector),
Et,x
[∥∥∥ s∫
t
η(r)dpi(r)
∥∥∥4
2
]
= Et,x
[∥∥∥ n∑
i=1
ei
s∫
t
ηi(r)dpii(r)
∥∥∥4
2
]
≤ n3
n∑
i=1
Et,x
[∣∣∣ s∫
t
ηi(r)dpii(r)
∣∣∣4]
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< K˜ (2.9)
for a constant K˜ independent of s. Combining Inequalities (2.4), (2.5) and (2.9) com-
pletes the proof.
2.1.2. Cost functional
In the discrete-time setting of Section 1.3.2 we showed that both the optimal strategy
and the value function are independent of the evolution of the fundamental asset price.
We define the costs of continuous-time admissible liquidation strategies u ∈ A(t, x) anal-
ogously to the costs of discrete-time strategies in the Optimization Problem (OPTdis).
Let t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ Rn. Then a liquidation strategy u ∈ A(t, x) yields the trading costs
J(t, x, u) := Et,x
[ T∫
t
f(ξ(s), Xu(s))ds
]
,
where f : Rn ×Rn → R is given by
f(ξ, x) := ξ>Λξ + αx>Σx. (2.10)
The first term of the right hand side of Equation (2.10) refers to the linear price impact
costs generated by trading in the traditional market. The second term refers to quadratic
risk costs penalizing slow liquidation. The trader aims to minimize her trading costs and
considers the following optimization problem:
v(t, x) := inf
u∈A(t,x)
J(t, x, u). (OPT)
Note that the optimization problem is well-defined and the value function satisfies
v(t, x) <∞
as for constant liquidation exclusively in the primary exchange, we have
v(t, x) ≤ J(t, x, u) =
T∫
t
( 1
(T − t)2x
>Λx+ (T − s)
2
(T − t)2 αx
>Σx
)
ds <∞.
Because of the liquidation constraint (cf. Definition 2.1.1 (iv)), we expect the value
function to fulfill
lim
s→T−
v(s, x) =
{
0 if x = 0
∞ else,
i.e., v has a singularity at the terminal time T . Because of this singularity, non-standard
considerations are necessary for solving the Optimization Problem (OPT) via a verifica-
tion argument using the HJB equation.
As an intermediate step, we hence weaken the liquidation constraint by allowing for all
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strategies u ∈ A˜(t, x) and penalizing non-liquidation by finite end-costs. More precisely,
for l > 0 and u = (ξ, η) ∈ A˜(t, x), we define the following cost functional
J˜(l, t, x, u) := Et,x
[ T∫
t
f(ξ(s), Xu(s))ds+ l ·Xu(T )>Xu(T )
]
.
The resulting optimization problem is
v˜(l, t, x) := inf
u∈A˜(t,x)
J˜(l, t, x, u). (O˜PT)
In the following, we solve the modified Optimization Problem (O˜PT) first. Later we
show that the solution of the Optimization Problem (O˜PT) converges to the solution of
the original Optimization Problem (OPT) as l→∞ (Section 2.4).
2.1.3. Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
In this section we derive a candidate for the value function of the Optimization Prob-
lem (O˜PT). Heuristic considerations suggest that it should satisfy the following HJB
equation (see, e.g., the book by Øksendal and Sulem [2007]):
∂w
∂t
(t, x) = sup
u=(ξ,η)∈Rn×Rn
[ n∑
i=1
θi
(
w(t, x)− w(t, x− η>ei)
)
+∇xw(t, x)ξ−f(ξ, x)
]
(H˜JB)
w(T, x) = lx>x.
There is reason to believe that the value function is quadratic in x (cf. Section 1.3).
Given that the above guesses are correct, the following lemma provides candidates both
for the value function and for the optimal strategy.
Lemma 2.1.5. Let w : R+ ×R×Rn → R be defined by
w(l, t, x) := x>C(l, t)x
for positive definite matrices
C(l, t) =
(
ci,j(l, t)
)
i,j=1,...,n ∈ Rn×n, t ∈ [0, T ],
such that ci,j(l, ·) ∈ C1([0, T ]) for i, j = 1, . . . , n.
Let h : R+ × [0, T ]×Rn ×Rn ×Rn → R be given by
h(l, t, x, ξ, η) :=
n∑
i=1
θi
(
w(t, x)− w(t, x− η>ei)
)
+∇xw(l, t, x)ξ − f(ξ, x)
88
2.1. Model description
=
n∑
i=1
θi
(
x>C(l, t)x− (x− ηiei)>C(l, t)(x− ηiei)
)
+ 2x>C(l, t)ξ − ξ>Λξ − αx>Σx. (2.11)
For fixed l > 0, t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ Rn, h(l, t, x, ·, ·) attains its maximum at
ξ∗ := ξ∗(l, t, x) := Λ−1C(l, t)x, (2.12)
η∗ := η∗(l, t, x) := C¯(l, t)C(l, t)x, (2.13)
where
C¯(l, t) := diag
( 1
ci,i(l, t)
)
. (2.14)
Moreover,
h(l, t, x, ξ∗, η∗) = x>C(l, t)Λ−1C(l, t)x+ x>C(l, t)C˜(l, t)C(l, t)x− αx>Σx, (2.15)
where
C˜(l, t) := diag
( θi
ci,i(l, t)
)
.
If θi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n, the maximum is obtained uniquely at (ξ∗, η∗) as in
Equations (2.12) and (2.13). If there exist i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that θij = 0
(j = 1, . . . , k), then ηij can be chosen arbitrarily without changing the value of h. Up to
arbitrary choices of ηij , the maximizer given in Equations (2.12) and (2.13) is unique.
Proof. We have
h(l, t, x, ξ, η) = −
n∑
i=1
θici,i(l, t)
(
ηi − e>i
1
ci,i(l, t)
C(l, t)x
)2
− (ξ − Λ−1C(l, t)x)>Λ(ξ − Λ−1C(l, t)x)
+ x>C(l, t)C˜(l, t)C(l, t)x+ x>C(l, t)Λ−1C(l, t)x− αx>Σx. (2.16)
If θi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n, the term in Equation (2.16) is maximal if and only if ξ = ξ∗
and η = η∗ for ξ∗ and η∗ as in Equations (2.12) and (2.13), respectively. If there exist
i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that θij = 0 (j = 1, . . . , k), ηij can be chosen arbitrarily
without changing the value of h.
Plugging (ξ∗, η∗) into Equation (2.11), we obtain Equation (2.15).
We can directly deduce a candidate for the value function via the solution of the
Matrix Differential Equation (2.17).
Corollary 2.1.6. Let l > 0 and assume that the initial value problem for a matrix
differential equation
C ′ = C>Λ−1C + C>C˜C − αΣ
C(T ) = lI
(2.17)
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possesses a positive definite solution C(l, t) on [0, T ]. Then
w(l, t, x) := x>C(l, t)x
satisfies the HJB Equation (H˜JB) with maximizer u∗ = (ξ∗, η∗) for
ξ∗ := ξ∗(l, t, x) := Λ−1C(l, t)x,
η∗ := η∗(l, t, x) := C¯(l, t)C(l, t)x
(as in Equations (2.12) and (2.13)).
2.2. Riccati matrix differential equations and inequalities
Corollary 2.1.6 suggests that we have to study the following initial value problem for a
matrix differential equation
C ′ = C>Λ−1C + C>C˜C − αΣ
C(T ) = lI,
(2.18)
where
C˜ := diag
( θi
ci,i
)
. (2.19)
It is not immediately clear that the Initial Value Problem (2.18) possesses a positive
definite solution on the whole interval [0, T ] for n ≥ 2. For n = 1, it reduces to
C ′ = C
2
Λ + θ1C − αΣ
C(T ) = l.
(2.20)
This is an initial value problem for a scalar Riccati differential equation with constant
coefficients, whose unique solution is explicitly known (cf. Section 2.2.2) and exists on
the whole interval [0, T ]. For n ≥ 2, the second summand in the matrix differential
equation
C>C˜C
is in general not linear (or quadratic), and (2.18) is not a Riccati matrix differential
equation. Furthermore, a closed form solution for the corresponding initial value problem
is not known, and the existing theory about Riccati matrix differential equations is not
applicable directly.
It turns out that appropriate upper and lower bounds for the non-linear term C>C˜C
transform to lower and upper bounds for the solution of the Matrix Initial Value Prob-
lem (2.18) and yield existence and positive definiteness of the solution on the whole
interval (−∞, T ] (but not on R in general). To this end, we require a version of a well-
known comparison result for matrix Riccati differential equations, which we state and
prove in Section 2.2.1. The main step is thus to obtain adequate matrix inequalities
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which enable us to transfer these results to the Initial Value Problem (2.18). Before
we execute this task in Section 2.2.3, we treat scalar Riccati differential equations with
constant coefficients, which can be solved explicitly in Section 2.2.2. Finally, we com-
bine the results of Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 in order to prove the existence of the
solution of (2.18) on (−∞, T ] in Section 2.2.4. We are also able to compute relatively
simple upper and lower bounds for the solution in closed form. These bounds will be a
main building block for the verification arguments in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4.
Before we proceed, we introduce the following notations.
Notation 2.2.1. (i) For symmetric matrices A and B we say
A > 0 (A ≥ 0)
if A is positive (nonnegative) definite. We say
A > B (A ≥ B)
if A−B is positive (nonnegative) definite.
(ii) We denote the smallest and the largest eigenvalues of a real-symmetric matrix A
by amin and amax, respectively.
(iii) We define the following nonnegative definite matrix:
D :=
√
Λ−1Σ
√
Λ−1.
2.2.1. Riccati matrix differential equations
In this section we prove a well-known comparison result for the solutions of Riccati matrix
differential equations. We only state and prove the result in the generality necessary for
the application we have in mind. For a general approach to Riccati matrix differential
equations, see, e.g., the book by Reid [1972].
Theorem 2.2.2. Let A(t), BP (t), CP (t), BQ(t), CQ(t) ∈ Rn×n be piecewise continuous
on R. Furthermore, let BP (t), CP (t), BQ(t), CQ(t) (t ∈ R) and SP , SQ ∈ Rn×n be
symmetric.
(i) Let t0 < t1 ≤ ∞ and
SP ≤ SQ, 0 ≤ BQ(·) ≤ BP (·), CP (·) ≤ CQ(·) (2.21)
on [t0, t1). Assume that the initial value problem
P ′ = −A>P − PA− PBPP + CP
P (t0) = SP
(2.22)
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possesses a solution P on [t0, t1). Then the initial value problem
Q′ = −A>Q−QA−QBQQ+ CQ
Q(t0) = SQ
(2.23)
possesses a solution Q on [t0, t1) and
P (t) ≤ Q(t) on [t0, t1).
(ii) Let t0 > t2 ≥ −∞ and
SQ ≤ SP , 0 ≤ BQ(·) ≤ BP (·), CP (·) ≤ CQ(·)
on (t2, t0]. Assume that the Initial Value Problem (2.22) possesses a solution P
on (t2, t0]. Then the Initial Value Problem (2.23) possesses a solution Q on (t2, t0]
and
P (t) ≥ Q(t) on (t2, t0].
Proof. Note first that uniqueness, local existence and symmetry of the solutions P (·)
and Q(·) follow from the Picard-Lindelöf theorem. We only prove the first assertion.
Straightforward modifications yield a proof of the second assertion.
Let
τ := sup{t ∈ [t0, t1)|Q exists on [t0, t)}
and Ψ be the fundamental matrix of
x′ = (A+BQQ)x on [t0, τ) with Ψ(t0) = I.
In the first step of the proof we show that
Ψ(t)>
(
Q(t)− P (t))Ψ(t) ≥ 0 on [t0, τ),
which implies by regularity of Ψ on [t0, τ) that
P (t) ≤ Q(t) on [t0, τ). (2.24)
To this end, we compute
d
dt
Ψ(t)>
(
Q(t)− P (t))Ψ(t)
= Ψ(t)>(A(t) +BQ(t)Q(t))>(Q(t)− P (t))Ψ(t)
+ Ψ(t)>(Q(t)− P (t))(A(t) +BQ(t)Q(t))Ψ(t) + Ψ(t)>(Q′(t)− P ′(t))Ψ(t)
= Ψ(t)>
(
CQ(t)− CP (t) +Q(t)BQ(t)Q(t) + P (t)BP (t)P (t)
−Q(t)BQ(t)P (t)− P (t)BQ(t)Q(t)
)
Ψ(t)
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= Ψ(t)>
(
CQ(t)− CP (t) + (Q(t)− P (t))BQ(t)(Q(t)− P (t))
+ P (t)(BP −BQ)P (t)
)
Ψ(t)
≥ 0
by (2.21). We deduce
Ψ(t)>
(
Q(t)− P (t))Ψ(t)
= Ψ(t0)>
(
Q(t0)− P (t0)
)
Ψ(t0) +
t∫
t0
d
ds
Ψ(s)>
(
Q(s)− P (s))Ψ(s)ds ≥ 0
on [t0, τ) by (2.21) and the inequality above as desired.
Let now Φ be the fundamental matrix of
x′ = Ax on R with Φ(t0) = I
and define
Z(t) := (Φ−1(t))>
(
SQ +
∫ t
t0
Φ(s)>CQ(s)Φ(s)ds
)
Φ−1(t).
In the next step of the proof, we show that
Φ(t)>
(
Z(t)−Q(t))Φ(t) ≥ 0 on [t0, τ),
hence by regularity of Φ on [t0, τ),
Q(t) ≤ Z(t) on [t0, τ). (2.25)
We note first that
Φ(t)>Z(t)Φ(t) = SQ +
∫ t
t0
Φ(s)>CQ(s)Φ(s)ds
and compute
d
dt
Φ(t)>
(
Z(t)−Q(t))Φ(t)
= Φ(t)>CQ(t)Φ(t)− Φ′(t)>Q(t)Φ(t)− Φ(t)>Q′(t)Φ(t)− Φ(t)>Q(t)Φ′(t)
= Φ(t)>Q(t)BQ(t)Q(t)Φ(t)
≥ 0
by (2.21). Similarly as before (note that Z(t0)−Q(t0) = SQ − SQ = 0),
Φ(t)>
(
Z(t)−Q(t))Φ(t) = t∫
t0
Φ(s)>Q(s)BQ(s)Q(s)Φ(s)ds ≥ 0
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on [t0, τ), as required.
To finish the proof, we need to show that τ = t1. Let us assume that τ < t1. Since by
our assumption on P , P and Z are continuous on the closed interval [t0, τ ], we have by
Inequalities (2.24) and (2.25) that
−cI ≤ P (t) ≤ Q(t) ≤ Z(t) ≤ cI on [t0, τ) (2.26)
for some constant c > 0. Thus for t ∈ [t0, τ),
Q(t) = Q(t0) +
t∫
t0
(−A>Q−QA−QBQQ+ CQ)(s)ds
−→ SQ +
τ∫
t0
(−A>Q−QA−QBQQ+ CQ)(s)ds as t→ τ−
since the integrand is bounded. By the existence theorem of Picard-Lindelöf, we obtain
existence of Q on [t0, τ + ) for some  > 0, contradicting the definition of τ .
2.2.2. Scalar Riccati differential equations
We will later use the following scalar Riccati differential equation with constant coef-
ficients, which can be solved explicitly (cf. the Initial Value Problem (2.20)). Let us
consider the problem
y′ = y2 + ay − b
y(T ) = c,
(2.27)
where a, b ≥ 0, c > 0, b < c2 + ac. If we substitute z(t) := y(t) + a2 , we obtain the initial
value problem
z′ = z2 − d
z(T ) = c+ a2 ,
(2.28)
where d := a24 + b ≥ 0. Let first d > 0. Noting that coth′ = 1 − coth2, we obtain that
the Initial Value Problem (2.28) is solved by
z(t) =
√
d coth
(√
d(T − t) + κ)
on (−∞, T ], where (note that c+ a2 >
√
d)
κ = arcoth
(c+ a2√
d
)
> 0.
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Thus, the Initial Value Problem (2.27) is solved by
y(t) =
√
d coth
(√
d(T − t) + κ)− a2 (2.29)
on (−∞, T ]. Note also that
lim
t→−∞ y(t) =
√
d− a2 > c > 0.
For d = 0 (i.e., a = b = 0), we obtain z′ = z2, z = y and the Initial Value Problem (2.27)
is solved by
y(t) = 1
T − t+ 1c
. (2.30)
The following simple upper and lower bounds for the solution of the Initial Value Prob-
lem (2.27) will later prove to be convenient.
Corollary 2.2.3. Let d > 0 and y be the solution of the Initial Value Problem (2.27),
i.e., y is as in Equation (2.29).
(i) Let t ∈ (−∞, T ], then
y(t) ≥ 1
T − t+ 1c+a/2
− a2 . (2.31)
(ii) Let t ∈ (−∞, T ] and c > √d, then
y(t) ≤ 1
T − t+ 1
c−√d+a/2
+
√
d− a2 . (2.32)
Proof. (i) As d > 0, we have that the solution z of the Initial Value Problem (2.28)
fulfills
z(t) ≥ 1
T − t+ 1c+a/2
on (−∞, T ] (2.33)
(cf. Theorem 2.2.2 (ii)). Equation (2.31) follows directly.
(ii) Let
h(t) := 1
T − t+ 1
c−√d+a/2
+
√
d.
Then h(T ) = c+ a2 and h(t) >
√
d on (−∞, T ] (recall c+ a2 >
√
d). Thus,
h′(t) = (h(t)−
√
d)2 = h(t)2 − 2
√
dh(t) + d < h(t)2 − d. (2.34)
By Theorem 2.2.2 (ii), h(t) ≥ z(t), and Equation (2.32) follows.
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2.2.3. Matrix inequalities
The matrix differential equation in (2.18) is not a Riccati type matrix differential equa-
tion and therefore the existing theory is not applicable; however, some of the methods
are. The main aim of this section is to bound the solution of (2.18) from below and from
above by systems that are Riccati differential equations and therefore easier to handle.
The inconvenient part of (2.18) is the non-linear term
CC˜C. (2.35)
For C > 0, we have
0 ≤ CC˜C.
Applying the results from the previous sections, we can use this lower bound to construct
an upper bound for the solution of the Initial Value Problem (2.18) in Section 2.2.4. This
upper bound is the solution of a matrix Riccati differential equation which is known in
closed form. On the other hand, it turns out that we need an upper bound of (2.35)
for obtaining a lower bound for the solution of the Initial Value Problem (2.18). Such a
bound is obtained in Corollary 2.2.5. It is a consequence of the matrix inequality stated
in the following theorem. This theorem is hence a vital component for the solution of
the Optimization Problems (OPT) and (O˜PT).
Theorem 2.2.4. Let C = (ci,j)i,j=1...,n ∈ Rn×n be a positive definite matrix and θi > 0,
i = 1, . . . , n. Then
C ≤ θ diag
(ci,i
θi
)
= θC˜−1, (2.36)
where
θ := θ(n) :=
n∑
i=1
θi.
Proof. We prove the inequality by induction on n. It is clear for n = 1 with equality
in (2.36).
Let now n ≥ 1 and C = (ci,j)i,j=1,...,n+1 ∈ R(n+1)×(n+1) be positive definite. Define
Cn ∈ Rn×n and c ∈ Rn such that
C =
(
Cn c
c> cn+1,n+1
)
.
For z = (x, y)> ∈ Rn ×R, z 6= 0, we have
z>Cz = x>Cnx+ 2x>cy + cn+1,n+1y2,
z> diag
(ci,i
θi
)
z = x> diag
(ci,i
θi
)
x+ cn+1,n+1
θn+1
y2.
Note that we use diag
(
ci,i
θi
)
both for the diagonal n × n - matrix with c1,1θ1 , . . . ,
cn,n
θn
in
the diagonal and for the respective diagonal (n + 1) × (n + 1) - matrix. Which one we
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refer to is always clear from the context.
z>
(
θ(n+ 1) diag
(ci,i
θi
)
− C
)
z
= θ(n+ 1)x> diag
(ci,i
θi
)
x+ θ(n+ 1)
θn+1
cn+1,n+1y
2
− x>Cnx− 2x>cy − cn+1,n+1y2
= x>
(
θ(n) diag
(ci,i
θi
)
− Cn
)
x>︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by the induction hypothesis
+ θn+1x> diag
(ci,i
θi
)
x− 2x>cy + θ(n)
θn+1
cn+1,n+1y
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗)
.
It is thus sufficient to show that (∗) ≥ 0.
(∗) =
(
x− 1
θn+1
diag
( θi
ci,i
)
cy
)>
θn+1 diag
(ci,i
θi
)(
x− 1
θn+1
diag
( θi
ci,i
)
cy
)
+
(
cn+1,n+1
θ(n)
θn+1
− c>
diag
( θi
ci,i
)
θn+1
c
)
y2, (2.37)
where the first term in Equation (2.37) is nonnegative as Cn (and therefore diag
( ci,i
θi
)
)
is positive definite and θn+1 > 0. We will now use the following property for positive
definite matrices A and B (see, e.g., the book by Horn and Johnson [1985], Corollary
7.7.4):
If 0 < A < B, then 0 < B−1 < A−1. (2.38)
Thus,
0 < 1
θ(n) diag
( θi
ci,i
)
≤ C−1n (2.39)
by the induction hypothesis. Moreover,
C
(
In×n −C−1n c
0 1
)
=
(
Cn 0
c> cn+1,n+1 − c>C−1n c
)
and hence
cn+1,n+1 − c>C−1n c =
detC
detCn
> 0. (2.40)
Finally,
cn+1,n+1 − 1
θ(n)c
> diag
( θi
ci,i
)
c
(2.39)
≥ cn+1,n+1 − c>C−1n c
(2.40)
> 0,
and the second term in (2.37) is positive.
Note that the same line of reasoning establishes strict inequality in Inequality (2.36)
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for n ≥ 2. We can now derive the desired upper bound for (2.35).
Corollary 2.2.5. For a positive definite matrix C ∈ Rn×n and θi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n, we
have
CC˜C ≤ θC. (2.41)
Proof. Let first θi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. By Theorem 2.2.4, we have
0 < C ≤ θC˜−1
and therefore (cf. Property (2.38))
C˜ ≤ θC−1.
As C is regular, this is equivalent to Inequality (2.41). If θi1 = · · · = θik = 0 for some
i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we set θ˜il = θil +  and let  tend to 0 in Inequality (2.41).
We close the section with two surprisingly simple matrix inequalities that are special
cases of Theorem 2.2.4. The first one proves useful for applications later.
Corollary 2.2.6. For a positive definite matrix C ∈ Rn×n, we have
C ≤ n diag (ci,i)
and
C ≤ tr(C)I.
Proof. The inequalities follow from Theorem 2.2.4 for θi = 1 respectively θi = ci,i (i =
1, . . . , n).
2.2.4. The key matrix differential equation
The matrix inequalities of Section 2.2.3 enable us to apply Theorem 2.2.2 to the Matrix
Initial Value Problem (2.18) such that we can prove existence of a solution C of (2.18)
on the whole interval (−∞, T ] and at the same time construct upper and lower bounds
for C. For technical reasons, we will rather bound
√
Λ−1C
√
Λ−1
though. The bounds are constructed in terms of multiples of the identity matrix and
hence commute with all matrices. Therefore, they transfer to bounds of C directly by
multiplying them with Λ.
In the following Lemma we solve two Riccati matrix initial value problems in closed
form. These solutions are proven to be the desired bounds in Theorem 2.2.8 below. This
is the key step for solving the Optimization Problems (OPT) and (O˜PT). First, we
obtain a well-defined candidate for the value function of (O˜PT). Secondly, the bounds
of C are needed for many important arguments of the corresponding verification proof
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in Section 2.3. Finally, the bounds enable us to transfer the solution of (O˜PT) to a
well-defined candidate for the solution of the Optimization Problem (OPT) by letting
l tend to infinity in Section 2.4. The limits of the upper and lower bounds are then
important for the verification proof.
Lemma 2.2.7. Let θi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , n, θ =
n∑
i=1
θi and l > l0, where
l0 := max
{
λmax
(√θ2
4 + αdmin −
θ
2
)
, λmin
(√
αdmax
)}
(2.42)
(cf. Notation 2.2.1). Then the initial value problems
P ′ = P 2 + θP − αdminI P (T ) = l
λmax
I
and
Q′ = Q2 − αdmaxI Q(T ) = l
λmin
I
possess unique positive definite solutions P (l, ·) respectively Q(l, ·) on (−∞, T ]. P and
Q are given by
P (l, t) = p(l, t)I, (2.43)
Q(l, t) = q(l, t)I, (2.44)
where
p(l, t) :=
√
θ2
4 + αdmin coth
(√θ2
4 + αdmin(T − t) + κ1(l)
)
− θ2 , (2.45)
q(l, t) :=
√
αdmax coth
(√
αdmax(T − t) + κ2(l)
)
(2.46)
for θ + αdmin > 0 respectively αdmax > 0 with
κ1(l) := arcoth
( l
λmax
+ θ2√
θ2
4 + αdmin
)
> 0,
κ2(l) := arcoth
( l
λmin√
αdmax
)
> 0
and
p(l, t) := 1
T − t+ λmaxl
, (2.47)
q(l, t) := 1
T − t+ λminl
(2.48)
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for θ = αdmin = 0 respectively αdmax = 0.
Proof. Let us first consider the scalar initial value problem
p′ = p2 + θp− αdmin
p(T ) = l
λmax
.
(2.49)
By Section 2.2.2, p(l, t) as in Equation (2.45) respectively Equation (2.47) solves (2.49).
We have
0 < p(l, t) <∞ for all t ∈ (−∞, T ]
and
P ′(l, t) = p′(l, t)I = (p2(l, t) + θp(l, t)− αdmin)I = P 2(l, t) + θP (l, t)− αdminI,
P (l, T ) = p(l, T )I = l
λmaxI
for P (l, t) as in Equation (2.43). By uniqueness of the solution, this establishes the
assertions that P as in Equation (2.43) solves the postulated Riccati matrix differential
equation uniquely in (−∞, T ] and that P (l, t) > 0 for all t ∈ (−∞, T ].
Setting θ = 0 and replacing dmin and λmax by dmax and λmin, establishes Equa-
tion (2.44), the existence of Q(l, ·) on (−∞, T ], 0 < q(l, t) < ∞ on (−∞, T ] and thus
Q(l, t) > 0.
Lemma 2.2.7 enables us to prove that the Initial Value Problem (2.18) admits a positive
definite solution on (−∞, T ]. The matrices P and Q turn out to be the desired bounds
for
√
Λ−1C(l, t)
√
Λ−1. Additionally, we introduce the simpler bounds p˜(l, t)I and q˜(l, t)I,
which simplify the calculations in several proofs of Sections 2.3 and 2.4. Note that all
results can be obtained without these simpler bounds by more tedious calculations.
Theorem 2.2.8. Let l > l0 for l0 as in Equation (2.42). The matrix differential equation
given by
C ′ = C>Λ−1C + C>C˜C − αΣ
C(T ) = lI
(2.50)
possesses a unique solution C(l, ·) on (−∞, T ]. The solution is symmetric for all t ∈
(−∞, T ] and
p˜(l, t)I ≤ P (l, t) ≤
√
Λ−1C(l, t)
√
Λ−1 ≤ Q(l, t) ≤ q˜(l, t)I, (2.51)
where P and Q are as in Lemma 2.2.7, and p˜ and q˜ are given by
p˜(l, t) := 1
T − t+ 2λmax2l+θλmax
− θ2 ,
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q˜(l, t) := 1
T − t+ λmin
l−λmin
√
αdmax
+
√
αdmax.
In particular, C(l, t) is positive definite for all t ∈ (−∞, T ].
Proof. Let C(l, t) be a solution of (2.50) on some interval (t1, T ]; note that there exists
a local solution by the Picard-Lindelöf theorem. The symmetry of Λ, Σ and the initial
value C(l, T ) = lI imply that C(l, t) is symmetric on (t1, T ].
Let now Pˆ := ΛP and Qˆ := ΛQ for P and Q as in Lemma 2.2.7. Then Pˆ (l, t) solves
Pˆ ′ = PˆΛ−1Pˆ + θPˆ − αdminΛ
Pˆ (T ) = l
λmax
Λ
and Qˆ(l, t) solves
Qˆ′ = QˆΛ−1Qˆ− αdmaxΛ
Qˆ(T ) = l
λmin
Λ
on (−∞, T ]. As P,Q > 0 and P and Q commute with Λ, we have
Pˆ (l, t), Qˆ(l, t) > 0.
Assume that
{t ∈ (t1, T ] |C(l, t) is not positive definite} 6= ∅ (2.52)
and define
τ := sup{t ∈ (t1, T ] |C(l, t) is not positive definite}.
As C(l, T ) = lI > 0 and C(l, ·) is continuous, there exists an  > 0 such that C(l, t) > 0
for t ∈ (T−, T ] and thus τ < T . We apply Theorem 2.2.2 (ii) to P¯ := −Pˆ and C¯ := −C
on [τ, T ]. We have
P¯ (l, T ) = − l
λmax
Λ ≥ −lI = C¯(l, T )
and
P¯ ′ = −P¯Λ−1P¯ + θP¯ + αdminΛ,
C¯ ′ = −C¯Λ−1C¯ + C¯ ˜¯CC¯ + αΣ
= −C¯Λ−1C¯ + θC¯ + (α√ΛD√Λ + C¯ ˜¯CC¯ − θC¯).
Let now x ∈ Rn. Applying Corollary 2.2.5 to −C¯, we obtain
x>
(
α
√
ΛD
√
Λ + C¯ ˜¯CC¯ − θC¯ − αdminΛ
)
x
= αx>
(√
Λ(D − dminI)
√
Λ
)
x+ x>
(
C¯ ˜¯CC¯ − θC¯)(t)x ≥ 0.
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As Λ > 0, Theorem 2.2.2 (ii) implies
C¯(l, t) ≤ P¯ (l, t)
and therefore
0 < Pˆ (l, t) ≤ C(l, t)
on (τ, T ]. By continuity of C(l, ·), we have
0 < Pˆ (l, τ) ≤ C(l, τ)
and thus C(l, t) > 0 in some neighborhood of τ , a contradiction to Assumption (2.52).
Hence, C(l, t) is positive definite on the whole interval (t1, T ]. Applying Theorem 2.2.2
(ii) in the same way as above again, yields that we may choose t1 = −∞ and that
0 < Pˆ (l, t) ≤ C(l, t)
on (−∞, T ].
Let now Q¯ := −Qˆ. We have
Q¯(l, T ) = − l
λmin
Λ ≤ −lI = C¯(l, T )
and
Q¯′ = −Q¯Λ−1Q¯+ αdmaxΛ,
C¯ ′ = −C¯Λ−1C¯ + (C¯ ˜¯CC¯ + α√ΛD√Λ).
Then for x ∈ Rn (note that C¯ ˜¯CC¯(l, t) < 0 for all t),
x>
(
αdmaxΛ− C¯ ˜¯CC¯ − α
√
ΛD
√
Λ
)
x = αx>
(√
Λ(dmaxI −D)
√
Λ
)
x− x>C¯ ˜¯CC¯(l, t)x ≥ 0.
Thus,
Q¯(l, t) ≤ C¯(l, t)
by Theorem 2.2.2 (ii) on (−∞, T ].
Combining the results above, we obtain
0 < P (l, t) ≤
√
Λ−1C(l, t)
√
Λ−1 ≤ Q(l, t)
on (−∞, T ] as Λ commutes with P and Q.
Corollary 2.2.3 directly implies
p˜(l, t)I ≤ P (l, t) and
q˜(l, t)I ≥ Q(l, t).
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2.3. Penalizing non-liquidation
In this section we solve the Optimization Problem (O˜PT). In Section 2.1.3 we obtained
candidates both for the value function and for the optimal strategy (cf. Lemma 2.1.5
and Corollary 2.1.6). In Section 2.2.4 we proved that these candidates are well-defined.
We are thus able to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 2.3.1. Let l ≥ l0 for l0 as in Equation (2.42) and let
C(l, t) = (ci,j(l, t))i,j=1,...,n
be the unique solution of the Initial Value Problem (2.18). Then the value function of
the Optimization Problem (O˜PT) is given by
v˜(l, t, x) = x>C(l, t)x (2.53)
and the P⊗ λ - almost surely unique optimal strategy is given by u∗(l) := (ξ∗(l), η∗(l)),
ξ∗(l) := ξ∗(l, t, x) := Λ−1C(l, t)x, (2.54)
η∗(l) := η∗(l, t, x) := I˜C¯(l, t)C(l, t)x, (2.55)
where I˜ = (ei,j)i,j=1,...,n is the diagonal matrix with
ei,i =
{
1 if θi > 0
0 else
and
C¯(l, t) := diag
( 1
ci,i(l, t)
)
.
We use the following notation.
Notation 2.3.2. (i) The independent Poisson processes pii, i = 1, . . . n, jump at dif-
ferent times almost surely, and the number of jumps in [t, T ] is almost surely finite.
We denote the jump times of pi by (τj)j∈N, where τj < τj+1 (j ∈ N) almost surely.
(ii) Given the Markovian control u∗(l), the Stochastic Differential Equation (2.1) pos-
sesses a unique solution. We denote the process controlled by u∗(l) by
X∗(l, s) := Xu∗(l)(s).
For the proof of Theorem 2.3.1 we have to show that u∗(l) is an admissible trading
strategy first. This is accomplished in Section 2.3.1 by using the bounds of C obtained
in Section 2.2.4. Section 2.3.2 finishes the proof of Theorem 2.3.1.
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2.3.1. Admissibility of the candidate optimal strategy
In order to prove admissibility of u∗(l), we require an upper bound for the process
‖X∗(l, s)‖2. Using Gronwall’s inequality pathwise inductively on the time-intervals
[τi ∧ T, τi+1 ∧ T )
and interlacing the jumps, this can be achieved by applying the upper and lower bounds
of C(l, s) from Section 2.2.4.
Lemma 2.3.3. Let l > l0 for l0 as in Equation (2.42), t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ Rn be the
portfolio position at time t. Then for s ∈ [t, T ),
X∗(l, s)>ΛX∗(l, s)
≤ x>Λx exp
(
− 2
s∫
t
p(l, u)du
) ∏
t≤τi≤s
(1 + n2)q(l, τi)
p(l, τi)
(2.56)
≤ x>Λx exp (θ(s− t))(T − s+ 2λmax2l+θλmax )2(
T − t+ 2λmax2l+θλmax
)2 ∏
t≤τi≤s
(1 + n2)q(l, τi)
p(l, τi)
a.s., (2.57)
where p and q are as in Equations (2.45) and (2.46) respectively (2.47) and (2.48).
Proof. Let i ∈ N. On {τi < T}, X∗(l, ·) solves the initial value problem
X ′ = −Λ−1C(l)X
X(τi) = X∗(l, τi)
for s ∈ [τi, τi+1 ∧ T ), and therefore
Y (l, ·) :=
√
ΛX∗(l, ·)
solves the initial value problem
Y ′ = −
√
Λ−1C(l)
√
Λ−1Y
Y (τi) =
√
ΛX∗(l, τi)
for s ∈ [τi, τi+1 ∧ T ). We set
Z(l, s) := Y (l, s)>Y (l, s) = X∗(l, s)>ΛX∗(l, s) (2.58)
and obtain
Z ′(l, s) = Y ′(l, s)>Y (l, s) + Y (l, s)>Y ′(l, s)
= −2Y (l, s)>
(√
Λ−1C(l, s)
√
Λ−1
)
Y (l, s)
≤ −2p(l, s)Y (l, s)>Y (l, s)
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= −2p(l, s)Z(l, s)
by Theorem 2.2.8. Gronwall’s inequality thus implies that
Z(l, s) ≤ Z(l, τi) exp
(
− 2
s∫
τi
p(l, u)du
)
and
Z(l, (τi+1 ∧ T )−) ≤ Z(l, τi) exp
(
− 2
τi+1∧T∫
τi
p(l, u)du
)
. (2.59)
Let now s ∈ [t, T ). By Corollary 2.2.6,
0 < C(l, s) ≤ nC¯(l, s)−1
and therefore
CC¯CC¯C(l, s) ≤ nCC¯C(l, s) ≤ n2C(l, s), (2.60)
where the last inequality follows from Corollary 2.2.6 again. On {τi+1 < T}, this implies
X∗(l, τi+1)>C(l, τi+1)X∗(l, τi+1)
=
(
X∗(l, τi+1−)− η∗(l, τi+1, X∗(l, τi+1−))
)>
C(l, τi+1)
(
X∗(l, τi+1−)− η∗(l, τi+1, X∗(l, τi+1−))
)
= X∗(l, τi+1−)>C(l, τi+1)X∗(l, τi+1−)
− 2X∗(l, τi+1−)>I˜CC¯C(l, τi+1)X∗(l, τi+1−)
+X∗(l, τi+1−)>I˜CC¯CC¯C(l, τi+1)X∗(l, τi+1−)
(2.60)
≤ (1 + n2)X∗(l, τi+1−)>C(l, τi+1)X∗(l, τi+1−) (2.61)
and thus
Y (l, τi+1)>Y (l, τi+1)
≤ Y (l, τi+1)>
(√
Λ−1C(l, τi+1)
√
Λ−1
p(l, τi+1)
)
Y (l, τi+1)
= 1
p(l, τi+1)
X∗(l, τi+1)>C(l, τi+1)X∗(l, τi+1)
(2.61)
≤ 1 + n
2
p(l, τi+1)
X∗(l, τi+1−)>C(l, τi+1)X∗(l, τi+1−)
= 1 + n
2
p(l, τi+1)
Y (l, τi+1−)>
(√
Λ−1C(l, τi+1)
√
Λ−1
)
Y (l, τi+1−)
≤ (1 + n2)q(l, τi+1)
p(l, τi+1)
Y (l, τi+1−)>Y (l, τi+1−) a.s. (2.62)
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Using Inequalities (2.59) and (2.62), we obtain Inequality (2.56) inductively. Inequal-
ity (2.57) follows from
p˜(l, u) = 1
T − u+ 2λmax2l+θλmax
− θ2 ≤ p(l, u)
(cf. Inequality (2.51)).
The bound obtained in Lemma 2.3.3 enables us to prove that u∗(l) fulfills the moment
conditions of Definition 2.1.1 (ii) and that it is an admissible trading strategy.
Proposition 2.3.4. Let l > l0 for l0 as in Equation (2.42) and (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rn. Then
u∗(l) = (ξ∗(l), η∗(l)) for ξ∗(l) and η∗(l) as in Equations (2.54) and (2.55) respectively is
admissible.
Proof. Definition 2.1.1 (i) and (iii) are clearly satisfied. By Lemma 2.3.3, we obtain for
k ≥ 1,
‖X∗(l, s)‖k2 ≤
( 1
λmin
X∗(l, s)>ΛX∗(l, s)
) k
2
≤
( 1
λmin
x>Λx
) k
2 exp
(
k
2θ(s− t)
)(T − s+ 2λmax2l+θλmax )k(
T − t+ 2λmax2l+θλmax
)k ( ∏
t≤τi≤s
(1 + n2)q(l, τi)
p(l, τi)
) k
2
.
Thus, as 0 < q(l,s)p(l,s) is bounded on [0, T ], there exist constants K˜ = K˜(k) and K¯ = K¯(k)
independent of s such that
Et,x
[‖X∗(l, s)‖k2] ≤ K˜Et,x[K¯#{i|t≤τi≤T}] = K˜Et,x[K¯ p˜i(T−t)] = K˜ exp(θK¯(T − t)),
where p˜i is a Poisson process with intensity θ = ∑i θi.
Let now ‖ · ‖2,2 denote the matrix norm induced by the space (Rn, ‖ · ‖2). Note that
‖ · ‖2,2 is the spectral norm on Rn×n and therefore (see, e.g., Bernstein [2005], Theorem
8.4.9)
‖A‖2,2 ≤ ‖B‖2,2 for 0 ≤ A ≤ B.
Using Theorem 2.2.8, we deduce
Et,x
[ T∫
t
‖ξ∗(l, s,X∗(s))‖42ds
]
≤ Et,x
[ T∫
t
‖Λ−1‖42,2‖C(l, s)‖42,2‖X∗(l, s)‖42ds
]
≤ Et,x
[ T∫
t
q(l, s)4K˜ exp(K¯(T − t))ds
]
<∞
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and
Et,x
[ T∫
t
‖η∗(l, s,X∗(s−))‖82ds
]
≤ Et,x
[ T∫
t
‖ C¯(l, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤nC(l,s)−1 by Corollary 2.2.6
‖82,2‖C(l, s)‖82,2‖X∗(l, s−)‖82ds
]
≤ Et,x
[ T∫
t
n8λ8maxq(l, s)8
λ8minp(l, s)8
K˜ exp(K¯(T − t))ds
]
<∞.
2.3.2. Proof of Theorem 2.3.1
We are now ready do prove the central result of this section. The proof is a verification
argument using Itô’s formula.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1. Let l > l0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × Rn and u = (ξ, η) ∈ A˜(t, x). We
apply Itô’s formula (see, e.g., the book by Øksendal and Sulem [2007]) to the function
w(l, t,Xu(t)) = Xu(t)>C(l, t)Xu(t).
w(l, t, x)
= w(l, T,Xu(T )) +
T∫
t
∇xw(l, s,Xu(s))ξ(s)− ∂w
∂s
(l, s,Xu(s))ds
+
T∫
t
( n∑
i=1
w(l, s,Xu(s−))− w(l, s,Xu(s−)− ηi(s)ei))pii(ds)
≤ w(l, T,Xu(T )) +
T∫
t
f(Xu(s), ξ(s))ds
+
T∫
t
( n∑
i=1
w(l, s,Xu(s−))− w(l, s,Xu(s−)− ηi(s)ei))pii(ds)
−
T∫
t
( n∑
i=1
θi
(
w(l, s,Xu(s−))− w(l, s,Xu(s−)− ηi(s)ei))ds (2.63)
= w(l, T,Xu(T )) +
T∫
t
f(Xu(s), ξ(s))ds
+
n∑
i=1
T∫
t
(
w(l, s,Xu(s−))− w(l, s,Xu(s−)− ηi(s)ei))Mi(ds),
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where Mi is the compensated Poisson process Mi(s) := pii(s)− θis and Inequality (2.63)
follows from Corollary 2.1.6. Furthermore, we have (pathwise) equality in (2.63) if and
only if u = u∗ λ - a.s.
Taking expectations on both sides, we obtain
w(l, t, x) ≤ J˜(l, t, x, u)
+
n∑
i=1
Et,x
[ T∫
t
(
w(l, s,Xu(s−))− w(l, s,Xu(s−)− ηi(s)ei))Mi(ds)], (2.64)
with equality if and only if u = u∗ P⊗ λ - a.s.
It remains to show that the stochastic integrals in Inequality (2.64) are martingales.
To this end, we compute
Et,x
[ T∫
t
|w(l, s,Xu(s−))− w(l, s,Xu(s−)− ηi(s)ei)|2ds]
= Et,x
[ T∫
t
|2Xu(s−)>C(l, s)eiηi(s)− ηi(s)2ci,i(s, l)|2ds
]
≤ Et,x
[ T∫
t
2|2Xu(s−)>C(l, s)eiηi(s)|2ds
]
+ Et,x
[ T∫
t
2|ηi(s)2ci,i(l, s)|2ds
]
≤ 8Et,x
[ T∫
t
‖Xu(s−)>‖22‖C(l, s)‖22,2|ηi(s)|2ds
]
+ 2Et,x
[ T∫
t
|ηi(s)|4|ci,i(l, s)|2ds
]
≤ 8λ2max
(
max
s∈[t,T ]
q(l, s)2
)
Et,x
[ T∫
t
‖Xu(s−)‖42ds
] 1
2Et,x
[ T∫
t
‖η(s)‖42ds
] 1
2
+ 2λ2max
(
max
s∈[t,T ]
q(l, s)2
)
Et,x
[ T∫
t
‖η(s)‖42ds
]
(2.65)
<∞
by Definition 2.1.1 (ii) and Proposition 2.1.4, where Inequality (2.65) follows from
Hölder’s inequality. As 〈Mi〉(s) = θis, this finishes the proof.
2.4. Optimal liquidation
We finally solve the Optimization Problem (OPT) in this section. A candidate for the
solution is the limit of the solution of the Optimization Problem (O˜PT) for l → ∞. In
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Section 2.4.1 we prove that the element-wise limit
C(t) := lim
l→∞
C(l, t)
exists for t ∈ [0, T ) so that the candidate for the value function of (OPT),
w(t, x) := x>C(t)x,
is well-defined. We also obtain upper and lower bounds for C and deduce that the limit
u∗ := lim
l→∞
u∗(l)
exists as well. In Section 2.4.2 we analyze the candidate optimal strategy u∗ and the
corresponding controlled process
X∗ := Xu∗ .
In particular, we show that u∗ is an admissible liquidation strategy. Using Sections 2.4.1
and 2.4.2, we verify that w(t, x) is indeed the value function and that u∗ is the optimal
strategy in Section 2.4.3.
2.4.1. The candidate value function
We start by computing the limits of the functions p(l) and q(l) given by Equations (2.45)
and (2.46) respectively (2.47) and (2.48) and obtain candidates for an upper and a lower
bound of lim
l→∞
C(l, t).
Lemma 2.4.1. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and p(l) and q(l) as in Equations (2.45) and (2.46)
respectively (2.47) and (2.48). Then
lim
l→∞
p(l, ·) = p(·), lim
l→∞
q(l, ·) = q(·)
compactly and strictly increasing on [0, T ), where p and q are given by
p(t) :=
√
θ2
4 + αdmin coth
(√θ2
4 + αdmin(T − t)
)
− θ2 , (2.66)
q(t) :=
√
αdmax coth
(√
αdmax(T − t)
)
(2.67)
for θ + αdmin > 0 respectively αdmax > 0 and
p(t) := 1
T − t , (2.68)
q(t) := 1
T − t (2.69)
109
2. Portfolio liquidation in continuous time
for θ = αdmin = 0 respectively αdmax = 0. Furthermore,
p(l, T ), q(l, T )↗∞ as l→∞.
Proof. Point-wise convergence and the formulae for the limits are straightforward by
Equations (2.45) and (2.46) respectively by Equations (2.47) and (2.48). Strict mono-
tonicity follows from the fact that the initial values are strictly increasing in l. Fi-
nally, compact convergence follows from these observations by Dini’s theorem (see,
e.g., Courant and Hilbert [1953]).
In the following Lemma we prove monotonicity of the sequence (C(l, t))l in the sense of
Notation 2.2.1 (i). Combining this with the candidate bounds obtained in Lemma 2.4.1,
we can prove the existence of
lim
l→∞
C(l, t)
in Proposition 2.4.3 below.
Lemma 2.4.2. For fixed t ∈ (−∞, T ], C(l, t) is strictly increasing in l on (l0,∞) for l0
as in Equation (2.42).
Proof. We differentiate C with respect to l (by differentiating with respect to initial
values), denote the partial derivative by
Cl := (cli,j)i,j=1,...n :=
∂C
∂l
and show that Cl(l, t) > 0 on (−∞, T ] (Formula (2.71) below).
Note that we can exchange partial derivatives and obtain the initial value problem
∂
∂t
Cl(l, t) =
∂
∂l
∂
∂t
C(l, t) = ∂
∂l
(
CΛ−1C + CC˜C − αΣ
)
(l, t)
=
(
ClA+A>Cl −B> diag
(
cli,i
)
B
)
(l, t) (2.70)
Cl(l, T ) = I,
where
A(l, t) :=
(
Λ−1 + C˜(l, t)
)
C(l, t), B(l, t) := diag
( √θi
ci,i(l, t)
)
C(l, t).
The Initial Value Problem (2.70) is a linear matrix differential equation for Cl (l > 0
fixed) and is thus solvable on the whole interval (−∞, T ] (with solution Cl).
We consider the linear matrix differential equation
x′ = −Ax
and its fundamental matrix Φ with initial condition Φ(l, T ) = I, i.e.,
Φ′ = −AΦ, Φ(l, T ) = I
110
2.4. Optimal liquidation
and Φ(l, t) is regular for all t ∈ (−∞, T ]. We define
Y (l, t) := Φ(l, t)>Cl(l, t)Φ(l, t),
thus
Cl(l, t) = (Φ(l, t)−1)>Y (l, t)Φ(l, t)−1
and
Y ′ = −Φ>A>ClΦ + Φ>
(
ClA+A>Cl −B> diag
(
cli,i
)
B
)
Φ− Φ>ClAΦ
= −Φ>B> diag (cli,i)BΦ,
= −Φ>B> diag ((Φ−1)>Y (l, t)Φ−1)BΦ,
Y (l, T ) = I.
This is a linear matrix differential equation for Y and has a symmetric solution on
(−∞, T ]. In the following we show that Y (l, t) ≥ I > 0 for all t ∈ (−∞, T ]. To this end,
define
τ := inf{t|Y (l, ·) > 0 on [t, T ]} < T.
Then Φ>B> diag
(
(Φ−1)>Y (l, t)Φ−1
)
BΦ ≥ 0 and hence Y ′(l, t) ≤ 0 on (τ, T ]. Thus,
Y (l, t) = Y (l, T )−
T∫
t
Y ′(l, s)ds ≥ Y (l, T ) = I
on (τ, T ]. Assume that τ > −∞. Continuity of Y (l, ·) yields Y (l, τ) ≥ I > 0 and
Y (l, t) > 0 on the interval [τ − , τ + ] for some  > 0, a contradiction. Therefore for all
t ∈ (−∞, T ],
Cl(l, t) = (Φ(l, t)−1)>Y (l, t)Φ(l, t)−1 > 0, (2.71)
finishing the proof.
We are now ready to prove the existence of the limit lim
l→∞
C(l, t) by combining the two
preceding lemmata.
Proposition 2.4.3. The element-wise limit of the value function matrix
C(t) := lim
l→∞
C(l, t)
exists on [0, T ), and C(l, ·) converges compactly to C on [0, T ). Furthermore,
lim
l→∞
cmin(l, T ) =∞.
Proof. The existence of the element-wise limit of (C(l, t))l>0 follows directly from the
monotonicity (cf. Lemma 2.4.2) and the boundedness by Λq(t)I for q(t) as in Equa-
tion (2.67) respectively (2.69).
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Compact convergence follows by Dini’s theorem due to the monotonicity.
We can deduce upper and lower bounds for the matrix C and that C solves the
differential equation
C ′ = C>Λ−1C + C>C˜C − αΣ.
This result is essential for the verification argument in Section 2.4.3.
Theorem 2.4.4. For t ∈ [0, T ),
0 < P (t) ≤
√
Λ−1C(t)
√
Λ−1 ≤ Q(t), (2.72)
where
P (t) = p(t)I, Q(t) = q(t)I
for p and q as in Equations (2.66) and (2.67) respectively (2.68) and (2.69); moreover,
C solves the matrix differential equation
C ′ = C>Λ−1C + C>C˜C − αΣ (2.73)
on [0, T ).
Proof. The inequalities in (2.72) follow directly from the previous results. Furthermore,
the compact convergence of C(l, t) (and C˜(l, t)) on [0, T ) and the fact that C(l, ·) solves
the Matrix Differential Equation (2.73) implies that C ′(l, t) converges compactly on
[0, T ) to some matrix D such that C ′(t) = D(t) on [0, T ), finishing the proof.
Remark 2.4.5. For Riccati matrix differential equations, there exists a unique solution
Q with
lim
s→T−
qmin(s) =∞.
This solution is called the principal solution (see, e.g., Coppel [1971]). In this spirit, C
is the principal solution of the Matrix Differential Equation (2.73). Note however that
it is not entirely clear that C is the only solution of (2.73) satisfying
lim
s→T−
cmin(s) =∞
since (2.73) is not a Riccati matrix differential equation.
2.4.2. The candidate optimal trading strategy and trajectory
By Proposition 2.4.3, we also obtain the existence of the limits of the optimal strategy
(cf. the uniform bounds obtained in Lemma 2.4.1):
ξ∗ := ξ∗(t, x) := lim
l→∞
ξ∗(l, t, x) = Λ−1C(t)x, (2.74)
η∗ := η∗(t, x) := lim
l→∞
η∗(l, t, x) = I˜C¯(t)C(t)x. (2.75)
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It turns out that u∗ := (ξ∗, η∗) solves the Optimization Problem (OPT). As a first step
it is thus necessary to prove that u∗ is an admissible liquidation strategy. To this end,
we first analyze the controlled process
X∗(t) := Xu∗(t)
and show that
lim
s→T−
X∗(s) = 0 a.s.
Proposition 2.4.6. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ Rn be the portfolio position at time t.
(i)
X∗(l, ·) l→∞−→ X∗(·) a.s. compactly on [t, T ).
(ii)
l · ‖X∗(l, T )‖22 l→∞−→ 0 a.s. and in L1.
In particular,
X∗(l, T ) l→∞−→ X∗(T ) = lim
s→T−
X∗(s) = 0 a.s.
For proving Proposition 2.4.6, we require the following lemma (cf. also Lemma 2.3.3).
Lemma 2.4.7. Let t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ Rn be the portfolio position at time t. Then for
s ∈ [t, T ],
X∗(s)>ΛX∗(s) ≤ x>Λx exp
(
− 2
s∫
t
p(u)du
) ∏
t≤τi≤s
(1 + n2)q(τi)
p(τi)
(2.76)
≤ x>Λx exp (θ(s− t))(T − s)2(T − t)2 ∏
t≤τi≤s
(1 + n2)q(τi)
p(τi)
. (2.77)
Proof. Inequality (2.76) follows by the same argument as the respective bound for
X∗(l, s)>ΛX∗(l, s) in Lemma 2.3.3. Inequality (2.77) follows from the fact that
p(u) ≥ p˜(u) := lim
l→∞
p˜(l, u) = 1
T − u −
θ
2 .
Proof of Proposition 2.4.6. (i) The spectral norm ‖ · ‖2,2 is equivalent to the matrix
maximum norm, and therefore the element-wise convergence results from Propo-
sition 2.4.3 transfer to corresponding results for the spectral norm.
Let t ≤ T ′ < T . On {τi < T ′}, X∗ and X∗(l) solve the respective ordinary
differential equations
X ′ = −ξ∗(·, X) = −Λ−1CX,
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X ′ = −ξ∗(l, ·, X) = −Λ−1C(l)X
on the interval [τi, τi+1 ∧ T ′). We prove that the assertion follows from the contin-
uous dependence of solutions of ordinary differential equations on the right hand
side and initial values. To this end, we first require some preliminary observations.
For s ∈ [t, T ′] and x, y ∈ Rn, we have
‖Λ−1C(s)x− Λ−1C(s)y‖2 ≤ max
s∈[t,T ′]
‖Q(s)‖2,2‖x− y‖2 =: L‖x− y‖2
(cf. Theorem 2.4.4), i.e., for all s ∈ [t, T ′], ξ∗(s, ·) is Lipschitz-continuous on Rn
with Lipschitz constant L = L(T ′) independent of s.
Furthermore, there exits a constant K1 ≥ 1 and a random variable K2 ≥ 1 such
that for s ∈ [t, T ′],
‖C¯(s)C(s)‖2,2 ≤ K1
and
‖X∗(l, s)‖22 ≤
1
λmin
X∗(l, s)>ΛX∗(l, s)
≤ 1
λmin
x>Λx exp
(
− 2
s∫
t
p(l, u)du
) ∏
t≤τi≤T ′
(1 + n2)q(l, τi)
p(l, τi)
(2.78)
≤ 1
λmin
x>Λx
∏
t≤τi≤T ′
(1 + n2)q(l, τi)
p(l, τi)
≤ K2,
where Inequality (2.78) follows from Lemma 2.3.3. Note now that
lim
t→T−
q(t)
p(t) = 1,
and thus q(t)p(t) admits a continuous extension to [0, T ]. Therefore, there exists a
constant K3 such that for all i ∈ N,
q(τi ∧ T )
p(τi ∧ T ) ≤ K3
and hence
Et,x
[ ∏
0≤τi≤T
q(τi)
p(τi)
]
≤ Et,x
[
K
#{i|0≤τi≤T}
3
]
=
∞∑
i=0
Ki3
exp(θT )(θT )i
i! = exp(K3) <∞.
Thus K2 is almost surely finite.
We now set τ0 = t and show by induction on i ∈ N that for all  > 0, there exits
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an li > l0 such that li ≥ li−1 and for all l ≥ li, s ∈ [t, τi ∧ T ′],
‖X∗(l, s)−X∗(s)‖2 < .
The assertion is clear for i = 0. Let i > 0 and  > 0. By the induction hypothesis,
there exists li−1 > l0 such that for l > li−1,
‖X∗(l, τi−1)−X∗(τi−1)‖2 < e
−L(T ′−t)
6K1
. (2.79)
Note that on {τi−1 ≥ T ′} the induction step is trivial. We therefore fix some
ω ∈ {τi−1 < T ′}.
Let now li ≥ li−1 such that for l > li, s ≤ τi ∧ T ′ (recall the uniform convergence
of (C(l, s))l on [t, T ′], Proposition 2.4.3)
‖Λ−1C(l, s)− Λ−1C(s)‖2,2 ≤ ‖Λ−1‖2,2‖C(l, s)− C(s)‖2,2 <  e
−L(T ′−t)
6(T ′ − t)K1 (2.80)
and
‖C¯(l, s)C(l, s)− C¯(s)C(s)‖2,2 < 3K2(ω) . (2.81)
By the continuous dependence of solutions of systems of ordinary differential equa-
tions on the right hand side and initial values, we have for s ∈ [τi−1, τi ∧ T ′) (by
Inequalities (2.79), and (2.80)),
‖X∗(l, s, ω)−X∗(s, ω)‖2 ≤
(

e−L(T ′−t)
6K1
+ (T ′ − t) e
−L(T ′−t)
6(T ′ − t)K1
)
eL(T
′−t)
= 3K1
,
in particular
‖X∗(l, (τi ∧ T ′)−)−X∗((τi ∧ T ′)−)‖2 ≤ 3K1 . (2.82)
We can conclude by using the Inequalities (2.81) and (2.82):
‖X∗(l, τi(ω) ∧ T ′, ω)−X∗(τi ∧ T ′, ω)‖2
=
∥∥X∗(l, (τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)
− C¯(l, τi(ω) ∧ T ′)C(l, τi(ω) ∧ T ′)X∗(l, (τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)
−X∗((τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)
+ C¯(τi(ω) ∧ T ′)C(τi(ω) ∧ T ′)X∗((τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)‖2
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≤ ‖X∗(l, (τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)−X∗((τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)
∥∥
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤/(3K1)≤/3 by Inequality (2.82)
+ ‖X∗(l, (τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)‖2
·‖C¯(l, τi(ω) ∧ T ′)C(l, τi(ω) ∧ T ′)− C¯(τi(ω) ∧ T ′)C(τi(ω) ∧ T ′)‖2,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤/3 by Inequality (2.81)
+ ‖C¯(τi(ω) ∧ T ′)C(τi(ω) ∧ T ′)‖2
·‖X∗(l, (τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)−X∗((τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
</3 by Inequality (2.82)
< 
as required.
(ii) For fixed ω ∈ Ω, we have by Lemma 2.3.3 that
l · ‖X∗(l, T, ω)‖22
≤ 1
λmin
x>Λx exp
(
θ(T − t)) ( 2λmax2l+θλmax )2(
T − t+ 2λmax2l+θλmax
)2 ∏
t≤τi≤s
(1 + n2)q(l, τi)
p(l, τi)
. (2.83)
Furthermore,
Et,x
[ ∏
t≤τi≤T
q(l, τi)
p(l, τi)
]
< K4 <∞
for some constant K4 independent of l; thus for almost all ω ∈ Ω, there exists a
constant K(ω) such that
∏
t≤τi(ω)≤T
q(l, τi(ω))
p(l, τi(ω))
< K(ω).
Therefore, Inequality (2.83) implies
Et,x
[
l · ‖X∗(l, T, ω)‖22
] l→∞−→ 0
and
l · ‖X∗(l, T, ω)‖22 l→∞−→ 0 a.s.
Finally, Lemma 2.4.7 implies that
‖ lim
s→T−
X∗(s)‖2 = 0 a.s.,
finishing the proof.
We can directly deduce compact convergence of the optimal trading intensity in the
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primary venue.
Corollary 2.4.8. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ Rn be the portfolio position an time t. Then
ξ∗(l, ·, X∗(l, ·)) −→ ξ∗(·, X∗(·)) a.s. compactly on [t, T )
as l→∞.
Proof. The assertion follows directly from the compact convergence results in Proposi-
tion 2.4.3 and Proposition 2.4.6.
We are now able to prove that u∗ is indeed an admissible liquidation strategy. The
main step towards this goal is accomplished by Proposition 2.4.6 (ii). It remains thus to
show that u∗ fulfills the moment conditions in Definition 2.1.1 (ii).
Theorem 2.4.9. Let t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ Rn and u∗ = (ξ∗, η∗) for ξ∗ and η∗ as in Equa-
tions (2.74) and (2.75), respectively. Then u∗ is an admissible liquidation strategy.
Proof. Definition 2.1.1 (i) and (iii) are clear, (iv) follows form Proposition 2.4.6.
Let now k ≥ 1 and s ∈ [t, T ). Similarly as in the proof of Proposition 2.4.6,
E
[( ∏
t≤τi≤s
(1 + n2)q(τi)
p(τi)
)k] ≤ E[( ∏
t≤τi≤T
(1 + n2)q(τi)
p(τi)
)k]
<∞. (2.84)
Let now
p˜(s) := lim
l→∞
p˜(l, s) = 1
T − s −
θ
2 ,
q˜(s) := lim
l→∞
q˜(l, s) = 1
T − s +
√
αdmax.
Then
r(s) := q˜(s)k exp
(
− k
s∫
t
p˜(v)dv
)
=
( 1
T − s +
√
αdmax
)k (T − s)k
(T − t)k exp
(k
2θ(s− t)
)
=
(
1− (T − s)
√
αdmax
)k 1
(T − t)k exp
(k
2θ(s− t)
)
and thus
T∫
t
r(s) <∞. (2.85)
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By Lemma 2.4.7, there exists a constant K such that
Et,x
[ T∫
t
‖ξ(s,X∗(s))‖42ds
]
≤ Et,x
[ T∫
t
q(s)4‖X∗(s)‖42ds
]
≤ KEt,x
[ T∫
t
q˜(s)4 exp
(
− 4
s∫
t
p˜(v)dv
)( ∏
t≤τi≤s
(1 + n2)q(τi)
p(τi)
)4
ds
]
≤ K
T∫
t
q˜(s)4 exp
(
− 4
s∫
t
p˜(v)dv
)
dsEt,x
[
(T − t)
( ∏
t≤τi≤T
(1 + n2)q(τi)
p(τi)
)4]
(2.84),(2.85)
< ∞.
By Corollary 2.2.6,
C¯(s) ≤ nC(s)−1
and thus, as q(s)p(s) admits a continuous extension on [t, T ], there exists a constant K¯
independent of s such that
‖C¯(s)C(s)‖82,2 ≤ n8‖C−1‖82,2‖C‖82,2 ≤
n8λ8maxq(s)8
λ8minp(s)8
≤ K¯.
Using Lemma 2.4.7 again, there exists a constant K˜ such that
Et,x
[ T∫
t
‖η(s,X∗(s−)‖82ds
]
≤ Et,x
[ T∫
t
‖C¯(s)C(s)‖82‖X∗(s−)‖82ds
]
≤ K¯Et,x
[ T∫
t
exp
(
− 8
s∫
t
p(v)dv
)( ∏
t≤τi≤s
(1 + n2)q(τi)
p(τi)
)8
ds
]
≤ K¯
T∫
t
exp
(
− 8
s∫
t
p(v)dv
)
Et,x
[
(T − t)
( ∏
t≤τi≤s
(1 + n2)q(τi)
p(τi)
)8]
(2.84)
< ∞.
2.4.3. Solution of the optimization problem
We are now ready to solve the Optimization Problem (OPT). By the results from
the preceding sections, the limit of the solution of the Optimization Problem (O˜PT)
exists. In the following we verify that this limit is indeed the solution of the original
Optimization Problem (OPT).
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Theorem 2.4.10. The value function of the Optimization Problem (OPT) is given by
v(t, x) = x>C(t)x
for all t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ Rn and
lim
s→T−
v(s, x) =
{
0 if x = 0
∞ else.
The P⊗ λ - almost surely unique optimal strategy is given by u∗ = (ξ∗, η∗),
ξ∗ = lim
l→∞
ξ∗(l, t, x) = Λ−1C(t)x,
η∗ = lim
l→∞
η∗(l, t, x) = I˜C¯(t)C(t)x.
Proof. We fix t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ Rn. Note first that we have
v(t, x) ≥ lim
l→∞
v˜(l, t, x). (2.86)
For the converse inequality, let
A := {pi(T ) = pi(t)}
be the set of scenarios without any dark pool execution in [0, T ] and K : (l0,∞)×Ω −→
[0,∞] be the following cost function:
K(l, ω) :=
∫ T
t
(
ξ∗(l, s,X∗(l, s, ω))>Λξ∗(l, s,X∗(l, s, ω)) + αX∗(l, s, ω)>ΣX∗(l, s, ω)
)
ds
+ l · ‖X∗(l, T, ω)‖22.
Then P[A] > 0 and for ω ∈ A, K(l, A) := K(l, ω) is independent of the specific scenario
ω almost surely. By optimality of u∗(l) (Theorem 2.3.1), K(l, A) is an upper bound for
K(l, ·) almost surely. As lim
l→∞
v˜(l, t, x) is bounded and P[A] > 0, there exists a constant
K such that for all l > l0
K(l, A) ≤ K.
By the dominated convergence theorem this implies
lim
l→∞
v˜(l, t, x) Theorem 2.3.1= lim
l→∞
Et,x[K(l)]
= lim
l→∞
Et,x
[ ∫ T
t
(
ξ∗(l, s,X∗(l, s))>Λξ∗(l, s,X∗(l, s))
+ αX∗(l, s)>ΣX∗(l, s)
)
ds+ l · ‖X∗(l, T )‖22
]
= Et,x[ lim
l→∞
K(l)]
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= Et,x
[
lim
l→∞
( ∫ T
t
(
ξ∗(l, s,X∗(l, s))>Λξ∗(l, s,X∗(l, s))
+ αX∗(l, s)>ΣX∗(l, s)
)
ds+ l · ‖X∗(l, T )‖22
)]
.
By Proposition 2.4.6 and Corollary 2.4.8, the limits exist, so Fatou’s lemma yields
lim
l→∞
v˜(l, t, x) ≥ Et,x
[ ∫ T
t
lim
l→∞
(
ξ∗(l, s,X∗(l, s))>Λξ∗(l, s,X∗(l, s))
+ αX∗(l, s)>ΣX∗(l, s)
)
ds+ lim
l→∞
l · ‖X∗(l, T )‖22
]
= Et,x
[ ∫ T
t
(
ξ∗(s,X∗(s))>Λξ∗(s,X∗(s)) + αX∗(s)>ΣX∗(s)
)
ds
]
≥ v(t, x). (2.87)
The Inequalities (2.86) and (2.87) establish that u∗ solves the Optimization Prob-
lem (OPT) and that the value function is given by v. For uniqueness, let u = (ξ, η), u˜ =
(ξ˜, η˜) ∈ A(t, x) and µ ∈ (0, 1). We define the convex combination u¯ = (ξ¯, η¯):
ξ¯(s) = µξ(s) + (1− µ)ξ˜(s),
η¯(s) = µη(s) + (1− µ)η˜(s)
for s ∈ [t, T ). Thus,
X u¯(s) = µXu(s) + (1− µ)X u˜(s)
and u¯ ∈ A(t, x). Notice that
P⊗ λ[u 6= u˜] > 0 implies P⊗ λ[ξ 6= ξ˜] > 0 (2.88)
as else
P
[
lim
s→T−
Xu(s) 6= lim
s→T−
X u˜(s)
]
> 0,
a contradiction to Definition 2.1.1 (iv). Hence,
J(t, x, u¯) = Et,x
[ ∫ T
t
f
(
ξ¯(r), X u¯(r)
)
dr
]
≤ Et,x
[ ∫ T
t
µf
(
ξ(r), Xu(r)
)
+ (1− µ)f(ξ˜(r), X u˜(r))dr] (2.89)
= µJ(t, x, u) + (1− µ)J(t, x, u˜),
where Inequality (2.89) follows from the convexity of f . We have equality in Inequal-
ity (2.89) if and only if u = u˜ P⊗ λ - a.s. by strict convexity of f in the first argument
and (2.88).
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2.5. Properties of the value function and the optimal strategy
Due to the analogy between the cost functionals in the discrete and the continuous-time
setting, the value functions and the optimal strategies have corresponding properties.
In Section 2.5.1 we consider the single asset setting. Using Section 2.2.2, we derive
closed form solutions for the value function and the optimal strategy. We prove simi-
lar monotonicity properties as for the corresponding objects in Section 1.3. The most
interesting result is that the risk costs of the optimal strategy are decreasing in θ on
the whole interval (0,∞) (Proposition 2.5.1 (v)), while in the discrete-time setting the
risk costs are increasing for sufficiently small probability of execution p (cf. Proposi-
tion 1.3.9 (ii)). This effect disappears if we let the number of trading times N + 1 tend
to infinity. In Section 2.5.2 we discuss the portfolio case and analyze the bounds P
and Q for the value function matrix C obtained in Section 2.4.1. By construction, P
and Q are not sensitive to the signs of the positions in the assets. In the discrete-time
setting we saw that different signs can yield different costs because of the correlation of
the assets (cf. Example 1.3.10). Therefore, this property is rather undesirable, and we
construct bounds that perform better and are sensitive to the signs of the positions. We
illustrate the improvement by a numerical example.
2.5.1. Single asset liquidation
We let n = 1 and set θ = θ1. By Subsection 2.2.2, the solution of the Initial Value
Problem (2.18) is given by
C(l, t) = Λθ˜2 coth
( θ˜
2(T − t) + κ(l)
)
− Λθ2 ,
where
κ(l) := arcoth
( 2l
Λ + θ
θ˜
)
,
θ˜ :=
√
θ2 + 4αΣΛ
for θ > 0 or αΣ > 0 and
C(l, t) = Λ
T − t+ Λl
for θ = αΣ = 0. In order to stress the dependence of the value function on the parameter
θ, we define
C(t; θ) := C(t) = lim
l→∞
C(l, t)
=

Λθ˜
2 coth
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
)
− Λθ2 if θ > 0 or αΣ > 0
Λ
T−t if θ = αΣ = 0,
(2.90)
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in particular
C(t; 0) =

√
αΣΛ coth
(√
αΣ
Λ (T − t)
)
if αΣ > 0
Λ
T−t if αΣ = 0.
(2.91)
For simplicity, we consider the case αΣ > 0 in the following. Thus, the value function
v and the optimal strategy u∗ = (ξ∗, η∗) are given by
v(t, x) = C(t; θ)x2 =
(Λθ˜
2 coth
( θ˜
2(T − t)
)
− Λθ2
)
x2,
ξ∗(t, x; θ) = C(t; θ)Λ x =
( θ˜
2 coth
( θ˜
2(T − t)
)
− θ2
)
x, (2.92)
η∗(t, x; θ) = C¯(t; θ)C(t; θ)x = x. (2.93)
Similarly as in Section 1.3, it is always optimal to place the entire remainder of the
position in the dark pool by Equation (2.93).
Let us now denote the optimal trading trajectory until execution in the dark pool by
X˜(·; θ), i.e., X˜ is the solution of the linear initial value problem
X ′ = −ξ∗(·, X; θ)
X(0) = x,
where x is the initial asset position at time t0 = 0. Then for t ∈ [0, T ),
X˜(t; θ) = x exp
(
−
t∫
0
C(s; θ)
Λ ds
)
=
sinh
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
)
exp
(
θ
2 t
)
sinh
(
θ˜
2T
) x. (2.94)
In the following Proposition we show that many properties of the discrete-time case
hold in the continuous case as well.
Proposition 2.5.1. (i) For t ∈ [0, T ), C(t; θ) is strictly decreasing in θ.
(ii) Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x > 0 be fixed. Then ξ∗(t, x; θ) is strictly decreasing in θ.
(iii) Assume that the initial asset position at time t0 = 0 is given by x > 0. Then
X˜(t; θ) is strictly increasing in θ for t ∈ (0, T ).
(iv) For an initial asset position x > 0 and t ∈ (0, T ), the expected asset position if the
optimal strategy is applied,
E[X∗(t; θ)],
is strictly decreasing in θ.
(v) For αΣ > 0, the risk costs
αΣ · E
[ T∫
0
X∗(t; θ)2dt
]
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are strictly decreasing in θ.
(vi) The impact costs
Λ · E
[ T∫
0
ξ∗(t,X∗(t, θ); θ)2dt
]
are strictly decreasing in θ.
Proof. We let t ∈ [0, T ) and compute
∂
∂θ
C(t; θ) =
Λθ coth
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
)
2θ˜
− Λθ(T − t)
4 sinh2
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
) − Λ2
≤ Λθ
(
cosh
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
)
sinh
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
)− θ˜2(T − t)− sinh2 ( θ˜2(T − t)))
2θ˜ sinh2
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
)
< 0
for θ > 0 since
cosh
( θ˜
2(T − t)
)
sinh
( θ˜
2(T − t)
)− θ˜2(T − t)− sinh2 ( θ˜2(T − t))
= sinh
( θ˜
2(T − t)
)(
cosh
( θ˜
2(T − t)
)− sinh ( θ˜2(T − t))
)
− θ˜2(T − t)
=
(1− exp(−θ˜(T − t))
2
)
− θ˜2(T − t)
< 0
for θ > 0 (note that 12
(
1 − exp(−2x)) − x < 0 for x > 0). This establishes the first
and the second assertion directly; the third assertion follows from the first equality in
Equation (2.94).
For the proof of (iv), we note first that
E[X∗(t; θ)] = P[pi(t) = 0] · X˜(t; θ) = sinh
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
)
exp
(− θ2 t)
sinh
(
θ˜
2T
) x. (2.95)
We compute for θ > 0,
∂
∂θ
X∗(t; θ) = x
sinh2
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
)(θ(T − t)2θ˜ sinh ( θ˜2T ) cosh ( θ˜2(T − t)) exp (− θ2 t)
− t2 sinh
( θ˜
2T
)
sinh
( θ˜
2(T − t)
)
exp
(− θ2 t)
− θT
2θ˜
cosh
( θ˜
2T
)
sinh
( θ˜
2(T − t)
)
exp
(− θ2 t)
)
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<
θ exp
(− θ2 t)x
2θ˜ sinh2
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
)((T − t) sinh ( θ˜2T ) cosh ( θ˜2(T − t))
− T cosh ( θ˜2T ) sinh ( θ˜2(T − t))
)
< 0
by Lemma 1.3.8 (i) (cf. also Equation (1.44)), finishing the proof of (iv).
We have
E[X∗(t; θ)2] = P[pi(t) = 0] · X˜(t; θ)2 = sinh
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
)
sinh
(
θ˜
2T
) x2.
This term is differentiable and strictly decreasing in θ by Lemma 1.3.8 (note that θ˜ is
strictly increasing in θ). Thus, by Fubini’s theorem,
∂
∂θ
E
[ T∫
0
X∗(t; θ)2dt
]
= ∂
∂θ
T∫
0
E[X∗(t; θ)2]dt =
T∫
0
∂
∂θ
E[X∗(t; θ)2]dt < 0,
establishing (v).
Finally, we note that
E[ξ∗(t,X∗(t; θ); θ)2] = P[pi(t) = 0] · C(t; θ)
2
Λ2 X˜(t; θ)
2 = C(t; θ)
2
Λ2 E[X
∗(t; θ)2]
by Equation (2.95). This term is differentiable and strictly decreasing in θ as both terms
are positive and strictly increasing in θ. Similarly as before, we deduce (vi).
Note that in the discrete-time setting, the risk costs are in general not decreasing
in the probability of execution p (cf. Proposition 1.3.9 (ii)). By letting the number of
trading times N+1 tend to infinity (and the length of each trading period tend to zero),
appropriate scaling of the parameters Λ, Σ and p ensures that in the limit case the risk
costs are strictly decreasing in p (cf. Section 2.6, in particular Remark 2.6.4).
2.5.2. Portfolio liquidation and improved bounds for the value function
As in the discrete-time setting of Section 1.3, it is in general not optimal for a trader
liquidating more than one asset, to place the whole portfolio in the dark pool until ex-
ecution. The optimal orders in the dark pool depend strongly on the correlation of the
assets. The properties we identified in the discrete-time setting transfer to corresponding
properties in the continuous-time setting. As we discussed this issue in detail in Sec-
tion 1.3.4 for the discrete-time case, we will not go into too much detail here. We want
to remark, however, that the discrete-time setting is somewhat more general as it allows
for a dependencies between the dark pool liquidities of the assets (cf. Section 1.3.4).
Throughout Chapter 2 we assumed that the Poisson processes which govern dark pool
execution are independent. Therefore, the discussion about dependencies of the dark
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pool liquidities in Example 1.3.11 does not apply here.
As we are not able to obtain closed form solutions for the value function and the
optimal strategy for n ≥ 2, we analyze the bounds for the value function C(l, t) of the
Optimization Problem (O˜PT) from Theorem 2.2.8:
0 < P (l, t) ≤
√
Λ−1C(l, t)
√
Λ−1 ≤ Q(l, t)
or equivalently
0 <
√
ΛP (l, t)
√
Λ ≤ C(l, t) ≤
√
ΛQ(l, t)
√
Λ.
These bounds transfer to bounds for the value function matrix C(t) = lim
l→∞
C(l, t) of the
Optimization Problem (OPT) (cf. Theorem 2.4.4):
0 < lim
l→∞
P (l, t) = P (t) ≤
√
Λ−1C(t)
√
Λ−1 ≤ lim
l→∞
Q(l, t) = Q(t)
or equivalently
0 <
√
ΛP (t)
√
Λ ≤ C(t) ≤
√
ΛQ(t)
√
Λ.
We require these bounds in several proofs (e.g., for establishing bounds of the norms of
the processes ‖X∗(l, t)‖2 and ‖X∗(t)‖2, respectively, which are important for the proof
of the main result, Theorem 2.4.10). It proved useful to construct these bounds in such
a way that they were multiples of the identity matrix:
P (l, t) = p(l, t)I, Q(l, t) = q(l, t)I, P (t) = p(t)I, Q(t) = q(t)I (2.96)
for explicitly known functions p(l), q(l) : [0, T ] → R, p, q : [0, T ) → R, so that they
commute with every matrix A ∈ Rn×n. Thus, the lower respectively upper bound
for the value function x>ΛPx respectively x>ΛQx are independent of the signs of xi,
i = 1, . . . , n, and thus ignore the diversification of the portfolio. In the following we
compute upper and lower bounds for C(t) in closed form that improve the bounds P (t)
and Q(t) by giving up Property (2.96). These bounds are sensitive for the signs of the
asset positions xi. To this end, we replace the Initial Value Problem (2.18) by
C ′ = C>Λ−1C + C>C˜C − αΣ
C(T ) = lΛ.
(2.97)
Let us assume that αΣ > 0 for simplicity. Recall that D =
√
Λ−1Σ
√
Λ−1 and consider
the initial value problems
P ′ = P 2 + θP − αD
P (T ) = lI
(2.98)
and
Q′ = P 2 − αD
Q(T ) = lI.
(2.99)
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By a slight abuse of notation, we denote the solution of (2.97) by C(l, t). By Theo-
rem 2.2.2, the Initial Value Problems (2.98) and (2.99) possess solutions P¯ (l, t) respec-
tively Q¯(l, t) on the interval (−∞, T ] for large enough l. Similarly as in the proof of
Theorem 2.2.8, we obtain that the Initial Value Problem (2.97) possesses a solution on
(−∞, T ] for large enough l and that
0 < P (l, t) ≤ P¯ (l, t) ≤
√
Λ−1C(l, t)
√
Λ−1 ≤ Q¯(l, t) ≤ Q(l, t).
We obtain monotonicity of (C(l, t))l by the same proof as in Lemma 2.4.2 (where we
proved monotonicity for initial values lI). Therefore, (C(l, t))l converges, and the limit
must be the same as before:
C(t) = lim
l→∞
C(l, t).
Thus, provided that
P¯ (t) := lim
l→∞
P¯ (l, t) and Q¯(t) := lim
l→∞
Q¯(l, t)
exist,
0 < P (t) ≤ P¯ (t) ≤
√
Λ−1C(t)
√
Λ−1 ≤ Q¯(t) ≤ Q(t)
or equivalently
0 <
√
ΛP (t)
√
Λ ≤
√
ΛP¯ (t)
√
Λ ≤ C(t) ≤
√
ΛQ¯(t)
√
Λ ≤
√
ΛQ(t)
√
Λ. (2.100)
In the following we solve the Initial Value Problems (2.98) and (2.99) explicitly using
matrix functions (see, e.g., the book by Horn and Johnson [1991]) and compute the
limits P¯ (t) and Q¯(t). By the above discussion, we obtain that Equation (2.100) holds.
Proposition 2.5.2. Let
l1 := max
i=1...,n
{√
αdi
}
,
where d1, . . . , dn > 0 are the eigenvalues of D. For l > l1, the solutions of the Initial
Value Problems (2.98) and (2.99) are given by
P¯ (l, t) =
√
D¯ coth
(√
D¯(T − t) + arcoth ((l + θ2)
√
D¯
−1))− θ2I, (2.101)
Q¯(l, t) =
√
D˜ coth
(
D˜(T − t) + arcoth (l√D˜−1)), (2.102)
respectively, where
D¯ := θ
2
4 I + αD, D˜ := αD.
In particular,
P¯ (t) = lim
l→∞
P¯ (l, t) = D¯ coth
(
D¯(T − t)))− θ2I, (2.103)
Q¯(t) = lim
l→∞
Q¯(l, t) = D˜ coth
(
D˜(T − t)). (2.104)
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Proof. We prove Equation (2.101). Equation (2.102) follows directly by setting θ = 0.
Equations (2.103) and (2.104) are a direct consequence.
Let us consider the scalar initial value problems (i = 1, . . . , n)
p′ = p2 + θp− αdi
p(T ) = l.
By Section 2.2.2, the solution pi(l, ·) of the ith initial value problem exists on (−∞, T ]
and is given by
pi(l, t) =
√
θ2
4 + αdi coth
(√θ2
4 + αdi(T − t) + arcoth
( l + θ2√
θ2
4 + αdi
))
− θ2 .
Recall that D is symmetric. By the spectral theorem, there exists an orthogonal matrix
U ∈ Rn×n with
U>DU = diag
(
d1, . . . , dn
)
.
We obtain that
∂
∂t
U diag
(
pi(l, t)
)
U> = U diag
( ∂
∂t
pi(l, t)
)
U>
= U diag
(
pi(l, t)2
)
U> + θU diag
(
pi(l, t)
)
U> − αU diag(di)U>
=
(
U diag
(
pi(l, t)
)
U>
)2 + θ(U diag (pi(l, t))U>)− αD
and therefore
P¯ (l, t) = U diag
(
pi(l, t)
)
U>
= U diag
(√
θ2/4 + αdi
)
U>U diag
(
coth(. . . )
)
U> − θ2I
=
√
D¯ coth
(
U diag
(√
θ2/4 + αdi
)
U>(T − t)
+ arcoth
(
U diag
( l + θ/2√
θ2/4 + αdi
)
U>
))− θ2I
=
√
D¯ coth
(√
D¯(T − t) + arcoth ((l + θ2)
√
D¯
−1))− θ2I.
As the bounds x>
√
ΛP¯
√
Λx and x>
√
ΛQ¯
√
Λx are sensitive for the sign of the asset
position, we expect them to be a significant improvement over x>ΛPx respectively
x>ΛQx. We analyze the improvement in the following numerical example.
Example 2.5.3. We consider the continuous-time analog of the discrete-time setting of
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Figure 2.1.: Value function v(t, x) = x>C(t)x and bounds for the value function for t ∈
[0, 0.8], x = (1, 1)> (left picture), x = (1,−1)> (right picture). In both pictures the solid
line represents the value function, dashed lines represent the improved upper respectively
lower bounds and dotted lines represent the bounds form Section 2.4.1.
Example 1.3.10. Let
Λ =
(
3 0
0 0.2
)
, Σ =
(
1 0.9
0.9 1
)
, θ =
(
θ1
θ2
)
=
(
0.5
3
)
, T = 1.
As x>ΛPx and x>ΛQx are independent of the signs of xi (i = 1, 2), these bounds are the
same for the well-diversified portfolio (1, 1)> and the poorly diversified portfolio (1,−1)>
(note the high correlation of the two stocks, cf. also Section 1.3.4) although the value
function differs significantly as we demonstrate below.
We solve the Initial Value Problem (2.18) numerically and compute the value function
v(t, ·) for x = (1, 1)> and y = (1,−1)>, respectively. We obtain
3.19 = v(0, y) < v(0, x) = 4.11, 15.29 = v(0.8, y) < v(0.8, x) = 15.70.
The value function at x and y differs significantly at both points in time t = 0 and
t = 0.8. Furthermore, P¯ and Q¯ perform significantly better than P and Q, respectively.
The relative differences between v(t, x) and v(t, y) as well as between P , Q and P¯ , Q¯
are much smaller for t = 0.8 than for t = 0. The reason is that for very short time
horizons, risk costs are not as significant and impact costs outweigh risk costs. Thus,
the diversification of the portfolio and the fact that P and Q ignore the sign of the asset
positions are less important for t = 0.8.
We illustrate this in Figure 2.1. In both pictures the thick solid line denotes the value
function. Dashed lines correspond to the improved bounds and dotted lines correspond
to the original bounds. As expected, the bounds x>
√
ΛP¯
√
Λx and x>
√
ΛQ¯
√
Λx perform
significantly better then x>ΛPx respectively x>ΛQx in both cases
2.6. Discretization
In Chapter 1 we introduced a discrete-time market model for liquidating a large port-
folio both by trading in the primary exchange and by trading in a dark pool. For a
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specification of this model where the price impact in the market is linear and temporary,
we obtained a recursive scheme for solving the associated optimization problem in Sec-
tion 1.3. We are thus able to compute the value function and the optimal strategy. The
construction of the corresponding continuous-time market model in Chapter 2 suggests
that there should be a close connection between the value function of the discrete-time
model and the value function of the continuous-time model. We believe that the discrete-
time value function converges to the continuous-time value function as the number of
trading times N tends to infinity.
In order to obtain such a convergence result, we have to scale the parameters of
the discrete-time setting appropriately. For example, for larger N , i.e., shorter trading
periods, the price impact per trading period should be larger, while the covariance matrix
and the probability of execution should be smaller.
In Section 2.6.1 we specify the scaling of the parameters and the form of the conver-
gence we expect. In Section 2.6.2 we prove convergence for the single asset setting. For
this case, we have closed form solutions for the value function both for the discrete-time
model and for the continuous-time model. In Section 2.6.3 we discuss the case of liqui-
dating a portfolio and give heuristic reasons why we think that the convergence result
also holds for general n ∈ N. In Section 2.6.4 we show that convergence of the value
function transfers to convergence of the optimal strategy.
2.6.1. Model description
In order to compare the discrete-time model and the continuous-time model, we first
have to introduce notations that avoid ambiguities. For example, the impact matrix Λ
in the discrete-time setting refers to a slightly different object than in the continuous-time
setting.
We will keep the notations for the continuous-time setting of Chapter 2. Λ > 0
denotes the price impact matrix and Σ ≥ 0 denote the covariance matrix for the unit
interval [0, 1]. Furthermore, θ1, . . . , θn denote the intensities of the n independent Poisson
processes pi1, . . . , pin. We assume that
θi > 0
for simplicity.
Let us now consider the discrete-time model of Section 1.3 with N + 1 trading times.
We make the following two simplifying specifications.
Assumption 2.6.1. (i) For j = 0, . . . , N , the trading intervals [tj , tj+1) have equal
length
tj+1 − tj = T
N
.
(ii) The dark pool liquidities for the n assets are independent.
Assumption 2.6.1 (ii) is necessary as we only consider independent dark pools in the
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continuous-time setting. We also assume implicitly that the last trade takes place in the
interval [tN , tN+1) rather than at time tN and that the trading horizon is [0, T + 1N ) with
no dark pool orders allowed in [T, T + 1N ).
We scale the parameters Λ, Σ, Pˆ (cf. Equation (1.22)) in the following way.
(i) Given the n-dimensional independent Poisson process pi, we replace the matrix Pˆ
by
Pˆ (N) = diag
(
pˆi,i(N)), pˆi,i(N) :=
θiT
N
.
Recall that pˆi,i(N) is the probability of execution of orders of the ith asset in the
dark pool in a given time interval [tj , tj+1). Consequently, the expected number
of executions for the ith asset in [0, T ] is given by
θiT
(independent of N ∈ N) both in the discrete-time and in the continuous-time
setting.
(ii) We replace the price impact matrix by
Λ(N) := Λ(N + 1)
T
.
Liquidating a portfolio X ∈ Rn at trading times 0 = t0 < · · · < tN = T in equally
large blocks in the primary venue yields the price impact costs
N∑
i=0
1
(N + 1)2X
>Λ(N + 1)
T
X = 1
T
X>ΛX.
Liquidating the same portfolio continuously in [0, T ] at constant trading rate yields
thus the same price impact costs:
T∫
0
1
T 2
X>ΛXdt = 1
T
X>ΛX.
(iii) We replace the covariance matrix by
Σ(N) := ΣT
N + 1 ,
i.e., we assume implicitly that the variances and the covariances of the price pro-
cesses P˜ (tk) are linear in time. This is, e.g., the case if the price increments are
identically distributed (recall that we assumed independence of the price incre-
ments in Chapter 1).
Also, for the value function matrix and the optimal strategy, we keep the notation for
the continuous-time setting and denote it by C(t) for t ∈ [0, T ). For the discrete-time
130
2.6. Discretization
setting with N+1 trading times, we denote the value function matrix C and the matrices
Cˇ and D (cf. Notation 1.3.3 and Equation (1.26)) at a given time t = tk by
C(t,N) = (ci,j(t,N))i,j,=1,...,n, Cˇ(t,N) = (cˇi,j(t,N))i,j,=1,...,n
and
D(t,N) = (di,j(t,N))i,j,=1,...,n,
respectively.
The goal is now to show the following conjecture.
Conjecture 2.6.2. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and assume that there is a sequence t(N) ∈ [0, T ] such
that
t(N) ∈ {0, TN , 2TN , . . . , NTN = T}
and
lim
N→∞
t(N) = t.
Then (element-wise)
lim
N→∞
C(t(N), N) = C(t). (2.105)
2.6.2. Single asset liquidation
In Section 1.3.3 we solved the discrete-time Optimization Problem (OPTdis) in closed
form for n = 1. Let N ∈ N, t(N) := ti(N) := iTN (i = 0, . . . , N) and p(N) = θTN be
the probability of execution. Using the notations from Section 2.6.1, the value function
matrix C is given by (cf. Proposition 1.3.5)
C(t(N), N) = Λ(N)1− p(N)
(√1− p(N) sinh (κ(p(N))(N + 2− i))
sinh
(
κ(p(N))(N + 1− i)
) − 1)
for
κ(p(N)) = arcosh
(√1− p(N)
2
(αΣ(N)
Λ(N) + 1 +
1
1− p(N)
))
.
We also derived the solution of the continuous-time Optimization Problem (OPT) (cf. Equa-
tion (2.90)) in closed form. For t ∈ [0, T ), the value function matrix is given by
C(t) = Λθ˜2 coth
( θ˜
2(T − t)
)
− Λθ2
for
θ˜ =
√
θ2 + 4αΣΛ .
Using these closed form solutions, we can prove Conjecture 2.6.2 for the case n = 1.
Theorem 2.6.3. For n = 1, Conjecture 2.6.2 holds.
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Proof. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and assume that there is a sequence t(N) ∈ [0, T ] such that for
i(N) ∈ {0, . . . , N},
t(N) = i(N)T
N
= t+ (N)
with
lim
N→∞
(N) = 0.
Using the addition formula for sinh, we obtain
C(t(N), N) = Λ(N)√
1− p(N)
(sinh (κ(p(N))(N + 1− i)) cosh (κ(p(N)))
sinh
(
κ(p(N))(N + 1− i))
+
cosh
(
κ(p(N))(N + 1− i)) sinh (κ(p(N)))
sinh
(
κ(p(N))(N + 1− i)) − 1√1− p(N)
)
= Λ
T
√
1− p(N)
(
(N + 1)
(
cosh
(
κ(p(N))
)− 1√
1− p(N)
)
+ (N + 1) sinh
(
κ(p(N))
)
coth
(
κ(p(N))(N + 1− i))). (2.106)
We have
(N + 1)
(
cosh
(
κ(p(N))
)− 1√
1− p(N)
)
= (N + 1)
(√1− p(N)
2
(αΣ(N)
Λ(N) + 1 +
1
1− p(N)
)− 1√
1− p(N)
)
=
√
1− θTN αΣT 2
2(N + 1)Λ +
N + 1
2
(√
1− θT
N
− 1√
1− θTN
)
−→ −θT2 (2.107)
as N →∞. Moreover,
(N + 1)2 sinh2
(
κ(p(N))
)
= (N + 1)2
(
cosh2
(
κ(p(N))
)− 1)
= 14(N + 1)
2
((√
1− p(N) + 1√
1− p(N)
αΣ(N)
√
1− p(N)
Λ(N)
)2
− 4
)
= 14(N + 1)
2
((
1− θT
N
)− 2 + 1
1− θTN
+ 2
αΣT 2
√
1− θTN
(
2− θTN
)
(N + 1)2Λ
+
α2Σ2T 4
(
1− θTN
)
(N + 1)4Λ2
)
−→ θ
2T 2
4 +
αΣT 2
Λ =
T 2θ˜2
4
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as N →∞ and hence
(N + 1) sinh
(
κ(p(N))
) −→ T θ˜2 (2.108)
and (note that lim
N→∞
κ(p(N)) = 0)
Nκ(p(N)) = N sinh
(
κ(p(N))
) κ(p(N))
sinh
(
κ(p(N))
) −→ T θ˜2 (2.109)
as N →∞. We note that
N + 1− i = N
T
(
T + T
N
− iT
N
)
= N
T
(
T − t+ ˜(N))
for lim
N→∞
˜(N) = 0 and deduce by Equation (2.106) (using (2.107), (2.108) and (2.109))
that
lim
N→∞
C(t(N), N) = −Λθ2 +
Λθ˜
2 coth
( θ˜
2(T − t)
)
as required.
Remark 2.6.4. In Section 1.3.3 we showed that in the discrete-time setting, the risk
costs are increasing in p(N) for
p(N) < αΣ(N)Λ(N) + αΣ(N) (2.110)
(cf. Proposition 1.3.9), while in the continuous-time setting, they are decreasing in θ
for θ > 0 (cf. Proposition 2.5.1). Considering Theorem 2.6.3, this is surprising at first
sight. We want to remark here that in the limit case of the discrete-time setting, the risk
costs are decreasing on the whole interval (0, 1) as Inequality (2.110) is equivalent to
θ <
NTαΣ
(N + 1)2Λ + αΣT 2 −→ 0
as N →∞.
2.6.3. Portfolio liquidation
For n ≥ 2, we neither have closed form solutions for the discrete-time optimization
problem nor for the continuous-time optimization problem. Therefore, we cannot prove
Conjecture 2.6.2 in a similar way as for n = 1.
For N ∈ N, t = iTN , i ∈ {0, . . . , N}, the discrete-time value function matrix is given
recursively by C(T,N) = Λ(N) + αΣ(N),
C(t,N) = αΣ(N) +D(t+ TN , N)−D(t+ TN , N)
(
Λ(N) +D(t+ TN , N))
)−1
D(t+ TN , N),
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where
D(t+ TN , N) = C(t+
T
N , N)− C(t+ TN , N)Pˆ (N)Cˇ(t+ TN , N)−1Pˆ (N)C(t+ TN , N)
(cf. Equation (1.25)).
For the continuous-time setting, the value function matrix solves the matrix differential
equation
C ′ = C>Λ−1C + C>C˜C − αΣ, (2.111)
where
C˜ := diag
( θi
ci,i
)
with boundary condition
lim
t→T−
cmin(t) =∞ (2.112)
(cf. Theorem 2.4.4).
It turns out that it is difficult to connect these two objects. One problem is that (2.111)
is not a matrix Riccati equation, and therefore it is not clear that the value function ma-
trix is the unique solution of (2.111) with boundary condition (2.112) (cf. Remark 2.4.5).
In the following we give heuristic reasons why we believe that Conjecture 2.6.2 is true
for general n ∈ N. It is left for future research to give a rigorous proof.
We note first that by the independence of the dark pools, we obtain
cˇi,j(t,N) =
{
ci,i(t,N)pˆi,i(N) if i = j
ci,j(t,N)pˆi,i(N)pˆj,j(N) if i 6= j
=

ci,i(t,N)θiT
N if i = j
ci,j(t,N)θiθjT 2
N2 if i 6= j.
(2.113)
We define the matrix Cˆ(t,N) = (cˆi,j(t,N))i,j,=1,...,n by
Cˆ(t,N) := Pˆ (N)−1Cˇ(t,N)Pˆ (N)−1.
Note that Cˆ is well-defined since we assumed θi > 0 and that
cˆi,j(t,N) =

ci,i(t,N)
pˆi,i(N) if i = j
ci,j(t,N) if i 6= j
=
{
ci,i(t,N)N
θiT
if i = j
ci,j(t,N) if i 6= j.
(2.114)
We will make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.6.5. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and consider a sequence t(N) ∈ [0, T ] such that
t(N) ∈ {0, TN , . . . , T} and
lim
N→∞
t(N) = t.
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Then, there exists a positive definite matrix F (t) = (fi,j(t))i,j=1,...,n ∈ Rn×n such that
lim
N→∞
C(t(N), N) = F (t). (2.115)
The following lemma implies the existence of a convergent subsequence.
Lemma 2.6.6. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and assume that there is a sequence t(N) ∈ [0, T ] such
that t(N) ∈ {0, TN , . . . , T} and
lim
N→∞
t(N) = t.
Then there exists a matrix G ∈ Rn×n such that
C(t(N), N) ≤ G for all N ∈ N.
Proof. Let x ∈ Rn be the portfolio position at time t(N). Assume that t(N) = i(N)TN
and define the following admissible strategy:
x(tj , N) :=
1
N − i(N) + 1x, y(tj , N) := 0, j = i, . . . , N.
This strategy yields at least the costs of the optimal strategy. For X(ti(N), N) = x,
X(tj , N) = X(tj−1, N)− x(tj−1, N), we obtain
x>C(t(N), N)x ≤
N∑
j=i(N)
x(tj , N)>Λ(N)x(tj , N) + α
N∑
j=i(N)
X(tj , N)>Σ(N)X(tj , N)
≤ N + 1
N − i(N) + 1x
>Λx+ αx>Σx
−→ T
T − tx
>Λx+ αx>Σx
as N −→∞.
We obtain the following result.
Proposition 2.6.7. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and t(N) ∈ [0, T ] such that t(N) ∈ {0, TN , . . . , T} and
lim
N→∞
t(N) = t.
If Assumption 2.6.5 holds, then
lim
N→∞
C
(
t(N) + TN , N
)− C(t(N), N)
T/N
= F (t)Λ−1F (t) + F (t)F˜ (t)F (t)− αΣ.
Proof. Note first that
C
(
t(N) + TN , N
)− C(t(N), N)
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= −αΣ(N) + C(t(N) + TN , N)Cˆ(t(N) + TN , N)−1C(t(N) + TN , N)
−D(t(N) + TN , N)(Λ(N) +D(t(N) + TN , N))−1D(t(N) + TN , N)
(recall that
D
(
t(N)+ TN , N
)
= C
(
t(N)+ TN , N
)−C(t(N)+ TN , N)Cˆ(t(N)+ TN , N)−1C(t(N)+ TN , N)
and note that Cˆ−1 is well-defined as θi > 0).
By Equation (2.114) and Assumption 2.6.5, we have
lim
N→∞
T
N
Cˆ
(
t(N) + TN , N
)
= diag
(fii(t)
θi
)
= F˜ (t)−1
and therefore
lim
N→∞
N
T
C
(
t(N) + TN , N
)
Cˆ
(
t(N) + TN , N
)−1
C
(
t(N) + TN , N
)
= F (t)F˜ (t)F (t).
Furthermore,
lim
N→∞
N
T
(
Λ(N) +D
(
t(N) + TN , N
))−1
= lim
N→∞
(
N+1
N Λ +
T
ND
(
t(N) + TN , N
))−1
= Λ−1
since
lim
N→∞
Cˆ
(
t(N) + TN , N
)−1 = 0.
We deduce
lim
N→∞
N
T
(
C
(
t(N) + TN , N
)− C(t(N), N)) = −αΣ + F (t)F˜ (t)F (t) + F (t)Λ−1F (t)
as desired.
By Lemma 2.6.6, the limit of (C(t(N), N))N exists for a subsequence. There is reason
to believe that all subsequences of (C(t(N), N))N converge to the same limit F (t) and
hence Assumption 2.6.5 holds in general. In this case Proposition 2.6.7 suggests that
the limit F is differentiable and solves the Matrix Differentiable Equation (2.111) with
boundary condition (2.112). As the principal solution for Riccati matrix differential
equations is unique (cf. Remark 2.4.5), we believe that this is also the case for the
Differential Equation (2.111) and hence that
F = C.
2.6.4. Convergence of the optimal liquidation strategy
Provided that Conjecture 2.6.2 holds, the convergence of the value function matrix carries
over to convergence of the optimal strategy in the sense of Proposition 2.6.8 below. In
particular, this yields a proof for convergence of the optimal strategy for the case n = 1.
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We first introduce the following notation. For the discrete-time setting with N + 1
trading times, we denote the optimal trading strategy at a given time t = i(N)TN for
portfolio position x ∈ Rn at time t and the corresponding matrices A and B (cf. Equa-
tions (1.23) respectively (1.24)) by
x∗(t,N) = A(t,N)x,
y∗(t,N) = B(t,N)x.
We keep the notation for the continuous-time setting and denote the optimal trading
strategy at time t ∈ [0, T ) and portfolio position x at time t by
u∗(t, x) = (ξ∗(t, x), η∗(t, x)).
By Theorem 1.3.4, the matrices A(t,N) and B(t,N) are given by
A(t,N) =
(
Λ(N) +D
(
t+ TN , N
))−1
D
(
t+ TN , N
)
,
B(t,N) = Cˇ
(
t+ TN , N
)−1
Pˆ (N)C
(
t+ TN , N
)(
I −A(t,N)
)
.
By Theorem 2.4.10, u∗ is given by
ξ∗(t, x) = Λ−1C(t)x,
η∗(t, x) = C¯(t)C(t)x.
We obtain the following convergence result.
Proposition 2.6.8. Assume that Conjecture 2.6.2 holds. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and
t(N) ∈ {0, TN , . . . , T} such that limN→∞ t(N) = t. Let furthermore x ∈ R
n be the portfo-
lio position at time t for the continuous-time setting respectively at time t(N) for the
discrete-time setting. Then
lim
N→∞
x∗(t(N), N)
T/N
= ξ∗(t, x)
and
lim
N→∞
y∗(t(N), N) = η∗(t, x).
Proof. Note first that Conjecture 2.6.2 implies
lim
N→∞
D
(
t(N) + TN , N
)
= C(t)
by Equation (2.114). Furthermore,
lim
N→∞
Λ(N) +D
(
t+ TN , N
)
N
= Λ
T
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and therefore
lim
N→∞
A(t(N), N)
T/N
= 1
T
lim
N→∞
N
(
Λ(N) +D
(
t+ TN , N
))−1
lim
N→∞
D
(
t(N) + TN , N
)
= Λ−1C(t)
as required.
For optimal dark pool orders, we define the matrix C¯(t,N) = (c¯i,j(t,N))i,j=1,...,n by
C¯(t,N) = Cˇ(t,N)−1Pˆ (N).
We obtain
lim
N→∞
C¯
(
t(N) + tN , N
)−1 = diag(ci,i(t))
and therefore
lim
N→∞
B(t(N), N) = lim
N→∞
C¯
(
t+ TN , N
)−1
C
(
t+ TN , N
)
lim
N→∞
(
I −A(t,N)
)
= C¯(t)C(t),
finishing the proof.
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In a similar fashion as in Chapter 2 we transfer the discrete-time market model of
Section 1.4 into a continuous-time model and specify the costs of a trading strategy by
the continuous-time analog of the the Optimization Problem (OPTdis). We set up the
model in Section 3.1.
Recall that much of the difficulty in Chapter 2 stems from the fact that we consider
n-dimensional portfolios. Here, we consider single asset liquidation. The fact that dark
pool orders inhabit “linear” costs (in an analog way as in the discrete-time setting) gives
rise to an optimization problem that is not linear-quadratic anymore. The value function
is therefore not quadratic and the major difficulty is hence to derive the structure of the
value function.
We derive a candidate for the value function in closed form heuristically in Section 3.2;
this is accomplished by using the insights from the discrete-time setting of Section 1.4
and by analyzing the HJB equation corresponding to the problem. This candidate is a
quadratic polynomial for large and for small asset positions. For intermediate positions,
we “interpolate” these polynomials in a non-trivial way. We are also able to obtain a
candidate for the optimal strategy in closed form.
It is a priori not clear that the candidate value function obtained in Section 3.2 is
well-defined. We verify this in Section 3.3 and show that it is additionally continuously
differentiable and strictly convex. We compute the partial derivatives which turn out
to be of surprisingly simple form. Combining these results, we prove that the candidate
value function solves the HJB equation corresponding to the problem, with the candidate
optimal strategy as unique maximizer.
We finally solve the optimization problem rigorously in Section 3.4 via a verification
based on the HJB equation. This involves taking the limit s→ T− and requires prelim-
inary considerations.
We close the chapter by studying the properties of this solution. In particular, we
analyze the dependence of the value function and the optimal strategy on the extent of
adverse selection and the optimal strategy for risk-neutral investors.
3.1. Model description
We consider the same model as in Chapter 2 but only treat the case of liquidating a
single asset position (n = 1). In particular, the price impact is linear and temporary and
is given by a positive real number Λ, the fundamental price process P˜ is a martingale
and is only relevant through its variance Σ ≥ 0, constant in time, and execution in the
dark pool is driven by a one-dimensional Poisson process pi with intensity θ ≥ 0. The set
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of admissible liquidation strategies is given as before by Definition 2.1.1; we only change
the cost functional and add a term reflecting adverse selection. Therefore, trading in the
dark pool is not entirely free anymore.
We define the cost functional and introduce the corresponding optimization problem in
Section 3.1.1. In Section 3.1.2 we state the HJB equation for the optimization problem.
3.1.1. Cost functional
As in Section 1.4, we assume that there is adverse selection in the market. In the
discrete-time setting the value function and the optimal strategy are independent of the
fundamental asset price P˜ , and we define the cost functional
J¯ : [0, T ]×R× A(t, x) −→ R+
as the continuous-time analog of the cost functional of the Optimization Problem (OPTdis):
J¯(t, x, u) := Et,x
[ T∫
t
f¯(ξ(s), η(s), Xu(s))ds
]
; (3.1)
the function f¯ : R×R→ R is given by
f¯(ξ, η, x) := Λξ2 + θΓ|η|+ αΣx2, (3.2)
where Γ ≥ 0 and θ ≥ 0 is the intensity of the Poisson process pi. The value function of
the optimization problem is
v¯(t, x) := inf
u∈A(t,x)
J¯(t, x, u). (OPT)
Thereby Γ denotes the expected price move in the primary exchange directly after liquid-
ity in the dark pool is found. The special case Γ = 0 is included in Chapter 2 and solved
explicitly in Section 2.5.1; θ = 0 implies that the value of Γ is irrelevant. Therefore, we
assume
θΓ > 0
from now on.
3.1.2. Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
The derivation of a candidate value function
w : [0, T )×R −→ R+
is the key step towards the solution of the Optimization Problem (OPT). Heuristic con-
siderations suggest that w should satisfy the following HJB equation (cf. Section 2.1.3):
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∂w
∂t
(t, x) = sup
u=(ξ,η)∈R×R
[
θ
(
w(t, x)− w(t, x− η))+ ∂w
∂x
(t, x)ξ − f¯(ξ, η, x)
]
,
lim
t→T−
w(t, x) =
{
0 if x = 0
∞ else.
(HJB)
Because of the non-linear-quadratic form of the cost functional caused by the term θΓ|η|,
there is no reason to believe that the value function is of linear-quadratic form, and a
linear-quadratic ansatz as in Chapter 2 fails.
3.2. Heuristic derivation of the candidate value function
Given the shape of the cost functional and the results from the discrete-time setting in
Section 1.4, we expect the value function and the optimal strategy to have the following
structure:
• For large absolute values of the asset position |x|, the value function is a quadratic
polynomial. The optimal strategy is affine linear in x.
• For small absolute values of the asset position |x|, the value function is given by
w(t, x) = C(t; 0)x2,
i.e., it is the same as the value function of the Optimization Problem (OPT) for
n = 1 and θ = 0 (cf. Equation (2.91)). Also the optimal strategy in the primary
exchange is the same as the one without dark pool, and the optimal order in the
dark pool is zero.
• For intermediate asset positions, we have to “interpolate” the value function in
such a way that it is continuously differentiable.
In Section 3.2.1 we make the ansatz that the value function is a “quasi-polynomial”
of degree two with the coefficients depending on the asset position x. In Section 3.2.2
we deduce a candidate for the optimal strategy (dependent on the coefficients of this
polynomial) using the HJB-Equation (HJB) and obtain a candidate for the boundary
below which the dark pool is not used. In Section 3.2.3 we derive differential equations
for the coefficients of the candidate value function.
3.2.1. Quasi-polynomial ansatz for the candidate value function
We make the ansatz that the value function is a quasi-polynomial of degree two with
the coefficients depending on the asset position x:
w(t, x) = C¯1(t, x)x2 + C¯2(t, x)|x|+ C¯3(t, x) (3.3)
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for functions C¯i : [0, T ) × R → R, i = 1, 2, 3. This ansatz is motivated by the fact
that the value function is a piecewise quadratic polynomial in the discrete-time setting
(cf. Theorem 1.4.4, in particular Equation (1.63)).
In the following we reflect on the optimal liquidation strategy. These considerations
yield possible properties of the coefficients in Equation (3.3). Assume that
u∗(t, x) = (ξ∗(t, x), η∗(t, x))
is the optimal strategy. For small positions, the linear costs for trading in the dark pool
are larger than the quadratic costs for trading in the primary venue. Therefore, there
should be a time-dependent boundary β : [0, T )→ R+ such that
η∗(t, x) = 0 for |x| ≤ β(t). (3.4)
For larger asset positions, the dark pool is cheaper than the primary venue and therefore
we expect that the execution of the dark pool order decreases the position to the level
β, where further dark pool use is too costly:
η∗(t, x) = sgn(x)
(|x| − β(t)) for |x| > β(t). (3.5)
As the dark pool is not used for |x| ≤ β(t), the optimal strategy below the bound-
ary should be the one without dark pool, which we obtained in Chapter 2 (cf. Equa-
tion (2.91)), i.e, the value function is given by
w(t, x) = C(t; 0)x2, (3.6)
and the optimal strategy in the primary venue is given by
ξ∗(t, x) = C(t; 0)Λ x.
In other words, we expect the coefficients of w as in Equation (3.3) to fulfill
C¯1(t, x) = C(t; 0), C¯2(t, x) = C¯3(t, x) = 0 for |x| ≤ β(t).
Let us now assume that these considerations are true. We hope that the value function
is differentiable on [0, T ) × R. We use this property for the proof of the verification
theorem via the HJB Equation (HJB) (cf. Theorem 3.4.4 below).
A necessary condition for continuity of w at x = β(t) is
C¯1(t, β(t)) = C(t; 0), C¯2(t, β(t)) = C¯3(t, β(t)) = 0.
In order to be differentiable at x = β(t), the right-hand and the left-hand partial deriva-
tive with respect to x must be equal, i.e., for t ∈ [0, T ), x = β(t),
2C(t; 0)x = 2C¯1(t, x)x+ C¯2(t, x) + x2
∂C¯1
∂x
(t, x) + x∂C¯2
∂x
(t, x) + ∂C¯3
∂x
(t, x),
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and therefore a necessary condition for differentiability is
β(t)2∂C¯1
∂x
(t, β(t)) + β(t)∂C¯2
∂x
(t, β(t)) + ∂C¯3
∂x
(t, β(t)) = 0.
We make the educated guess that this condition also holds for x 6= β(t):
x2
∂C¯1
∂x
(t, x) + |x|∂C¯2
∂x
(t, x) + ∂C¯3
∂x
(t, x) = 0 (3.7)
for all t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ R and thus
∂w
∂x
(t, x) = 2C¯1(t, x)x+ sgn(x)C¯2(t, x). (3.8)
3.2.2. The candidate optimal trading strategy
We assume from now on that the value function is given by w as in Equation (3.3)
respectively as in Equation (3.6), that all partial derivatives exist, that ∂w∂x is given as in
Equation (3.8) and that the optimal strategy in the dark pool is given by Equations (3.4)
and (3.5).
We consider the HJB Equation (HJB) and maximize the function
h(t, x, ξ, η) := θ
(
w(t, x)− w(t, x− η))+ ∂w
∂x
(t, x)ξ − Λξ2 − θΓ|η| − αΣx2
= θw(t, x)− θ(w(t, x− η) + Γ|η|)− αΣx2
− Λ
( ∂w
∂x (t, x)
2Λ − ξ
)2
+
∂w
∂x (t, x)2
4Λ
in (ξ, η). Using Equation (3.8), we obtain that h is maximal for
ξ∗ := ξ∗(t, x) := 2C¯1(t, x)x+ sgn(x)C¯2(t, x)2Λ (3.9)
and for η∗ = η∗(t, x) such that
h¯(η) := w(t, x− η) + Γ|η|
is minimal. For x > β(t), Equation (3.5) suggests that this should be the case for
η∗ = η∗(t, x) = x− β(t). (3.10)
Furthermore, we have for η∗ > 0 and
h¯′(η∗) = −∂w
∂x
(t, x− η∗) + Γ = 0
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if and only if
∂w
∂x
(t, x− η∗) = Γ. (3.11)
Combining Equations (3.6), (3.10) and (3.11), we obtain the following candidate for the
boundary β(t):
β(t) = Γ2C(t; 0) . (3.12)
3.2.3. Differential equations for the coefficients
From now on we consider the case x > β(t). Given the assumption that w as in Equa-
tion (3.3) solves the HJB Equation (HJB) with maximizer u∗ = (ξ∗, η∗) for ξ∗ and η∗ as
in Equations (3.9) and (3.10), respectively, we obtain
∂w
∂t
(t, x) = h(t, x, ξ∗, η∗).
Provided that Equations (3.7) and (3.12) hold, this implies
∂C¯1
∂t
(t, x)x2 + ∂C¯2
∂t
(t, x)x+ ∂C¯3
∂t
(t, x)
= θ
(
C¯1(t, x)x2 + C¯2(t, x)x+ C¯3(t, x)
)− θC(t; 0)β(t)2 + 12Λ(2C¯1(t, x)x+ C¯2(t, x))2
− 14Λ
(
2C¯1(t, x)x+ C¯2(t, x)
)2 − θΓ(x− β(t)))− αΣx2
=
( C¯1(t, x)2
Λ + θC¯1(t, x)− αΣ
)
x2 +
(
C¯2(t, x)
( C¯1(t, x)
Λ + θ
)
− θΓ
)
x
+ θC¯3(t, x) +
θΓ2
4C(t; 0) +
C¯2(t, x)2
4Λ .
We hence expect that for |x| > β(t), the coefficients of the candidate value function
fulfill the ordinary differential equations
∂C¯1
∂t
(t, x) = C¯1(t, x)
2
Λ + θC¯1(t, x)− αΣ, (3.13)
∂C¯2
∂t
(t, x) = C¯2(t, x)
( C¯1(t, x)
Λ + θ
)
− θΓ, (3.14)
∂C¯3
∂t
(t, x) = θC¯3(t, x) +
θΓ2
4C(t; 0) +
C¯2(t, x)2
4Λ (3.15)
and that for x = β(t),
C¯1(t, x) = C(t; 0), C¯2(t, x) = C¯3(t, x) = 0. (3.16)
In order to transfer the Differential Equations (3.13), (3.14), (3.15) and the Condi-
tions (3.16) into initial value problems, we consider the trading trajectory resulting from
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the candidate optimal trading intensity ξ∗. Let t ∈ [0, T ), x ≥ β(t) and let s ∈ [t, T ) be
the first time such that the trading trajectory crosses the boundary β(s), provided that
there is no dark pool execution in [t, T ). If such an s exists, it is the last time at which
the optimal asset position crosses the boundary β, and we define
X¯(t, s) := x.
In other words, the deterministic function X¯(·, s) defined on [t, s] is the candidate for
the optimal asset position corresponding to the candidate optimal trading intensity ξ∗,
provided no order in the dark pool is executed (cf. the respective functions X¯ in the
discrete-time setting of Section 1.4). Note also that this implies
X¯(s, s) = β(s) = Γ2C(s; 0) .
We modify the notation for the coefficients of the candidate value function in the fol-
lowing way. If t ∈ [0, T ), x ≥ β(t) and if there exists a smallest s ∈ [t, T ) such that the
trading trajectory resulting from the candidate optimal trading intensity ξ∗ crosses the
boundary β at time s without any dark pool execution, we write
C1(t, s) := C¯1(t, x), C2(t, s) := C¯2(t, x), C3(t, s) := C¯3(t, x).
Thus, we expect that the new coefficients C1, C2 and C3 solve the following initial value
problems
∂C1
∂t
(·, s) = C1(·, s)
2
Λ + θC1(·, s)− αΣ (3.17)
C1(s, s) = C(s; 0),
∂C2
∂t
(·, s) = C2(·, s)
(C1(·, s)
Λ + θ
)
− θΓ (3.18)
C2(s, s) = 0,
∂C3
∂t
(·, s) = θC3(·, s) + θΓ
2
4C(·; 0) +
C2(·, s)2
4Λ (3.19)
C3(s, s) = 0
and that X¯ solves the initial value problem (cf. Equation (3.9))
∂X¯
∂t
(·, s) = −C1(·, s)Λ X¯(·, s)−
C2(·, s)
2Λ = −ξ
∗(·, X¯(·, s))
X¯(s, s) = Γ2C(s; 0) .
(3.20)
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3.3. The candidate value function
Following the heuristic considerations of Section 3.2, we define the candidate value func-
tion w by
w(t, x) := C1(t, g(t, x))x2 + C2(t, g(t, x))|x|+ C3(t, g(t, x)), (3.21)
where C1, C2 and C3 are the solutions of the Initial Value Problems (3.17), (3.18)
and (3.19), respectively. The function g : [0, T ] × R → [0, T ] is given explicitly for
|x| ∈ [0, Γ2C(t;0) ] ∪ [X¯(t, T ),∞) by
g(t, x) :=
t if |x| ∈ [0,
Γ
2C(t;0) ]
T if |x| ∈ [X¯(t, T ),∞), (3.22)
and implicitly for |x| ∈ ( Γ2C(t;0) , X¯(t, T )) by
X¯(t, g(t, x)) = |x|, (3.23)
where X¯ is the solution of the Initial Value Problem (3.20), i.e., g(t, ·) is the inverse
function of X¯(t, ·). It is not immediately clear that such an inverse function exists and
that the function w defined by Equation (3.21) is well-defined.
The remainder of the section is structured as follows. In Section 3.3.1 we compute
the solutions of the Initial Value Problems (3.17), (3.18), (3.19) and (3.20) in closed
form. This enables us to prove that w is well-defined. In Section 3.3.2 we prove that
w is continuously differentiable and strictly convex in x. Finally, we show that w is a
solution of the HJB Equation (HJB) in Section 3.3.3.
In Sections 3.3 - 3.5.1 we assume that
αΣ > 0.
We treat the case αΣ = 0 in Section 3.5.2.
3.3.1. Closed form solutions for the coefficients and the trading trajectory
in order that the value function is well-defined, the function g must be well-defined.
Therefore, we require that X¯ is strictly monotone in s (cf. Equation (3.23)). We prove
this by directly computing the partial derivative of X¯ with respect to s and show that
it is strictly positive.
We start by giving closed form solutions for the value function coefficients C1, C2,
C3 and for X¯, which follow from the Initial Value Problems (3.17), (3.18), (3.19) and
(3.20), respectively. Proposition 3.3.1 treats the case s ∈ (t, T ), Proposition 3.3.2 treats
the case s = T .
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Proposition 3.3.1. Let t ∈ [0, T ), s ∈ (t, T ) and define
µ(s) := 2C(s; 0) + θΛ
θ˜Λ
, (3.24)
κ(s) := arcoth(µ(s));
recall that
θ˜ =
√
θ2 + 4αΣΛ .
Then
C1(t, s) =
Λθ˜
2 coth
( θ˜
2(s− t) + κ(s)
)− Λθ2 > 0, (3.25)
C2(t, s) =
θΓ
2αΣ
(
− θΛ
+
Λθ˜
(
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)
+µ(s) cosh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
))−2C(s; 0) exp ( θ2(t− s))
µ(s) sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)
+ cosh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
) ) (3.26)
> 0,
C3(t, s) = −
s∫
t
exp
(
θ(t− u))( θΓ24C(u; 0) + C2(u, s)
2
4Λ
)
du < 0, (3.27)
X¯(t, s) =
( Γµ(s)
2C(s; 0) +
θ2Γ
2θ˜αΣ
)
sinh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
exp
(θ
2(t− s)
)
+
( Γ
2C(s; 0) +
θΓ
2αΣ
)
cosh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
exp
(θ
2(t− s)
)− θΓ2αΣ . (3.28)
Proof. Note first that for s ∈ (t, T ),
C(s; 0) >
√
αΣΛ
by Equation (2.91). Therefore,
Λθ˜ =
√
Λ2θ2 + 4αΣΛ < Λθ + 2
√
αΣΛ ≤ Λθ + 2C(s; 0);
thus
µ(s) > 1
and κ(s) as in Equation (3.24) is well-defined for all s ∈ [0, T ).
Let us now consider the initial value problem
P ′ = P 2 + θP − αΣΛ
P (s) = C(s; 0)Λ .
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By Section 2.2.2, the solution is given by
P (t) = θ˜2 coth
( θ˜
2(s− t) + κ(s)
)− θ2 .
Furthermore, ΛP solves the Initial Value Problem (3.17), finishing the proof of Equa-
tion (3.25).
Note now that C1(·, s) is continuous on [t, s). Thus, the solution of the inhomogeneous
linear Initial Value Problem (3.18) is given by
C2(t, s) = −θΓ exp
( t∫
s
(C1(u, s)
Λ + θ
)
du
) t∫
s
exp
( s∫
u
(C1(v, s)
Λ + θ
)
dv
)
du > 0 (3.29)
for t < s. Elementary but tedious algebraic manipulations show that
C2(t, s) =
θΓ
2αΣ
(
− θΛ
+
Λθ˜
(
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)
+µ(s) cosh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
))−2C(s; 0) exp ( θ2(t− s))
µ(s) sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)
+ cosh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
) ) (3.30)
as required (cf. Equation (3.26)). A detailed proof of Equation (3.30) is provided in
Appendix A.3.
The assertion that C3 as in Equation (3.27) solves the inhomogeneous linear Initial
Value Problem (3.19) follows directly as C2(·, s) and 1C(·;0) are continuous.
The solution of the inhomogeneous linear Initial Value Problem (3.20) is given by
X¯(t, s) = exp
( s∫
t
(C1(u, s)
Λ
)
du
)
( Γ
2C(s; 0) −
t∫
s
exp
( u∫
s
(C1(v, s)
Λ
)
dv
)C2(u, s)
2Λ du
)
(3.31)
=
( Γµ(s)
2C(s; 0) +
θ2Γ
2θ˜αΣ
)
sinh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
exp
(θ
2(t− s)
)
+
( Γ
2C(s; 0) +
θΓ
2αΣ
)
cosh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
exp
(θ
2(t− s)
)− θΓ2αΣ . (3.32)
Again, a detailed proof of Equation (3.32) is provided in Appendix A.3.
For t ∈ [0, T ), C1(t, s), C2(t, s), C3(t, s) and X¯(t, s) as in Equations (3.25), (3.26),
(3.27) and (3.28) are not defined for s = T as C(T ; 0) is not defined and lim
s→T−
C(s; 0) =
∞. However, we require these objects for the definition of the candidate value function
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w. We define C1(t, T ), C2(t, T ), C3(t, T ) and X¯(t, T ) by
C1(t, T ) := lim
s→T−
C1(t, s), C2(t, T ) := lim
s→T−
C2(t, s),
C3(t, T ) := lim
s→T−
C3(t, s), X¯(t, T ) := lim
s→T−
X¯(t, s).
The following proposition ensures that these limits exist and hence that C1(t, T ), C2(t, T ),
C3(t, T ) and X¯(t, T ) are well-defined.
Proposition 3.3.2. Let t ∈ [0, T ). Then
C1(t, T ) =
Λθ˜
2 coth
( θ˜
2(T − t)
)− Λθ2 > 0, (3.33)
C2(t, T ) =
θΓΛ
2αΣ
(
θ˜ coth
( θ˜
2(T − t)
)− θ˜ exp ( θ2(t− T ))
sinh
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
) − θ) > 0, (3.34)
C3(t, T ) = −
T∫
t
exp
(
θ(t− u))( θΓ24C(u; 0) + C2(u, T )
2
4Λ
)
du < 0, (3.35)
X¯(t, T ) =
( Γ
θ˜Λ
+ θ
2Γ
2θ˜αΣ
)
sinh
( θ˜
2(T − t)
)
exp
(θ
2(t− T )
)
+ θΓ2αΣ cosh
( θ˜
2(T − t)
)
exp
(θ
2(t− T )
)− θΓ2αΣ . (3.36)
Proof. Note first that
lim
s→T−
κ(s) = 0.
Therefore, Equation (3.33) follows directly from Equation (3.25).
By Equation (A.28) and the fact that
lim
s→T−
C(s; 0)√
µ(s)2 − 1 = lims→T−
C(s; 0)
µ(s) =
Λθ˜
2 , (3.37)
Equation (3.34) follows.
Furthermore,
C3(t, T ) = − lim
s→T−
T∫
t
1[t,s](u) exp
(
θ(t− u))( θΓ24C(u; 0) + C2(u, s)
2
4Λ
)
du
= −
T∫
t
lim
s→T−
(
1[t,s](u) exp
(
θ(t− u))( θΓ24C(u; 0) + C2(u, s)
2
4Λ
))
du (3.38)
= −
T∫
t
exp
(
θ(t− u))( θΓ24C(u; 0) + C2(u, T )
2
4Λ
)
du
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(observe that 1C(s;0) → 0 as s→ T−). We applied the dominated convergence theorem in
Equation (3.38); recall that lim
s→T−
C(s; 0) =∞ and that C2 can be extended continuously
to A := {(t, s)|t ∈ [0, T ], s ∈ [t, T ]}, hence it attains its maximum in A as lim
t→s−C2(t, s) =
0 for all s ∈ [0, T ].
Equation (3.36) follows directly from Equation (3.28) and Equation (3.37).
It follows immediately from the Formulae (3.25) - (3.28) that both the coefficients of
the candidate value function and the trajectories X¯ are continuously differentiable, even
analytic.
Corollary 3.3.3. Let t ∈ [0, T ), s ∈ (t, T ). Then C1, C2, C3 and X¯ have continuous
partial derivatives of any order in (t, s).
In order to show that the function g given in Equations (3.22) and (3.23) and thus the
candidate value function is well-defined, we need monotonicity of the function X¯(t, ·).
We prove this result by directly computing the partial derivative of X¯ with respect to
the second argument.
Proposition 3.3.4. Let t ∈ [0, T ). Then X¯(t, ·) is strictly increasing in (t, T ).
Proof. Let t ∈ [0, T ), s ∈ [t, T ). Then
∂X¯
∂s
(t, s) =
αΣΓ exp
(
θ
2(t− s)
)
2C(s; 0)2
(
µ(s) sinh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
+ cosh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
))
> 0 (3.39)
since αΣΓ > 0 and µ(s) > 1. A detailed proof of Equation (3.39) is provided in Ap-
pendix A.3.
We can now prove the central result of this section.
Corollary 3.3.5. The candidate value function w given by Equation (3.21) is well-
defined.
Proof. By Proposition 3.3.4, X¯(t, ·) possesses an inverse on (t, T ). Thus, g as in Equa-
tions (3.22) and (3.23) is well-defined on [0, T )×R (cf. also Equation (3.36)). Further-
more, g(t, x) = g(t, |x|) ∈ [t, T ] for all t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ R, and the functions Ci (i = 1, 2, 3)
are well-defined for t ∈ [0, T ), s ∈ [t, T ] by Propositions 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.
3.3.2. Differentiation and convexity of the candidate value function
The goal of this section is to show that the candidate value function w is continuously
differentiable. We are also able to compute the partial derivatives
∂w
∂t
,
∂w
∂x
and ∂
2w
∂x2
.
It turns out that ∂w∂x has indeed the form we assumed in the heuristics in Section 3.2.1
(cf. Equation (3.8)). We also show that ∂2w
∂x2 > 0 and hence that w is strictly convex in
x. We first state the main theorem.
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Theorem 3.3.6. The candidate value function w given by Equation (3.21) is continu-
ously differentiable in [0, T )×R. Furthermore, we have
∂w
∂x
(t, x) = 2C1(t, g(t, x))x+ sgn(x)C2(t, g(t, x)), (3.40)
∂w
∂t
(t, x) =
C ′(t; 0)x2 if x =
Γ
2C(t;0)
∂C1
∂t (t, g(t, x))x2 +
∂C2
∂t (t, g(t, x))|x|+ ∂C3∂t (t, g(t, x)) else.
(3.41)
Before we proceed with the proof of Theorem 3.3.6, we show that g is continuously
differentiable. We prove this in the following lemma and compute the partial derivatives
∂g
∂t
and ∂g
∂x
.
Lemma 3.3.7. Let V := {(t, x) ∈ R2|t ∈ (0, T ), x ∈ (X¯(t, t), X¯(t, T ))}. Then g given
by Equations (3.22) and (3.23) is continuously differentiable on V and
∂g
∂x
(t, x) = 1
∂X¯
∂s (t, g(t, x))
, (3.42)
∂g
∂t
(t, x) = −
∂X¯
∂t (t, g(t, x))
∂X¯
∂s (t, g(t, x))
. (3.43)
Proof. Consider the open set U := {(t, s) ∈ R2|t ∈ (0, T ), s ∈ (t, T )} and the continu-
ously differentiable function h : R2 −→ R2 (cf. Corollary 3.3.3),
h(t, s) := (t, X¯(t, s))>.
Then for all (t0, s0) ∈ U , the Jacobian matrix of h is given by
Dh(t0, s0) :=
(
1 ∂X¯∂t (t0, s0)
0 ∂X¯∂s (t0, s0)
)
.
Note that ∂X¯∂s (t0, s0) 6= 0 by Proposition 3.3.4. Therefore
detDh(t0, s0) =
∂X¯
∂s
(t0, s0) 6= 0,
and we can apply the inverse function theorem. Thus, the inverse function h−1 of h
exists locally and is locally continuously differentiable. However, on
V˜ := h(U) = {(t, x) ∈ R2|t ∈ (0, T ), x ∈ (X¯(t, t), X¯(t, T ))},
we have h−1 = g˜ for
g˜(t, x) := (t, g(t, x))>
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globally, and therefore g is continuously differentiable on V .
Equation (3.42) follows form Equation (3.23) immediately. Equation (3.43) follows by
differentiating with respect to t on either side of Equation (3.23).
We derive continuity of w directly.
Corollary 3.3.8. w is continuous on [0, T )×R.
We can now prove the main building block of the proof of Theorem 3.3.6. We show
that
∂C1
∂s
(t, s)X¯(t, s)2 + ∂C2
∂s
(t, s)X¯(t, s) + ∂C3
∂s
(t, s) = 0.
This is equivalent to Equation (3.7) in the heuristics of Section 3.2.1 and was the key
step towards the derivation of the differential equations for the coefficients C1, C2 and
C3. Therefore, the construction of the candidate value function relies strongly on this
property. Recall that we had good reasons to believe that Equation (3.7) is true for
x = β(t) or equivalently t = s. It is somewhat surprising that it is indeed also correct
for t < s.
The second part of the lemma is a similar assertion which is useful for the computation
of the second order derivative ∂2w
∂x2 and hence for the proof of the convexity of w below.
Lemma 3.3.9. Let t ∈ [0, T ), and s ∈ [t, T ). Then
(i)
a(t, s) := ∂C1
∂s
(t, s)X¯(t, s)2 + ∂C2
∂s
(t, s)X¯(t, s) + ∂C3
∂s
(t, s) = 0,
(ii)
b(t, s) := 2∂C1
∂s
(t, s)X¯(t, s) + ∂C2
∂s
(t, s) = 0.
Proof. (i) For fixed s, we derive a linear homogeneous differential equation for a(·, s)
on [0, s) and show that
a(s, s) = lim
t→s− a(t, s) = 0.
To this end, we start by computing the derivatives of C1, C2 and C3 with respect
to s:
∂C1
∂s
(t, s) = −θC(s; 0)(
µ(s) sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)
+ cosh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)2 , (3.44)
∂C2
∂s
(t, s) = θΓ
2αΣ
(
µ(s) sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)
+ cosh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
))2 ·
(2θαΣ + (θ2 + θ˜2)C(s; 0)
θ˜
sinh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
exp
(θ
2(t− s)
)
+
(
2θC(s; 0)+2αΣ
)
cosh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
exp
(θ
2(t− s)
)−2θC(s; 0)), (3.45)
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∂C3
∂s
(t, s) = − θΓ
2
4C(s; 0) exp
(
θ(t− s))− s∫
t
exp
(
θ(t− u)) ∂
∂s
(C2(u, s)2
4Λ
)
du. (3.46)
Detailed proofs of Equations (3.44) and (3.45) can be found in the Appendix A.3.
Equation (3.46) follows from Leibniz’ integral rule.
Using Equation (3.28), we deduce from Equations (3.44) - (3.46) that
lim
t→s− a(t, s) = −θC(s; 0)
( Γ
2C(s; 0)
)2
+ θΓ Γ2C(s; 0) −
θΓ2
4C(s; 0) = 0. (3.47)
Moreover, by Equation (3.46), we have
a(t, s) = ∂C1
∂s
(t, s)X¯(t, s)2 + ∂C2
∂s
(t, s)X¯(t, s)− exp (θ(t− s)) θΓ24C(s; 0)
+ exp(θt)
s∫
t
− ∂
∂s
(C2(u, s)2
4Λ
)
exp(−θu)du.
Thus, using the Differential Equations (3.17), (3.18), (3.19) and (3.20) (note that
we can apply Schwarz’ theorem by Corollary 3.3.3), we obtain
∂a
∂t
(t, s) = ∂
2C1
∂s∂t
(t, s)X¯(t, s)2 + 2∂C1
∂s
(t, s)∂X¯
∂t
(t, s)X¯(t, s) + ∂
2C2
∂s∂t
(t, s)X¯(t, s)
+ ∂C2
∂s
(t, s)∂X¯
∂t
(t, s)− θ exp (θ(t− s)) θΓ24C(s; 0)
+ ∂
∂s
(C2(t, s)2
4Λ
)
+ θ exp(θt)
s∫
t
− ∂
∂s
(C2(u, s)2
4Λ
)
exp(−θu)du
= ∂
∂s
(C1(t, s)2
Λ + θC1(t, s)− αΣ
)
X¯(t, s)2
+ 2∂C1
∂s
(t, s)
(
− C1(t, s)Λ X¯(t, s)−
C2(t, s)
2Λ
)
X¯(t, s)
+ ∂
∂s
(
C2(t, s)
(C1(t, s)
Λ + θ
)
− θΓ
)
X¯(t, s)
+ ∂C2
∂s
(t, s)
(
− C1(t, s)Λ X¯(t, s)−
C2(t, s)
2Λ
)
− θ exp (θ(t− s)) θΓ24C(s; 0) + ∂∂s
(C2(t, s)2
4Λ
)
+ θ exp(θt)
s∫
t
− ∂
∂s
(C2(u, s)2
4Λ
)
exp(−θu)du
= θa(t, s).
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Hence, there exists a constant C(s) (s ∈ (0, T )) such that for all t ∈ [0, s),
a(t, s) = C(s) exp(θt).
Equation (3.47) implies
0 = lim
t→s− a(t, s) = C(s) exp(θs),
i.e., C(s) = 0, finishing the proof of (i).
(ii) We proceed similarly as in the proof of (i). Using the Differential Equations (3.17),
(3.18) and (3.20), we obtain
∂b
∂t
(t, s) = 2 ∂
∂s
(C1(t, s)2
Λ + θC1(t, s)− αΣ
)
X¯(t, s)
+ 2∂C1
∂s
(t, s)
(
− C1(t, s)Λ X¯(t, s)−
C2(t, s)
2Λ
)
+ ∂
∂s
(
C2(t, s)
(C1(t, s)
Λ + θ
)
− θΓ
)
=
(C1(t, s)
Λ + θ
)
b(t, s).
Thus, there exists a constant C(s) (s ∈ (0, T )) such that for all t ∈ [0, s),
b(t, s) = C(s) exp
( t∫
s
(C1(u, s)
Λ + θ
)
du
)
.
Furthermore, by Equations (3.44) and (3.45) and Equation (3.28), we have
lim
t→s− b(t, s) = 0.
We deduce
0 = lim
t→s− b(t, s) = C(s),
finishing the proof.
We are now able to prove that w is continuously differentiable.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.6. Let t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ R. We only treat the case x ≥ 0. The case
x < 0 follows accordingly. We consider four cases separately.
(i) x < Γ2C(t;0) .
In this case we have g(v, y) = v for all (v, y) in some neighborhood of (t, x)
(cf. Equation (3.22)). Therefore,
w(v, y) = C(v; 0)y2
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and consequently (recall that C1(t, t) = C(t; 0), C2(t, t) = 0)
∂w
∂x
(t, x) = 2C(t; 0)x
= 2C1(t, t)x+ C2(t, t)
= 2C1(t, g(t, x))x+ C2(t, g(t, x)) (3.48)
and
∂w
∂t
(t, x) = C ′(t; 0)x2. (3.49)
(ii) x ∈ ( Γ2C(t;0) , X¯(t, T )).
This is equivalent to x = X¯(t, s), g(t, x) = s for some s ∈ (t, T ). We have y ∈
( Γ2C(v;0) , X¯(t, T )) and therefore g(v, y) ∈ (t, T ) for all (v, y) in some neighborhood
of (t, x), thus
w(t, y) = C1(t, g(t, y))y2 + C2(t, g(t, y))y + C3(t, g(t, y)).
By Lemma 3.3.7, we have
∂g
∂x
(t, x) = 1
∂X¯
∂s (t, g(t, x))
= 1
∂X¯
∂s (t, s)
> 0
and hence by Lemma 3.3.9 (i),
∂w
∂x
(t, x) = 2C1(t, g(t, x))x+ C2(t, g(t, x))
+ ∂g
∂x
(t, x)
(
x2
∂C1
∂s
(t, g(t, x)) + x∂C2
∂s
(t, g(t, x)) + ∂C3
∂s
(t, g(t, x))
)
= 2C1(t, g(t, x))x+ C2(t, g(t, x))
+ ∂g
∂x
(t, x)
(∂C1
∂s
(t, s)X¯(t, s)2 + ∂C2
∂s
(t, s)X¯(t, s) + ∂C3
∂s
(t, s)
)
= 2C1(t, g(t, x))x+ C2(t, g(t, x)). (3.50)
Similarly, we have
∂g
∂t
(v, x) = −
∂X¯
∂t (v, g(v, x))
∂X¯
∂s (v, g(v, x))
by Lemma 3.3.7 and therefore by Lemma 3.3.9 (i),
∂w
∂t
(t, x) = ∂C1
∂t
(t, g(t, x))x2 + ∂C2
∂t
(t, g(t, x))x+ ∂C3
∂t
(t, g(t, x))
+ ∂g
∂t
(t, x)
(
x2
∂C1
∂s
(t, g(t, x)) + x∂C2
∂s
(t, g(t, x)) + ∂C3
∂s
(t, g(t, x))
)
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= ∂C1
∂t
(t, g(t, x))x2 + ∂C2
∂t
(t, g(t, x))x+ ∂C3
∂t
(t, g(t, x))
+ ∂g
∂t
(t, x)
(∂C1
∂s
(t, s)X¯(t, s)2 + ∂C2
∂s
(t, s)X¯(t, s) + ∂C3
∂s
(t, s)
)
= ∂C1
∂t
(t, g(t, x))x2 + ∂C2
∂t
(t, g(t, x))x+ ∂C3
∂t
(t, g(t, x)). (3.51)
(iii) x > X¯(t, T ).
In this case we have y > X¯(v, T ) and g(v, y) = T for all (v, y) in some neighborhood
of (t, x) (cf. Equation (3.22) again), thus
w(v, y) = C1(v, T )y2 + C2(v, T )y + C3(v, T ).
Therefore,
∂w
∂x
(t, x) = 2C1(t, T )x+ C2(t, T ) = 2C1(t, g(t, x))x+ C2(t, g(t, x)), (3.52)
∂w
∂t
(t, x) = ∂C1
∂t
(t, T )x2 + ∂C2
∂t
(t, T )x+ ∂C3
∂t
(t, T ). (3.53)
(iv) x ∈ { Γ2C(t;0) , X¯(t, T )}.
By Corollary 3.3.8, w is continuous. Furthermore, as g(t, ·) is continuous in x with
values in [t, T ] and C1 and C2 are continuous in [t, T ], ∂w∂x (t, ·) can be extended
continuously to R (cf. also Equations (3.48), (3.50) and (3.52)). Let now hn 6= 0
(n ∈ N), hn → 0. For large enough n, the mean-value theorem implies that there
exists ξn strictly between x and x− hn such that
w(t, x)− w(t, x− hn)
hn
= ∂w
∂x
(t, ξn).
As lim
n→∞ ξn = x, this implies
∂w
∂x
(t, x) = lim
n→∞
w(t, x)− w(t, x− hn)
hn
= lim
n→∞
∂w
∂x
(t, ξn),
i.e., w(t, ·) is differentiable in x with derivative
∂w
∂x
(t, x) = lim
n→∞
∂w
∂x
(t, ξn) = 2C1(t, g(t, x))x+ C2(t, g(t, x)).
For differentiation with respect to t, note that by the differential equations for
C(t; 0), C1(·, s), C2(·, s) and C3(·, s), we obtain for x = Γ2C(t;0) that
∂C1
∂t
(t, t)x2 + ∂C2
∂t
(t, t)x+ ∂C3
∂t
(t, t) = C ′(t; 0)x2.
Therefore, ∂w∂t (·, x) can be extended continuously to [0, T ) by Equations (3.49),
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(3.51) and (3.53). Using the mean-value theorem in a similar fashion as before, we
obtain that w(·, x) is differentiable in t with derivative
∂w
∂t
(t, x) =

∂C1
∂t (t, t)x2 +
∂C2
∂t (t, t)x+
∂C3
∂t (t, t) = C ′(t; 0)x2 if x =
Γ
2C(t;0)
∂C1
∂t (t, T )x2 +
∂C2
∂t (t, T )x+
∂C3
∂t (t, T ) if x = X¯(t, T ).
By Theorem 3.3.6, we obtain first order partial derivatives of the candidate value
function w. We can deduce strict convexity of w in x by computing the second order
partial derivative
∂2w
∂x2
.
The key step towards this goal is Lemma 3.3.9 (ii).
Theorem 3.3.10. The candidate value function w given by Equation (3.21) is strictly
convex in x ∈ R.
Proof. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ R. We consider the case x ≥ 0. The case x < 0 can be
proven accordingly. Thus, x = X¯(t, s) for some s ∈ [t, T ) or x ≥ X¯(t, T ). In the first
case Theorem 3.3.6, Lemma 3.3.7 and Lemma 3.3.9 (ii) yield
∂2w
∂x2
(t, x) = 2C1(t, g(t, x)) +
∂g
∂x
(t, x)
(
2x∂C1
∂s
(t, g(t, x)) + ∂C2
∂s
(t, g(t, x))
)
= 2C1(t, g(t, x)) +
∂g
∂x
(t, x)
(
2∂C1
∂s
(t, s)X¯(t, s) + ∂C2
∂s
(t, s)
)
= 2C1(t, g(t, x)). (3.54)
For x > X¯(t, T ), we obtain
∂2w
∂x2
(t, x) = 2C1(t, T ). (3.55)
By Equations (3.54) and (3.55), ∂2w
∂x2 (t, x) can be extended continuously to x = X¯(t, T )
and we obtain
∂2w
∂x2
(t, X¯(t, T )) = 2C1(t, T )
by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.3.6. Therefore (and by the respective
considerations for x < 0), the second partial derivative of w with respect to x exists and
∂2w
∂x2
(t, x) > 0,
hence w is strictly convex in x.
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3.3.3. Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
The fact that w is differentiable and the formulae for the partial derivatives finally enable
us to prove that w solves the HJB Equation (HJB).
Theorem 3.3.11. The candidate value function w given by Equation (3.21) fulfills the
HJB Equation (HJB) with unique maximizer u∗ = (ξ∗, η∗), where
ξ∗ = ξ∗(t, x) := 2C1(t, g(t, x))x+ sgn(x)C2(t, g(t, x))2Λ , (3.56)
η∗ = η∗(t, x) :=
sgn(x)
(
|x| − Γ2C(t;0)
)
if |x| > Γ2C(t;0)
0 if |x| ≤ Γ2C(t;0) .
(3.57)
Proof. The theorem follows directly from the subsequent Lemma 3.3.12 and Theo-
rem 3.3.6 by using the Differential Equations (3.17), (3.18) and (3.19) for the case
|x| > Γ2C(t;0) and the differential equation
C ′(·; 0) = C(·; 0)
2
Λ − αΣ
for the case |x| ≤ Γ2C(t;0) .
Lemma 3.3.12. Let h : [0, T )×R×R×R→ R be given by
h(t, x, ξ, η) := θ
(
w(t, x)− w(t, x− η))+ ∂w
∂x
(t, x)ξ − f¯(ξ, η, x).
For fixed t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ R, h(t, x, ·, ·) attains its unique maximum at u∗ = (ξ∗, η∗)
for ξ∗ and η∗ as in Equations (3.56) and (3.57), respectively.
Moreover,
h(t, x, ξ∗, η∗) =

(
C1(t,g(t,x))2
Λ + θC1(t, g(t, x))− αΣ
)
x2
+
(
C2(t, g(t, x))
(
C1(t,g(t,x))
Λ + θ
)
− θΓ
)
|x|
+θC3(t, g(t, x)) + θΓ
2
4C(t;0) +
C2(t,g(t,x))2
4Λ if |x| > Γ2C(t;0)(
C(t;0)2
Λ − αΣ
)
x2 if |x| ≤ Γ2C(t;0) .
(3.58)
Proof. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ R. We have
h(t, x, ξ, η) = θw(t, x)− αΣx2 + h1(t, x, ξ) + h2(t, x, η)
for
h1(t, x, ξ) := −Λξ2 + ∂w
∂x
(t, x)ξ
= −Λ
( ∂w
∂x (t, x)
2Λ − ξ
)2
+
∂w
∂x (t, x)2
4Λ ,
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h2(t, x, η) := −θw(t, x− η)− θΓ|η|.
As Λ > 0, h1(t, x, ·) is strictly concave in ξ. Furthermore, h2(t, x, ·) is strictly concave in
η by Theorem 3.3.10. Thus, h(t, x, ·, ·) is strictly concave in (ξ, η) and attains its unique
global maximum in (ξ∗, η∗) if h1(t, x, ·) attains its unique global maximum in ξ∗ and h2
attains its unique global maximum in η∗.
By Theorem 3.3.6, h1 attains its unique global maximum for ξ∗ as in Equation (3.56).
Note now that h2 ≤ 0. For x = 0,
h2(t, x, η∗) = h2(t, 0, 0) = 0,
and therefore h2 attains its unique global maximum in η∗ as in Equation (3.57).
For η 6= 0, h2 is differentiable in η. For |x| > Γ2C(t;0) , we have
∂h2
∂η
(t, x, η∗) = θ
( w
∂x
(t, x− η∗)− sgn(x)Γ
)
= θ
(
2C(t; 0) sgn(x) Γ2C(t; 0) − sgn(x)Γ
)
= 0
for η∗ = η∗(t, x) as in Equation (3.57) (note that η∗(t, x) 6= 0 for |x| > Γ2C(t;0)). By
strict concavity, we conclude that h2(t, x, ·) attains its unique maximum at η∗ as in
Equation (3.57).
Let now x ∈ (0, Γ2C(t;0)). We have
lim
η→0−
∂h2
∂η
(t, x, η) = lim
η→0− 2θC(t; 0)(x− η) + θΓ = 2θC(t; 0)x+ θΓ > 0,
lim
η→0+
∂h2
∂η
(t, x, η) = lim
η→0+ 2θC(t; 0)(x− η)− θΓ = 2θC(t; 0)x− θΓ < 0.
Therefore, η∗ = 0 maximizes h2 uniquely by strict concavity as required.
By continuity of η∗ and h2, η∗(t, x) = 0 maximizes h2 uniquely for x = Γ2C(t;0) .
The case x ∈ [− Γ2C(t;0) , 0) follows similarly as above. We plug (ξ∗, η∗) into h and
obtain Equation (3.58), finishing the proof.
3.4. Optimal liquidation
In the previous sections we collected the building blocks for solving the Optimization
Problem (OPT). The goal of this section is to prove that (OPT) is indeed solved by
the candidate optimal strategy u∗ = (ξ∗, η∗) and that the value function is given by the
candidate value function w.
Given the candidate optimal strategy u∗, we denote the process controlled by u∗ by
X∗ := Xu∗ .
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We proceed as follows. In Section 3.4.1 we obtain bounds for w, u∗ and X∗. Using these
bounds, we show that u∗ is an admissible liquidation strategy. We prove the verification
theorem in Section 3.4.2.
3.4.1. Admissibility of the candidate optimal strategy
By Equation (3.44), C1(t, ·) is strictly decreasing in [t, T ]. Using the series expansion of
coth, Equation (2.91) and Equation (3.33) we obtain the following inequalities (cf. also
Equations (2.90) and (3.33)). For t ∈ [0, T ) and s1, s2 ∈ (t, T ), s1 < s2,
0<C(t; θ)=C1(t, T )<C1(t, s2)<C1(t, s1)<C1(t, t)=C(t; 0)≤ Λ
T − t +
√
αΣΛ. (3.59)
Using Taylor’s theorem with integral remainder term, we can deduce the following
useful bounds for the candidate value function w and the candidate optimal strategy in
the primary venue ξ∗.
Proposition 3.4.1. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x 6= 0. Then
C1(t, T )x2 < w(t, x) ≤ C(t; 0)x2 ≤
( Λ
T − t +
√
αΣΛ
)
x2, (3.60)
C1(t, T )
Λ |x| < |ξ
∗(t, x)| ≤ C(t; 0)Λ |x| ≤
( 1
T − t +
√
αΣ
Λ
)
|x|. (3.61)
Proof. We use Taylor’s theorem with integral remainder term. Note first that
w(t, 0) = ∂w
∂x
(t, 0) = 0
by Equations (3.21) and (3.40) (recall that g(t, 0) = t). Thus by Equation (3.54),
w(t, x) = w(t, 0) + ∂w
∂x
(t, 0)x+
x∫
0
∂2w
∂x2
(t, y)(x− y)dy
= 2
x∫
0
C1(t, g(t, y))(x− y)dy.
Using (3.59), we can directly deduce (3.60). Furthermore,
∂w
∂x
(t, x) = 2Λξ∗(t, x).
Thus,
2Λξ∗(t, x) = ∂w
∂x
(t, 0) +
x∫
0
∂2w
∂x2
(t, y)dy
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= 2
x∫
0
C1(t, g(t, y))dy,
and (3.61) follows from (3.59).
Using Gronwall’s inequality, we can deduce an upper bound for the candidate optimal
asset position X∗.
Corollary 3.4.2. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ R. Then
|X∗(s)| ≤ |x| exp
(
−
s∫
t
C1(u, T )
Λ du
)
= |x| exp (Λθ2 (s− t))sinh
(
θ˜
2(T − s)
)
sinh
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
) .
Proof. We define the process (X˜(s))s∈[t,T ) as the solution of the initial value problem
X ′(s) = −ξ∗(s,X(s))
X(t) = x.
By the structure of the process η∗ (cf. Equation (3.57)), we have that for all s ∈ [0, T ),
|X∗(s)| ≤ |X˜(s)|.
Therefore, by Gronwall’s inequality, Proposition 3.4.1 and Equation (3.33),
|X∗(s)| ≤ |X˜(s)| ≤ |x| exp
(
−
s∫
t
C1(u, T )
Λ du
)
= |x| exp (Λθ2 (s− t))sinh
(
θ˜
2(T − s)
)
sinh
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
)
as required.
The bounds derived above allow us to deduce admissibility of the candidate optimal
strategy u∗.
Proposition 3.4.3. Let t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ R be the asset position at time t and u∗ = (ξ∗, η∗)
be as in Equations (3.56) and (3.57). Then u∗ ∈ A(t, x).
Proof. Note first that (i) of Definition 2.1.1 is straightforward and that (iii) holds as
θ > 0. By Proposition 3.4.1, Corollary 3.4.2 and Equation (2.91) we have
|ξ∗(s,X∗(s))| ≤ C(s; 0)Λ |X
∗(s)|
≤ |x|
√
αΣ
Λ exp
(Λθ
2 (s− t)
)sinh ( θ˜2(T − s))
sinh
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
) cosh
(√
αΣ
Λ (T − s)
)
sinh
(√
αΣ
Λ (T − s)
)
−→ |x|
√
αΣ
Λ exp
(Λθ
2 (T − t)
) 1
sinh
(
θ˜
2(T − t)
) <∞
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as s→ T−. Thus,
Et,x
[ T∫
t
|ξ∗(s,X∗(s))|4ds
]
<∞.
As |η∗(t,X∗(s−))| < |X∗(s−)|, we have
Et,x
[ T∫
t
|η∗(s,X∗(s−))|8ds
]
<∞
by Corollary 3.4.2. Finally, again by Corollary 3.4.2,
lim
s→T−
X∗(s) = 0.
3.4.2. Verification
We are now finally able to prove that the Optimization Problem (OPT) is solved by the
candidate optimal strategy in Equations (3.56) and (3.57) and that the value function
is given as in Equation (3.21).
Theorem 3.4.4. The value function of the Optimization Problem (OPT) is given by
v¯(t, x) = C1(t, g(t, x))x2 + C2(t, g(t, x))|x|+ C3(t, g(t, x))
for t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ Rn (cf. Equation (3.21)) where C1, C2, C3 and g are given as in
Section 3.3. The P⊗λ - a.s. unique optimal liquidation strategy is given by u∗ = (ξ∗, η∗)
such that (cf. Equations (3.56) and (3.57))
ξ∗ = ξ∗(t, x) := 2C1(t, g(t, x))x+ sgn(x)C2(t, g(t, x))2Λ , (3.62)
η∗ = η∗(t, x) :=
sgn(x)
(
|x| − Γ2C(t;0)
)
if |x| > Γ2C(t;0)
0 if |x| ≤ Γ2C(t;0) .
(3.63)
For the proof of the theorem, we require the following lemma, which relies on the fact
that the value function v of the Optimization Problem (OPT) is a lower bound of v¯.
Lemma 3.4.5. Let t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ R and u ∈ A(t, x). Then
lim
s→T−
Et,x
[
w(s,Xu(s))
]
= 0
Proof. Note first that there exists a constant K > 0 such that
K
T − tx
2 ≤ C(t; θ)x2 = v(t, x) ≤ v¯(t, x), (3.64)
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where v is the value function of the Optimization Problem (OPT) for optimal liquidation
without adverse selection and C(t; θ) is as in Equation (2.90).
A strategy u ∈ A(t, x) has finite costs J¯(t, x, u) < ∞ by Definition 2.1.1 (ii) and
Proposition 2.1.4. Let now s ∈ (t, T ). Then
J¯(t, x, u) = Et,x
[ s∫
t
(
Λξ(r)2 + θΓ|η(r)|+ αΣXu(r)2
)
dr
]
+ Et,x
[ T∫
s
(
Λξ(r)2 + θΓ|η(r)|+ αΣXu(r)2
)
dr
]
≥ Et,x
[ s∫
t
(
Λξ(r)2 + θΓ|η(r)|+ αΣXu(r)2
)
dr + v¯(s,Xu(s))
]
(3.64)
≥ Et,x
[ s∫
t
(
Λξ(r)2 + θΓ|η(r)|+ αΣXu(r)2
)
dr
]
+KEt,x
[Xu(s)2
T − s
]
.
Thus by the monotone convergence theorem,
J¯(t, x, u) ≥ lim
s→T−
(
Et,x
[ s∫
t
(
Λξ(r)2 + θΓ|η(r)|+ αΣXu(r)2
)
dr
]
+KEt,x
[Xu(s)2
T − s
])
= J¯(t, x, u) +K lim
s→T−
Et,x
[Xu(s)2
T − s
]
,
hence
lim
s→T−
Et,x
[Xu(s)2
T − s
]
= 0.
The assertion now follows directly from Proposition 3.4.1 (cf. Inequality (3.60)).
Proof of Theorem 3.4.4. Let t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ R, u ∈ A(t, x) and s ∈ [t, T ). We apply Itô’s
formula to the function w(r,Xu(r)) (recall that w is differentiable by Theorem 3.3.6):
w(t, x) = w(s,Xu(s)) +
s∫
t
(∂w
∂x
(r,Xu(r))ξ(r)− ∂w
∂r
(r,Xu(r))
)
dr
+
s∫
t
(
w(r,Xu(r−))− w(r,Xu(r−)− η(r)))pi(dr)
≤ w(s,Xu(s)) +
s∫
t
f¯(ξ(r), η(r), Xu(r))dr
+
s∫
t
(
w(r,Xu(r−))− w(r,Xu(r−)− η(r)))pi(dr)
163
3. Adverse selection in continuous time
−
s∫
t
θ
(
w(r,Xu(r−))− w(r,Xu(r−)− η(r)))dr (3.65)
= w(s,Xu(s)) +
s∫
t
f¯(ξ(r), η(r), Xu(r))dr
+
s∫
t
(
w(r,Xu(r−))− w(l, r,Xu(r−)− η(r)))M(dr), (3.66)
where M is the compensated Poisson process given by M(r) := pi(r)− θr and Inequal-
ity (3.65) follows from Theorem 3.3.11, with equality if and only if
λ[u = u∗] = 0.
Taking expectations on both sides, we obtain
w(t, x) ≤ Et,x[w(s,Xu(s))] + Et,x
[ s∫
t
f¯(ξ(r), η(r), Xu(r))dr
]
+ Et,x
[ s∫
t
w(r,Xu(r−))− w(r,Xu(r−)− η(r))M(dr)
]
, (3.67)
with equality if and only if
λ⊗ P[u = u∗] = 0.
By Proposition 3.4.1, there exists a constant K = K(s) such that
Et,x
[ s∫
t
|w(r,Xu(r−))− w(r,Xu(r−)− η(r,Xu(r−)))|2dr]
≤ K(s)
(
Et,x
[ s∫
t
(|Xu(r−)|4 + |η(r)|4)dr])
<∞
by Definition 2.1.1 (ii) and Proposition 2.1.4. As 〈M〉(s) = θs, this implies that
M˜(s) :=
s∫
t
(
w(r,Xu(r−))− w(r,Xu(r−)− η(r)))M(dr)
is a martingale. Thus, taking the limit s → T− in Inequality (3.67), we obtain by
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Lemma 3.4.5 and the monotone convergence theorem that
w(t, x) ≤ Et,x
[ T∫
t
f¯(ξ(r), η(r), Xu(r))dr
]
= J¯(t, x, u), (3.68)
again with equality if
λ⊗ P[u = u∗] = 0.
Uniqueness follows from the strict convexity of f¯ as in the proof of Theorem 2.4.10.
3.5. Properties of the value function and the optimal strategy
In the discrete-time setting of Section 1.4 we discussed the properties of the solution
of the discrete-time optimization problem corresponding to (OPT) in detail (cf. also
the heuristics in Section 3.2). Most of these properties hold in an analog way in the
continuous-time setting. Therefore, the discussion will be shorter here.
In Section 3.5.1 we discuss the dependence of the optimal strategy and the value
function on the adverse selection parameter Γ. In Section 3.5.2 we analyze the case of a
risk-neutral investor (αΣ = 0), which we had excluded in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
3.5.1. Risk-averse investors
Theorem 3.4.4 confirms the structure of the optimal strategy and the value function of
the Optimization Problem (OPT) we had expected in the heuristics of Section 3.2.
Both for large initial asset positions x (|x| ≥ X¯(t, T )) and for small initial asset
positions (|x| ≤ X¯(t, t) = Γ2C(t;0)), the value function is a quadratic polynomial. In
between, it is an “interpolation” of these polynomials.
The value function and the optimal strategy for |x| ≤ Γ2C(t;0) are the same as the ones
without dark pool and without adverse selection (i.e., the optimal order in the dark pool
is zero).
For larger asset positions, the absolute value of order in the dark pool is greater than
zero; after the execution of the optimal dark pool order at time s, the asset position
is Γ2C(s;0) . The optimal trading trajectory until dark pool execution for an initial asset
positions |x| = X¯(t, s) ∈ (X¯(t, t), X¯(t, T )) is given by the function X¯(·, s) in [t, s].
It is interesting to examine the dependence of the value function and the optimal strat-
egy on the adverse selection parameter Γ. Intuitively, costs should be higher for large
adverse selection and therefore the value function should be increasing in Γ. Further-
more, the dark pool is less attractive for large adverse selection and therefore optimal
dark pool orders should be decreasing in Γ, whereas trading intensity in the primary
venue should be increasing in Γ (as impact costs are relatively lower with respect to
adverse selection costs). The following proposition confirms these intuitions. To stress
the dependence on Γ, we will add it as an argument for the remainder of the section and
write
v¯(t, x,Γ) := v¯(t, x), u∗(t, x,Γ) := u∗(t, x), · · ·
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Proposition 3.5.1. Let t ∈ [0, T ), s ∈ [t, T ] and x ∈ R. Then
(i) C1(t, s, ·) is constant, C2(t, s, ·) is strictly increasing and C3(t, s, ·) is strictly de-
creasing.
(ii) X¯(t, s, ·) is strictly increasing.
(iii) v¯(t, x, ·) is strictly increasing on the interval (0, 2|x|C(t; 0)) and constant for Γ >
2|x|C(t; 0).
(iv) |ξ∗(t, x, ·)| is strictly increasing and |η∗(t, x, ·)| is strictly decreasing on the interval
(0, 2|x|C(t; 0)) and constant for Γ > 2|x|C(t; 0).
Proof. (i) The first assertion follows directly from the Initial Value Problem for C1,
(3.17). The second and the third assertion can be deduced from that by Equa-
tions (3.29) and (3.27), respectively.
(ii) The assertion follows directly from Equation (3.31).
(iii) Monotonicity of the value function follows directly from the form of the cost func-
tional (cf. Equation (3.1)) as long as |η∗(t, x,Γ)| > 0, i.e., Γ ∈ (0, 2|x|C(t; 0))
(cf. Equation (3.63)).
(iv) For the first assertion, let without loss of generality x > 0 and Γ < Γ˜ < 2xC(t; 0).
By (ii) (cf. Equation (3.23)),
g(t, y, Γ˜) ≤ g(t, y,Γ)
for all y ∈ [0, x] with strict inequality for
Γ˜
2C(t; 0) < y < X¯(t, T,Γ).
Therefore (cf. the proof of Proposition 3.4.1),
ξ∗(t, x,Γ) = 1Λ
x∫
0
C1(t, g(t, y,Γ),Γ)dy <
1
Λ
x∫
0
C1(t, g(t, y, Γ˜), Γ˜)dy = ξ∗(t, x, Γ˜)
by (i) and the fact that C1 is strictly decreasing in s (cf. Equation (3.44)).
The assertion that |η∗(t, x, ·)| is strictly decreasing follows directly from Equa-
tion (3.63).
3.5.2. Risk-neutral investors
In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 we excluded the case αΣ = 0. The main reason was that in some
formulae the term αΣ appears in the denominator (cf., e.g., Equations (3.28), and (3.36))
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and it would thus have complicated the exposition of the results. However, the case
αΣ = 0
can be treated in a similar way as the case αΣ > 0.
We define C1, C2, C3 and X¯ as before by the Initial Value Problems (3.17) - (3.20).
Note that only the differential equation for C1 depends on αΣ. Therefore C2, C3 and X¯
only depend on αΣ through C1. We can compute solutions of the initial value problems
directly or by taking the limits for αΣ→ 0 in Equations (3.25) - (3.28).
Note first that αΣ = 0 implies
θ˜ = θ, C(t; 0) = Λ
T − t .
Therefore,
X¯(t, t) = Γ2C(t; 0) =
Γ
2Λ(T − t).
By Proposition 3.3.4, we have
∂X¯
∂s
(t, s) = 0
and therefore
X¯(t, s) = Γ2Λ(T − t) (3.69)
for t ∈ [0, T ), s ∈ [t, T ]. Hence, we expect only two different trading regions. The dark
pool is only used for |x| > Γ2Λ(T − t), and we expect the value function to be given by
w(t, x) =
{
C(t; 0)x2 = ΛT−tx2 if |x| ≤ Γ2Λ(T − t)
C1(t, T )x2 + C2(t, T )|x|+ C3(t, T ) if |x| > Γ2Λ(T − t).
(3.70)
As in Lemma 3.3.9 we obtain that
∂C1
∂s
(t, s)X¯(t, s)2 + ∂C2
∂s
(t, s)X¯(t, s) + ∂C3
∂s
(t, s) = 0,
2∂C1
∂s
(t, s)X¯(t, s) + ∂C2
∂s
(t, s) = 0.
Thus, by Equation (3.69),
∂
∂s
(
C1(t, s)X¯(t, s)2 + C2(t, s)X¯(t, s) + C3(t, s)
)
= 0,
∂
∂s
(
2C1(t, s)X¯(t, s) + C2(t, s)
)
= 0,
in particular
C1(t, T )
( Γ
2Λ(T − t)
)2
+ C2(t, T )
Γ
2Λ(T − t) + C3(t, T ) = C(t; 0)
( Γ
2Λ(T − t)
)2
,
167
3. Adverse selection in continuous time
Figure 3.1.: The left picture shows the optimal trading intensity ξ∗ at time t = 0 dependent
on the initial asset position x ∈ [0, 1.3]. It is well visible that ξ∗(0, ·) is not differentiable
at x = ΓT2Λ = 0.5. The right picture shows the optimal trading trajectories (provided there
is no dark pool execution) for initial asset positions x = 1 (thick solid line) and x = 0.6
(thin solid line). The dashed line is the boundary Γ(T−t)2Λ . Even for initial asset positions
close to this boundary, the boundary is not crossed during the entire trading horizon unless
the dark pool order is executed. After execution in the dark pool, the investor follows the
dashed line for the remainder of the trading horizon. T = Λ = Γ = 1, θ = 2.
2C1(t, T )
Γ
2Λ(T − t) + C2(t, T ) = 2C(t; 0)
Γ
2Λ(T − t).
We can deduce that
w(t, ·) and ∂w
∂x
(t, ·)
are continuous. However (cf. the proof of Theorem 3.3.10)
∂2w
∂x2
(t, x) =
{
2C(t; 0) if |x| < Γ2Λ(T − t)
2C1(t, T ) < 2C(t; 0) if |x| > Γ2Λ(T − t).
Defining the candidate optimal strategy as before by
ξ∗ = ξ∗(t, x) := 12Λ
∂w
∂x
(t, x) =
{2C1(t,T )x+sgn(x)C2(t,T )
2Λ if |x| > Γ2Λ(T − t)
x
T−t if |x| ≤ Γ2Λ(T − t),
(3.71)
η∗ = η∗(t, x) :=
sgn(x)
(
|x| − Γ2Λ(T − t)
)
if |x| > Γ2Λ(T − t)
0 if |x| ≤ Γ2Λ(T − t),
(3.72)
we obtain that ξ∗(t, ·) is continuous but not differentiable at
|x| = Γ2Λ(T − t).
All steps of the proof of Theorem 3.4.4 can be replicated for the case αΣ = 0 in a
straightforward manner. The solution of the Optimization Problem (OPT) is given by
Equations (3.71) and (3.72). The value function is given by w as in Equation (3.70).
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We want to conclude this section by illustrating the following two features of the
optimal trading strategy in Figure 3.1. First, it is well visible that the optimal trading
intensity ξ∗(t, ·) is not differentiable at x = ΓT2Λ . Secondly, if the initial asset position x
at time t is larger than the boundary Γ2ΛT , the optimal trading trajectory X∗(s) never
crosses the boundary Γ2Λ(T − s), provided there is no dark pool execution.
Let us briefly comment on this structure. For risk-neutral optimal liquidation without
dark pool, the optimal trading intensity is constant (cf. the thin solid lines in Figure 1.3).
The boundary itself is linear, and it is the trading trajectory of the optimal strategy
(without dark pool) with initial position on the boundary. If the initial position is above
the boundary, the usage of the dark pool slows down the optimal trading intensity, i.e.,
if the dark pool is not executed, the trading trajectory is concave and thus never crosses
the boundary.
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Conclusions
This thesis establishes a tractable mathematical benchmark model which captures the
key properties of optimal order execution in dark pools.
The first part develops a discrete-time model which describes the stylized facts of both
the dark pool and the traditional exchange and allows us to derive qualitative and quan-
titative characteristics of the optimal liquidation strategy and the value function of the
respective optimization problems. In the second part we develop the mathematical tools
for solving the stochastic control problems arising from this model in the continuous-time
setting. The two parts are closely connected: the continuous-time optimization problems
in Chapters 2 and 3 arise from discrete-time optimal control problems of Chapter 1. The
structure of the solutions of these problems is analog to the structure of the solutions of
the corresponding discrete-time models; especially in Chapter 3, we use the insight about
the structure of the discrete-time solution in order to derive the continuous-time value
function via heuristic considerations. Additionally, the solutions of the discrete-time
optimization problems converge to the solutions of the continuous-time optimization
problems under suitable assumptions.
The thesis contributes both to the economical and to the mathematical literature. We
have outlined the economical contributions above: our market model may serve as the
starting point for further research of optimal order execution in dark pools; these venues
attain increasing importance and should not be ignored in this context. Mathemati-
cally, the solutions of the continuous-time optimization problems in Chapters 2 and 3
contribute to the literature on stochastic control:
• In Chapter 2 we solve the multidimensional linear-quadratic control problem with
singular value function at terminal time T in a non-standard way. We bound
positive definite solutions of a certain matrix differential equation by using a com-
parison result for Riccati matrix differential equations via an appropriate matrix
inequality. We then use an approximation argument to show that the value func-
tion of the optimization problem is a quadratic form for a matrix-valued function
which is the “principal solution” of the considered matrix differential equation.
• In Chapter 3 we solve the non-linear-quadratic one-dimensional control problem
in closed form via heuristic considerations and a non-standard “interpolation pro-
cedure”.
The thesis is by no means an exhausting treatment of the research topic. Both on the
economical and on the mathematical side, there are numerous possibilities to generalize
and/or modify the results obtained. We want conclude this thesis by mentioning a few
problems which we think are interesting future research endeavors.
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Conclusions
(i) In the general discrete-time optimization problem of Section 1.2 we required the
additional assumptions that the probability space is finite and that trade execution
in the dark pool is independent for the n assets (Assumption 1.2.1). While we
believe that a finite probability space is not too restrictive, we think that it is
desirable (and possible) to replace the second assumption by a generalization of the
symmetry assumption we made in Section 1.3 (Assumption 1.3.1 (iv)). Note that
removing the independence assumption without substitution, causes the convexity
argument in the proof of Proposition 1.2.4 to break down (cf. Remark 1.3.2).
(ii) In Section 1.5 we analyze the effect of a different transaction price for the dark
pool in a linear price impact model. If we assume that trades in the dark pool
are settled at the price P prevailing at the primary venue, market manipulation
might become possible and optimal strategies might not exist. We showed that
this undesirable property disappears in the model specification of Section 1.5 if
the dark pool liquidity is bounded and adverse selection is sufficiently strong. The
conditions we find are rather strong and it is an interesting question how these can
be weakened.
More broadly, our model is flexible enough to allow for a more general form of price
impact at the primary exchange, e.g., in the form of temporary and permanent
impact. If the transaction price in the dark pool comprises partly the price impact
generated in the primary venue, e.g., the permanent impact but not the temporary
impact, similar effects as in Section 1.5 might occur. It is thus also interesting to
analyze modified settings in the context of market manipulation in dark pools.
(iii) In the discrete-time model the criterion for the costs of a trading strategy was
the implementation shortfall. In the model specifications of Sections 1.3 and 1.4
the fundamental asset price P˜ is a martingale and the cost functional is inde-
pendent of its development. In the corresponding continuous-time optimization
problems we therefore do not include P˜ into the cost functionals. If we analyze the
minimization of the implementation shortfall instead, this could lead to technical
and mathematical difficulties even if P˜ is a martingale which we leave for future
research.
(iv) In the continuous-time model of Chapter 2, the price impact matrix Λ and the
covariance matrix Σ are constant in time. For the case n = 1, the argumentation
of Chapter 2 can be replicated for time-dependent functions Σ(t) and Λ(t) (if these
are, e.g., continuous). Note that closed form solutions for the value function and
the optimal strategy are not possible anymore as the value function is no longer
the solution of a scalar Riccati equation with constant coefficients.
For general n, we can still replace Σ by a time-dependent matrix-valued function
Σ(t) without changing the argumentation essentially. It is an open question how
the results can be transfered to a time-dependent function Λ(t) instead of Λ.
(v) In Section 2.6 we showed that the value function and the optimal strategy of
the single asset discrete-time optimization problem of Section 1.3 converge to the
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corresponding objects of the continuous-time optimization problem of Chapter 2 if
the number of trading times tends to infinity and the step size is constant (provided
the parameters are scaled appropriately). In these cases we have closed form
solutions both in the discrete and in the continuous-time setting. We are not yet
able to give a rigorous proof for the respective multi asset result (Conjecture 2.6.2).
We want to remark here that a convergence result for the models with adverse
selection is possible as the discrete and the continuous-time optimization problems
were solved in closed form. Because of the rather complex formulae, we omitted
the tedious execution.
(vi) We only treated adverse selection for single asset liquidation. Given the complexity
of the heuristic derivation of the value function of the optimization problems both
in the discrete-time and in the continuous-time setting, we believe that it is difficult
to solve this problem. Nevertheless, we believe that it is one of the most interesting
research questions raised by this thesis.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Recursions for Section 1.4.4
The functions
A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2, C3 :
{
(t, s) ∈ R2 | t, s ∈ {t0, . . . tN}, t ≤ s
} −→ R
are given recursively by
C1(ti, ti) = C(ti, 0), C2(ti, ti) = C3(ti, ti) = 0, (A.1)
A1(ti, ti) = A(ti, 0), A2(ti, ti) = 0, (A.2)
B1(ti, ti) = B2(ti, ti) = 0
for i = 0, . . . , N and
C1(ti, tj) =
αΣΛ + (1− p)C1(ti+1, tj)(Λ + αΣ)
C1(ti+1, tj)(1− p) + Λ , (A.3)
C2(ti, tj) =
((1− p)C2(ti+1, tj) + Γp)Λ
(1− p)C1(ti+1, tj) + Λ , (A.4)
C3(ti, tj) = (1− p)C3(ti+1, tj)− Γ
2p
4C(ti+1, 0)
−
(
(1− p)C2(ti+1, tj) + Γp
)2
4((1− p)C1(ti+1, tj) + Λ) , (A.5)
A1(ti, tj) =
(1− p)C1(ti+1, tj)
(1− p)C1(ti+1, tj) + Λ , (A.6)
A2(ti, tj) =
(1− p)C2(ti+1, tj) + Γp
2((1− p)C1(ti+1, tj) + Λ) , (A.7)
B1(ti, tj) =
Λ
(1− p)C1(ti+1, tj) + Λ , (A.8)
B2(ti, tj) = − (1−p)C(ti+1,0)C2(ti+1,tj)+Γ
(
(1−p)C1(ti+1,tj)+C(ti+1,0)p+Λ
)
2C(ti+1,0)(C1(ti+1,tj)(1−p)+Λ) (A.9)
for i = 0, . . . , N − 1, j = i+ 1, . . . , N .
The function
X¯ :
{
(t, s) ∈ R2 | t, s ∈ {t0, . . . tN}, t < s
} −→ R,
is given recursively by
X¯(ti, ti+1) =
Γ(C(ti+1, 0) + Λ)
2C(ti+1, 0)Λ
(A.10)
175
A. Appendix
for i = 0, . . . , N − 1 and
X¯(ti, tj) =
C2(ti+1, tj−1)(1− p) + Γp+ 2(C1(ti+1, tj−1)(1− p) + Λ)X¯(ti+1, tj)
2Λ (A.11)
for i = 0, . . . , N − 2 and j = i+ 2, ..., N .
A.2. Closed form solutions for Section 1.4.6
Let i = 0, . . . , N − 1, j = i+ 1, . . . , N − 1. By abuse of notation, we define
X¯(ti+1, ti+1) :=
Γ
2C(ti+2, 0)
6= 0.
Then
A1(ti, tj) = 1− X¯(ti+1, tj+1)− X¯(ti+1, tj)
X¯(ti, tj+1)− X¯(ti, tj)
, (A.12)
A2(ti, tj) =
X¯(ti+1, tj+1)X¯i,j − X¯(ti+1, tj)X¯(ti, tj+1)
X¯(ti, tj+1)− X¯i,j
, (A.13)
B1(ti, tj) = 1−A1(ti, tj), (A.14)
B2(ti, tj) = −A2(ti, tj)− Γ2C(ti+1, 0) , (A.15)
C1(ti, tj) =
Λ
1− p
(
X¯(ti−1, tj+1)− X¯(ti−1, tj)
X¯(ti, tj+1)− X¯(ti, tj)
− 1
)
, (A.16)
C2(ti, tj) =
X¯(ti, tj+1)(2ΛX¯(ti−1, tj)− Γp)− X¯(ti, tj)(2ΛX¯(ti−1, tj+1)− Γp)
(1− p)(X¯(ti, tj+1)− X¯(ti, tj))
, (A.17)
where X¯ is given as in Equation (1.76).
Furthermore, for i = 0, . . . , N − 1,
A1(ti, tN ) = A(ti, p), (A.18)
A2(ti, tN ) = B(ti, p)X¯(ti, tN )− X¯(ti+1, tN ), (A.19)
B1(ti, tN ) = B(ti, p), (A.20)
B2(ti, tN ) = −A2(ti, tj)− Γ2C(ti+1, 0) , (A.21)
C1(ti, tN ) = C(ti, p), (A.22)
C2(ti, tN ) =
A2(ti−1, tN )
(
C(ti, p)(1− p) + Λ
)
1− p . (A.23)
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A.3. Detailed proofs for selected formulae of Chapter 3
Finally, for i, . . . , N − 1, j = i+ 1, . . . , N , we have
C3(ti, tj) =
j−1∑
k=i
(1− p)k−iD(tk+1, tj), where (A.24)
D(ti, tj) := − Γ
2p
4Ci(0)
−
(
C2(ti, tj)(1− p) + Γp
)2
4(C1(ti, tj)(1− p) + Λ) .
A.3. Detailed proofs for selected formulae of Chapter 3
We give proofs for selected formulae which were not executed in the main body of the
thesis. All calculations have been carried out by hand and afterwards been verified with
Mathematica.
Proof of Equation (3.30). Note first that
t∫
s
(C1(u, s)
Λ + θ
)
du =
[
− log ( sinh ( θ˜2(s− u) + κ(s)))+ θ2u
]t
s
= − log ( sinh ( θ˜2(s− t) + κ(s)))+ log ( sinh(κ(s)))+ θ2(t− s).
Therefore (note that θ˜2 − θ2 = 4αΣΛ ),
C2(t, s) = −θΓ
sinh(κ(s)) exp
(
θ
2(t− s)
)
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t) + κ(s)
) t∫
s
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− u) + κ(s)
)
exp
(
θ
2(s− u)
)
sinh(κ(s)) du
= −θΓ exp
(
θ
2(t− s)
)
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t) + κ(s)
)
[
4
exp
(
θ
2(s− u)
)(
θ˜
2 cosh
(
θ˜
2(s− u) + κ(s)
)− θ2 sinh ( θ˜2(s− u) + κ(s)))
θ˜2 − θ2
]s
t
= θΓΛ2αΣ
(
− exp
(
θ
2(t− s)
)(
θ˜ cosh(κ(s))− θ sinh(κ(s)))
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t) + κ(s)
)
+ θ˜ coth
( θ˜
2(s− t) + κ(s)
)− θ). (A.25)
We have
sinh(κ(s)) = sinh(arcoth(µ(s))) = 1√
µ(s)2 − 1 , (A.26)
cosh(κ(s)) = sinh(arcoth(µ(s))) = µ(s)√
µ(s)2 − 1 (A.27)
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and therefore
θ˜ cosh(κ(s))− θ sinh(κ(s)) = 2C(s; 0)
Λ
√
µ(s)2 − 1 .
Plugging this into Equation (A.25), we obtain
C2(t, s) =
θΓΛ
2αΣ
(
θ˜ coth
( θ˜
2(s− t) + κ(s)
)
− 2C(s; 0)
Λ
√
µ(s)2 − 1
exp
(
θ
2(t− s)
)
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t) + κ(s)
) − θ). (A.28)
We use the addition formulae for hyperbolic functions and Equations (A.26) and (A.27)
again and conclude as follows:
C2(t, s) =
θΓΛ
2αΣ
(
θ˜
1 + coth
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)
coth(κ(s))
coth
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)
+ coth(κ(s))
− 2C(s; 0)
Λ
√
µ(s)2 − 1
exp
(
θ
2(t− s)
)
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)
cosh(κ(s)) + cosh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)
sinh(κ(s))
− θ
)
= θΓ2αΣ
(
Λθ˜
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)
+ µ(s) cosh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)
µ(s) sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)
+ cosh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)
− 2C(s; 0) exp
(
θ
2(t− s)
)
µ(s) sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
)
+ cosh
(
θ˜
2(s− t)
) − Λθ).
Proof of Equation (3.32). Similarly as before, we obtain
s∫
t
(C1(u, s)
Λ
)
du = log
(
sinh
( θ˜
2(s− t) + κ(s)
))− log ( sinh(κ(s)))+ θ2(t− s).
Furthermore, by partial integration, we have
t∫
s
θ exp
(
θ
2(s− u)
)
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− u) + κ(s)
)du = θ t∫
s
exp
(θ
2(s− u)
) 1
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− u) + κ(s)
)du
= −2
[ exp ( θ2(s− u))
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− u) + κ(s)
)]t
s
+ θ˜
t∫
s
exp
(
θ
2(s− u)
)
cosh
(
θ˜
2(s− u) + κ(s)
)
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− u) + κ(s)
) du. (A.29)
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Thus, by Equation (A.28),
X¯(t, s) = Γ2C(s; 0)
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t) + κ(s)
)
exp
(
θ
2(t− s)
)
sinh(κ(s))
− θΓ4αΣ
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− t) + κ(s)
)
exp
(
θ
2(t− s)
)
sinh(κ(s))
t∫
s
(sinh(κ(s)) exp ( θ2(s− u))
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− u) + κ(s)
) (θ˜ coth ( θ˜2(s− u) + κ(s))
− 2C(s; 0)
Λ
√
µ(s)2 − 1
exp
(
θ
2(u− s)
)
sinh
(
θ˜
2(u− t) + κ(s)
) − θ))du
=
Γ
√
µ(s)2 − 1 sinh ( θ˜2(s− t) + κ(s)) exp ( θ2(t− s))
2C(s; 0)
− θΓ4αΣ sinh
( θ˜
2(s− t) + κ(s)
)
exp
(θ
2(t− s)
)
t∫
s
(
θ˜ cosh
(
θ˜
2(s− u) + κ(s)
)
exp
(
θ
2(s− u)
)
sinh2
(
θ˜
2(s− u) + κ(s)
) − θ exp ( θ2(s− u))
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− u) + κ(s)
)
− 2C(s; 0)
Λ
√
µ(s)2 − 1 sinh2 ( θ˜2(u− t) + κ(s))
)
du
(A.29)=
Γ
√
µ(s)2 − 1 sinh ( θ˜2(s− t) + κ(s)) exp ( θ2(t− s))
2C(s; 0)
− θΓ4αΣ sinh
( θ˜
2(s− t) + κ(s)
)
exp
(θ
2(t− s)
)
(
2
[ exp ( θ2(s− u))
sinh
(
θ˜
2(s− u) + κ(s)
)]t
s
− 4C(s; 0)
Λθ˜
√
µ(s)2 − 1
[
coth
( θ˜
2(s− u) + κ(s)
)]t
s
)
=
Γ
√
µ(s)2 − 1 sinh ( θ˜2(s− t) + κ(s)) exp ( θ2(t− s))
2C(s; 0) −
θΓ
2αΣ
− θΓC(s; 0) cosh
(
θ˜
2(s− t) + κ(s)
)
exp
(
θ
2(t− s)
)
αΣΛθ˜
√
µ(s)2 − 1
−
(
2αΣΛθΓ− Λθ2ΓC(s; 0)) sinh ( θ˜2(s− t) + κ(s)) exp ( θ2(t− s))
αΣΛ2θ˜2
√
µ(s)2 − 1 , (A.30)
where we used the fact that
µ(s)2 − 1 = 4C(s; 0)
2 + ΛθC(s; 0)− αΣΛ
Λ2θ˜2
(A.31)
in Equation (A.30). Using the addition formulae for hyperbolic functions and Equa-
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tions (A.26), (A.27) and (A.31), we obtain Equation (3.32).
Proof of Equation (3.39). Note first that C(·; 0) and thus µ is differentiable in (0, T ) and
that
C ′(s; 0) = C(s; 0)
2
Λ − αΣ. (A.32)
We compute
∂X¯
∂s
(t, s) = ∂
∂s
( Γµ(s)
2C(s; 0)
)
sinh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
exp
(θ
2(t− s)
)
+ ∂
∂s
( Γ
2C(s; 0)
)
exp
(θ
2(t− s)
)
cosh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
+ exp
(θ
2(t− s)
)( Γµ(s)
2C(s; 0) +
θ2Γ
2θ˜αΣ
)( θ˜
2 cosh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)− θ2 sinh ( θ˜2(s− t))
)
+ exp
(θ
2(t− s)
)( Γ
2C(s; 0) +
θΓ
2αΣ
)( θ˜
2 sinh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)− θ2 cosh ( θ˜2(s− t))
)
=: a(s) sinh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
exp
(θ
2(t− s)
)
+ b(s) cosh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
exp
(θ
2(t− s)
)
.
Furthermore,
µ(s)
C(s; 0) =
2
Λθ˜
+ θ
θ˜C(0; s)
,
∂
∂s
( µ(s)
C(s; 0)
)
= − θC
′(s; 0)
θ˜C(s; 0)2
= − θ
Λθ˜
+ θαΣ
θ˜C(0; s)2
,
∂
∂s
( 1
C(s; 0)
)
= − θC
′(s; 0)
θ˜C(s; 0)2
= − 1Λ +
αΣ
C(s; 0)2 .
Therefore (note again that θ˜2 − θ2 = 4αΣΛ ),
a(s) = − θΓ
2Λθ˜
+ θαΣΓ
2θ˜C(s; 0)2
− θΓ
2Λθ˜
− θ
2Γ
4θ˜C(s; 0)
− θ
3Γ
4θ˜αΣ
+ θ˜Γ4C(s; 0) +
θθ˜Γ
4αΣ
= − θΓ
Λθ˜
+ θαΣΛΓ
2Λθ˜C(s; 0)2
− Λθ
2Γ
4Λθ˜C(s; 0)
+ Λθ˜
2Γ
4Λθ˜C(s; 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= αΣΓΛθ˜C(s;0)
− θ
3Γ
4θ˜αΣ
+ θθ˜
2Γ
4θ˜αΣ︸ ︷︷ ︸
= θΓΛθ˜
= αΣΓ2C(s; 0)2
(Λθ + 2C(s; 0)
Λθ˜
)
= αΣΓ2C(s; 0)2µ(s),
b(s) = Γ2Λ +
θ2Γ
4αΣ −
Γ
2Λ +
αΣΓ
2C(s; 0)2 −
θΓ
4C(s; 0) −
θ2Γ
4αΣ +
θΓ
4C(s; 0)
= αΣΓ2C(s; 0)2
180
A.3. Detailed proofs for selected formulae of Chapter 3
and Equation (3.39) follows directly.
Proof of Equation (3.44). Note first that
µ′(s) = 2C(s; 0)
2 − 2αΣΛ
Λ2θ˜
.
Furthermore by Equation (A.31),
κ′(s) + θ˜2 =
µ′(s)
1− µ(s)2 +
θ˜
2
= 4C(s; 0)
2 − 4αΣΛ + Λ2θ˜2(1− µ(s)2)
2Λ2θ˜(1− µ(s)2)
= −4θC(s; 0)
2Λθ˜(1− µ(s)2) .
Thus,
∂C1
∂s
(t, s) = −Λθ˜2
(
κ′(s) + θ˜2
) 1
sinh2
(
θ˜
2(s− t) + κ(s)
)
= θC(s; 0)
(1− µ(s)2) sinh2 ( θ˜2(s− t) + κ(s)) < 0
as µ(s) > 1. Using the addition formulae for hyperbolic functions, Equation (3.44)
follows.
Proof of Equation (3.45). Note first that
µ′(s) = 2C
′(s; 0)
θ˜Λ
.
Let now
f(s) := µ(s) sinh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
+ cosh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
,
g(s) := Λθ˜ sinh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
+ Λθ˜µ(s) cosh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)− 2C(s; 0) exp (θ2(t− s)).
Using Equation (A.32), we have
θµ(s)C(s; 0)− 2µ(s)C(s; 0) + 4C(s; 0)C
′(s; 0)
Λθ˜
+ θ˜C(s; 0) = 2θ˜αΣ + (θ
2 + θ˜2)C(s; 0)
θ˜
θµ(s)C(s; 0)θ˜µ(s)C(s; 0)− 2C ′(s; 0) + θC(s; 0) = 2θC(s; 0) + 2αΣ.
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Thus, we are able to compute (note that sinh2(x)− cosh(x) = −1)
(fg′ − gf ′)(s) =
(Λθ˜2(µ(s)2 − 1)
2 − 2C
′(s; 0)
)
· sinh2 ( θ˜2(s− t))
+
(Λθ˜2(1− µ(s)2)
2 + 2C
′(s; 0)
)
· cosh2 ( θ˜2(s− t))
+
(
θµ(s)C(s; 0)− 2µ(s)C(s; 0) + 4C(s; 0)C
′(s; 0)
Λθ˜
+ θ˜C(s; 0)
)
sinh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
exp
( θ˜
2(t− s)
)
+
(
θµ(s)C(s; 0)− 2C ′(s; 0) + θC(s; 0)
)
cosh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
exp
( θ˜
2(t− s)
)
= −2θC(s; 0) + 2θ˜αΣ + (θ
2 + θ˜2)C(s; 0)
θ˜
sinh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
exp
( θ˜
2(t− s)
)
+
(
2θC(s; 0) + 2αΣ
)
cosh
( θ˜
2(s− t)
)
exp
( θ˜
2(t− s)
)
.
Equation (3.45) follows directly.
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Index of Notation
n number of assets
T time-horizon
N number of trading intervals
ti trading time
(Ω,F ,P) underlying probability space
ω, ωl, . . . elements of Ω
F = (Fti)i=0,...,N filtration reflecting the total information in the
market
F˜ = (F˜ti)i=0,...,N filtration reflecting the information of the in-
vestor
F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] filtration in continuous time
E expectation with respect to P
Et,x expectation conditional on portfolio position x
at time t
λ Lebesgue measure on [0, T ] or [t, T ]
P˜ (ti) fundamental asset price
P (ti) price at the primary exchange comprising the
price impact of the investor
(ti) increments of P˜
Σ(ti), Σ covariance matrix
α risk-aversion parameter
fi price impact function
Λ price impact matrix
D :=
√
Λ−1Σ
√
Λ−1
A > 0, A ≥ 0 A is positive respectively nonnegative definite
Γ adverse selection parameter
L liquidity bound
a(ti), b(ti) dark pool liquidity; supply respectively demand
pl probability of a specific “scenario” for multi asset
liquidation
Zl diagonal matrix with 1’s and 0’s on the diagonal
associated with scenario l
Mˇ := ∑l plZlMZl
Pˆ := ∑l plZl
M † Moore-Penrose inverse of M
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Index of Notation
p probability of execution for single asset liquida-
tion
κ(p) :=arcosh
(√
1−p
2
(
αΣ
Λ +1+
1
1−p
))
pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) n-dimensional Poisson process governing dark
pool execution
θi intensity of the Poisson process pii
θ := ∑i θi
θ˜ :=
√
θ2 + 4αΣΛ
ei i
th unit vector
τi i
th jump time of the Poisson process pi in [0, T ]
or [t, T ]
A(ti, X(ti)) set of admissible liquidation strategies in discrete
time
A˜(t, x) set of admissible strategies in continuous time
A(t, x) set of admissible liquidation strategies in contin-
uous time
R(·) implementation shortfall
J(·), J¯(·), J˜(·) cost functionals
f(·), f¯(·) running costs in continuous time
v(ti, x(t0), . . . , x(ti−1), X(ti)),
v(ti, X(ti)), v¯(ti, X(ti))
value functions in discrete time
v(t, x), v˜(t, x), v¯(t, x) value functions in continuous time
w(t, x) candidate value function in continuous time
(x(ti))i=0,...,N trading strategy in the primary venue
(y(ti))i=0,...,N trading strategy in the dark pool
(z(ti))i=0,...,N executed dark pool orders associated with
(y(ti))i=0,...,N
(x∗(ti))i=0,...,N optimal trading strategy in the primary venue
(y∗(ti))i=0,...,N optimal trading strategy in the dark pool
(z∗(ti))i=0,...,N executed dark pool orders associated with
(y∗(ti))i=0,...,N
X(ti) portfolio position at time ti associated with the
trading strategy ((x(ti), y(ti)))i=0,...,N
Xne(ti) optimal trading trajectory if no dark pool orders
have been executed before time ti
X¯(ti, tj) upper and lower bounds of the trading regimes
for optimal liquidation with adverse selection in
discrete time
A(ti) coefficient matrix for the optimal order in the
primary venue
188
B(ti) coefficient matrix for the optimal order in the
dark pool
C(ti) value function matrix
D(ti) :=C(ti)−C(ti)Pˆ Cˇ(ti)†PˆC(ti)
A(ti, p), B(ti, p), C(ti, p) respective objects for n = 1 and probability of
execution p
A1(ti, tj), A2(ti, tj) coefficients of the optimal order in the primary
venue for optimal liquidation with adverse selec-
tion in discrete time
B1(ti, tj), B2(ti, tj) coefficients of the optimal dark pool order for
optimal liquidation with adverse selection in dis-
crete time
C1(ti, tj), C2(ti, tj), C3(ti, tj) value function coefficients for optimal liquidation
with adverse selection in discrete time
ξ(t) trading intensity in the primary venue in contin-
uous time
η(t) dark pool order in continuous time
u = (ξ, η) trading strategy in continuous time
l end-costs parameter
l0, l1 lower bounds for the end-costs parameter
u∗(l) = (ξ∗(l), η∗(l)) optimal trading strategy in continuous time for
finite end-costs
u∗ = (ξ∗, η∗) optimal liquidation strategy in continuous time
Xu(t) portfolio position associated with the trading
strategy u
X∗(l, t) portfolio position associated with the trading
strategy u∗(l)
X∗(t) portfolio position associated with the trading
strategy u∗
X¯(t, s) optimal trading trajectory associated with a cer-
tain initial asset position
g(t, x) interpolation function
I˜ diagonal matrix with 1’s and 0’s on the diagonal
depending on whether θi > 0
C(l, t) value function matrix for finite end-costs
C(t) value function matrix for optimal liquidation
C˜ := diag
( θi
ci,i
)
C¯ := diag
( 1
ci,i
)
C(t; θ) value function coefficient for n = 1 and intensity
θ
C1(t, s), C2(t, s), C3(t, s) value function coefficients for optimal liquidation
with adverse selection in continuous time
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Index of Notation
µ(s) := 2C(s;0)+θΛ
θ˜Λ
κ(s) := arcoth(µ(s))
s ∧ t := min{s, t}
HJB equation Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
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